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Abstract
In Bolivia, indigenous women have contributed to President Morales’ and MAS
(Movement Toward Socialism) electoral victories and are exercising an emerging
influence on the government’s decisions on policy. This contrasts with their experiences
with failed policy efforts prior to the early 2000s, which presents an interesting puzzle for
social movement theories. These theories argue that the language of repertoires and
framing processes, resources of social movements, along with structural opportunities are
important causes of social movement success. Research on social movement outcomes is
needed to understand indigenous women’s changing relationship with society and the
government. As indigenous women’s influence on policy has scarcely been studied, and
only in relation to a few policy areas, this study broadens our understanding of the range
of social movements’ influence.
I conduct qualitative historical analysis of primary, secondary, and field research
data to test hypotheses about indigenous women’s social movements in Bolivia between
1994-2012. The empirical chapters investigate the impact of organizational, state, and
international variables on education reform, land reform, coca protests, domestic
violence, the Gas War, gas and food subsidies, and the territorial conflict in the TIPNIS
region. The major finding of this dissertation is that indigenous women need to confront
very open political opportunities with very high amounts of human capital resources–
especially women in leadership roles and strong networks—in order to have a significant
impact on policy outcomes.

v

List of Acronyms
CEDAW—Conference to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEDIB --Centro de Estudios Documentación y información Boliviano (Center for
Studies, Documentation and Information, Bolivia)
CEDLA—Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos (Center for Latin
American Studies and Documentation)
CIPCA—Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (Center for
Investigation and Promotion of Peasants)
CNMCIOB-BS—Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias
de Bolivia “Bartolina Sisa” (National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous, Native
Women)
CNMCB—Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia, “Bartolina Sisa”
(National Confederation of Peasant Women, Bolivia)
COB—Centro Obrero Boliviano (Central Workers of Bolivia)
CONISUR – Consejo Indígena del Sur (Council of Indigenous People of the South
CSUTCB—Confederación Sindical Unidad Trabajadores Campesinos Bolivianos (United
Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers)
ILO—International Labor Organization
IMF—International Monetary Fund
INRA—Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Agrarian Reform Institute)
MAS—Movimiento a Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism)
LPP—Ley de Participación Popular (Law of Popular Participation)
MNR—Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement)
NACLA—North American Congress on Latin America
NAFTA—North American Free Trade Agreement

vi

CNMCIOB-BS—Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias
de Bolivia “Bartolina Sisa” (National Confederation of Peasant, Indigenous, Native
Women)
OAS—Organization of American States
OMAQ Mujeres—Organización Mujeres Aymara Qyosullo
TIPNIS—Territorio Indígena y Parque Isiboro-Sécure (Isiboro Sécure National Park and
Indigenous Territory)
UMOPAR --Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje Rural (Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, Bolivia)
UN—United Nations
UNESCO—United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF—United Nation’s Children’s Fund
UNIFEM—United Nations Development Fund for Women
YFPB --Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (Bolivian Petroleum Company)
LAPOP—Latin American Public Opinion Project

vii

Table of Contents
Chapter I Introduction and General Information……………………..…………...............1
Introduction to the Study……………………………………………………...............1
Theoretical Foundations………………………………………………........................12
Conclusions…………………………………………………………….......................30
Chapter II Research Design: Data, Methods, and
Analysis………………...……….……………………………………..……..............34
Research Design………………………………………………………………..….….34
Data………………………………………………………………………...……...….45
Variables, Definitions, and Measurement…………………………...………………..53
Conclusions…………………………………………………...………………………59
Chapter III From ‘Exercising Voice’ to Leadership: Indigenous Women’s Mobilization in
Domestic and International Context, 1994-2012.………………………….…………….60
Organizational Characteristics: Resources and Frames………………...………….....60
The State: Ideology and Opportunity…………………………………………...…….81
International Forces 1994-2012…………………………………………….................94
Conclusions………………………………………………………………………….101
Chapter IV Struggles for Land, Literacy, Coca, and Justice: a Record of Indigenous
Women’s Mobilizing in the 1990s.………………………………………………....103
Coca Mobilization…………………………………………………………………...108
Education Reform…………………………………………………………………....116
Land Reform (INRA)………………………………………………………………..127
Domestic Violence…………………………………………………………………..138
Discussion and Conclusions…………………………………………………………145
Chapter V Interlude: Indigenous Women’s Social Movements 20002006............................................................................................................................152
Nationalization of Natural Gas………………………………………………………154
Conclusions………………………………………………………………………….171
Chapter VI Organizational, State, and International Influences on Policy,
2006-2012…….………………………………………………………………………...168
Gasoline and Food Prices……………………………………………………………173
viii

Land Reform Revisited……………………………………………………………...184
The TIPNIS Conflict…...………………………………………………………...…193
Discussion and Conclusions…………………………………………………………204
Chapter VII Organizational State, and International Influences, an Overview of the Past
Two Decades........………………...…………………………………………………….209
Organizational Resources…………………………………………………………....210
Organizational Frames……….…………………………………………………...…216
Political Opportunity Structures...………..….....….………………………...............220
Neoliberal Commitment…………………………….……………………………….224
International Influences…………………………….………………………………..230
Further Discussion and Conclusions...……………..………………………………..234
Chapter VIII Conclusion…..……………………………..……………………………..240
Contributions and Implications…………………………………………………...…240
Comments on the Study and Directions for Future Research...………….………….245
Conclusions……………………………………………………………………….....249
Works Cited…………………………………………………………………….............251
Appendix………………………………………………….……………………….........289
Vita………………………………………………………….…………………...……...292

ix

List of Tables
Table 1 Summary of Hypotheses…………………………………………………32
Table 2 Summary of Independent Variable Coding…...……....………………..102
Table 3 Selected Cases and Coding…………....………………………………..107
Table 4 Cases and Coding of Independent and Dependent Variables…..............151
Table 5 Selected Cases and Coding ……...........………………………………..153
Table 6 Selected Cases and Coding ………………….......................…………..172
Table 7 Human Capital Resources......…………………………………………..211
Table 8 Movement Frames………………………...........……………………....217
Table 9 State Political Opportunity Structure……………………….…………..221
Table 10 Neoliberal Commitment………..……………………………….....….225
Table 11 International Influences………….…………………………………….231
Table 12 Summary of Independent and Dependent Variable Scores…………...238

x

List of Figures
Figure 1 Economic Freedom Index Scores for Bolivia 1994-2011…………...……….93

xi

Chapter I
Introduction and General Information
Introduction to the Study
What political and organizational factors explain indigenous women’s growing
influence as political actors in social movements during the past decade in Bolivia?
While indigenous women have had a presence in indigenous movements for at least the
past thirty years, their ability to impact policy has truly only been evident since the
2000s. Their most impressive influences include changes like natural resource
nationalizations (gas and water) that occurred over protracted bloody struggles in the
early 2000s. Another notable influence includes their mobilization for Evo Morales’
presidential campaign, which significantly changed the course of politics in the country.
Women were at the forefront of most of these battles, and in subsequent years, they have
attempted to assert increasing influence over government policy in similar battles. This
contrasts with an earlier period of low access to political institutions and very low
influence over government policy. What are the actual steps taken from being a poor,
marginalized group of activists to becoming a strong group of activists that help shape
policy? Are marginalized groups in social movements more likely to change policy under
certain types of organizational and structural settings? Policy success and failure of
female indigenous women in Latin America presents important puzzles for questions of
democratization, identity politics, gender rights and especially, social movements. How
well do theories of social movements explain indigenous women’s surprising success in
influencing Bolivian political outcomes in recent years? I propose that a beneficial way
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of approaching this question is by investigating indigenous women’s mobilization and
outcomes during the last twenty years of important policy events or “policy moments.”
In many states in Latin America, the indigenous are a significant portion of the
population, and have a prolonged history of mixed outcomes in negotiations with
governments—from land redistribution programs, ejido arrangements, patronizing
cooptation, to militarized action in indigenous regions. The relationships between
governments, democracy, quality of democratization, and the mobilization of indigenous
people often illuminates the contradictions involved in the process of incorporating a
previously marginalized group into citizenship. Indigenous groups have become ever
more active in national politics, and their ongoing struggles with the state have taken on
new dimensions of organization and participation in democratic settings. Studies on
social movement outcomes are especially relevant to indigenous politics in Latin
America because indigenous peoples in the Americas have organized more through social
movements than political parties, corporate interest groups, or guerilla movements (Chase
Smith 1984; Brysk 2000). Social movements are also relevant because they have led to
the formation of political parties and electoral victories of indigenous candidates (Van
Cott 2000).
I accept a common scholarly definition of social movements: “persistent,
patterned, and widely distributed collective challenges to the status quo” (Darnosvky,
Epstein and Flacks 1995: vii; Brysk 2000:33). Scholarship identifies social movements as
distinct phenomena from other forms of representation and political activity because of
their combined use of collective action, identity, universal goals, and political orientation.
Moreover, “they generally seek to reshape state policy rather than hold state power”
2

(Brysk 2000:33). This chapter presents the background, theoretical questions and
literature addressing social movements and the hypotheses derived from them for the
purposes of researching the policy outcomes of indigenous women’s social movement
activity.
Research on social movements has questioned why social movements emerge,
which social movement strategies are chosen and why, and how social movements utilize
cultural components in society to achieve their goals. Among the impressive number of
studies of modern and historical social movements, the common motivations are to
explain the causes and consequences of social movements. The main research question of
this dissertation relates to the consequences of indigenous women’s mobilization to
policy outcomes. I focus on variables posited by other scholars to be important
characteristics of social movement organization in order to determine their impact on
indigenous women’s social movement outcomes in policy in Bolivia.
Scholars find a number of variables to be important for answering why and how
people participate in social movements, and what outcomes result from this participation.
The major findings of resource mobilization theorists point to material and human
resources as necessary components of creating and sustaining social movements
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; Foweraker 1991; Klandermans 1984). This perspective is
extended here to include how resources affect the achievement of indigenous women’s
social movement goals, as well as which resources are most important to their ability to
impact policy. Social movement political process or political opportunity approaches
(Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Tilly 1989;
Goodwin 1997; Tarrow 1998) have also posited a number of environmental factors that
3

influence social movement emergence and outcomes, including state political opportunity
structures and international influences like globalization. A significant portion of
literature drawing from the political opportunity approach points to the role of
neoliberalism as an important contributor to causes and consequences of social
movements (Nash 2005; Yashar 1999; Lavrin 1993; Bouvier 2009; Eber and Kovic 2003;
Gonzales and Kampwirth 2001). The changing status of neoliberal commitments and
openings within the political opportunity structures between 1994 and 2012 in Bolivia
allow theoretical reflection on the importance of these variables in affecting policy
outcomes. Related to political opportunity structures, many scholars have identified
various international norms, laws, and networks that play into, specifically, indigenous
movements in Latin America (Brysk 2000; Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000; Yashar 2005;
Rousseau 2011; Hernández Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, 2007; Kampwirth 2002, 2004;
Speed et al 2006). My research follows this cue and asks whether or not changing
transnational or international structures have a significant impact on indigenous women’s
policy outcomes. Both resource mobilization theories and political process theories are
considered structural perspectives, and such theories tend to answer questions related to
the emergence and endurance of social movements. The social-constructivist or framing
approach (Snow et al 2004; Davies 1999; Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992;
Alverez et al 1998) argues for extending analyses beyond structural explanations:
Participation in collective action depends not only on perceptions of structural
strain, availability and the deployment of material resources, and on the opening
or closing of political opportunities, or on a cost-benefit calculus more generally,
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but also on the way these variables are constructed and framed and the degree to
which they resonate with targets of mobilization. (Snow et al 1986)
This “new social movement” approach, coined in European social movement studies, has
largely concerned itself with the “how” of organizing, whereas structural theories are
more concerned with “why” (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2009). Framing
hypotheses have mainly been asserted to explain the emergence of social movements. But
I extend the logic of emergence to the outcome, positing that the frames related to
identity and the message sent to the “targets of mobilization” are likely to be relevant to
questions of how movements achieve goals. These components have undergone
significant changes in recent decades, providing significant insight into their movement
goals and tactics. Informed by advice from various scholars on the importance of
integrating these theories to further social movement research (Lucero 2008; Eckstein
2001; Foweraker 1999), I draw from these several strains of thought on social
movements. Together, these theoretical viewpoints are likely to present a fuller picture of
the factors that impact outcomes for indigenous women.
Following the theoretical guidance of social movement scholars, I ask how
organizational resources, activist framing, neoliberalism, political opportunities within
the state, and international influences structure indigenous women’s policy outcomes
during particular policy moments. I consider policy outcomes to mean the degree to
which indigenous women are able to get their preferences represented in policy. Policy
outcomes are conceived of as ending in success, failure, or a combination of success and
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failure for varied goals. Success relates to a concession, change in legislation, or other
means of incorporating indigenous women’s preferences into policy.1
Bolivia is an interesting location for studying indigenous movements because like
many states it has instituted constitutional provisions that protect rights, land, and
identities of indigenous people as part of the democratization process. But at the same
time, Bolivia, as with many states, engaged in multi-ethnic negotiations with indigenous
peoples while committing itself to contradictory neoliberal policies that have had
ambiguous consequences for indigenous communities and urbanized indigenous people
(Lind 2005; Nash 2005; Yashar 2005). Ongoing economic disturbances and increasing
economic internationalization have troubled indigenous communities, especially women,
while state capabilities to ameliorate “market failures” decrease under neoliberalism
(Lind 2005; Nash 2005; Yashar 2005). At its core, this research questions how
marginalized groups confront governments with demands for policies and assesses the
conditions under which they (do not) succeed in getting what they want, given the
economic, political, and social constraints they face.
The focus on indigenous women’s mobilization outcomes in Bolivia is
empirically interesting because it represents a period of change for a long-excluded
group, and because Bolivia is an illustration of many of the cultural, geographical, and
political tendencies in Latin America related to indigenous peoples. For many reasons,
we may not expect that indigenous women would be particularly effective in promoting
their interests to governments. Despite comprising great numbers, these women are one

1

The next chapter on data and methods provides the justification for these definitions.
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of Latin America’s most economically, socially, and politically marginalized populations.
But indigenous women do, in fact, organize in Latin America, and sometimes effectively,
for their own interests, for those of their entire communities, and for the whole of Bolivia
(Pacari 2002). They confront states with policy demands, and some are successful to the
degree that they achieve support from the public and government officials, and
ultimately, the passage of policies they want. What conditions bring about these
successes, and which bring about failure? What, in other words, makes for successful
organizing and outcomes for atomized groups within society? Given the history of
indigenous marginalization in Latin America, and especially the ethnic, linguistic,
economic and gendered dimension to indigenous women’s experiences, where they (fail
to) become empowered enough to affect policy, their experiences reveal much about
relationships between social movements and the state. This study will illustrate how the
nature of indigenous women’s social movement organizing affects their chances of
success in achieving policies that benefit their lives.
Intersectionality provides the conceptual lens that structures this project.
Important gender scholarship has contributed to furthering the understanding of the
divergent experiences people have based on the complex interactions of class,
race/ethnicity, and gender. Especially important is how these experiences shape political
phenomena in the comparative context or when explaining ethnic, linguistic and class
influences on gender politics (Burns 2007; Castillo 2006; Acosta-Belen 1993). This
investigation addresses the intersections of ethnicity and gender in assessing factors
influencing indigenous women’s outcomes. In essence, it is an effort to gain
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understanding of how and when ethnic minority women’s concerns are incorporated into
the policy-making process.
Bolivian indigenous women are an interesting focus for social movement studies
because they exhibit a lot of characteristics common to social movements that have been
identified by theorists on the topic. Like other social movements, indigenous women’s
movements are collective efforts to affect political outcomes, and like many social
movements of historical significance (i.e., the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S.) they
provide a venue for political participation for a group that has historically been shut out
of society and government processes. Their movements exhibit a lot of expected
characteristics like movement-specific frames, deployment of a range of resources to
varying consequences, and negotiation with structures (both organizational, state, and
international) for favored outcomes. Their movements are unique because they contain
complex gender ideologies, and because the ethnic component of their mobilization
entails not only a demand for civil and human rights but for the recognition of indigenous
identity, language, and autonomy. It is, therefore, unlike many social movements,
simultaneously a quest for inclusion and independence.
This movement is also relevant because indigenous women remain under-studied
in terms of social movements and gender studies. While the research on non-white
women’s activism has been fruitful, the intersectional perspective suggests further
avenues for improvement of this scholarship. For example, we need greater
understanding of non-Western notions of female empowerment. Bolivia’s examples show
how non-feminist mobilization for non-gendered interests has empowering potential for
women’s leadership in politics. In fact, many of the testimonies of indigenous women
8

referenced in this dissertation point to a seemingly paradoxical trait: women declaring
themselves non-feminist while pursuing goals of promoting women’s advancement and
equality in community, society, and the government. In addition, the complexities of
indigenous women’s identity formation and guiding philosophies warrant a focus to help
social movement scholarship grasp the meaning of activism and accompanying
outcomes. Indigenous women have carved out their own legitimacy and leadership that is
based on experience as women and follows a gender perspective they view as superior to
one that combats men for power. Struggles for fair food and gas pricing, land
redistribution, gas nationalization, territorial autonomy, and women’s reproductive rights
exhibit indigenous women’s ability to credibly speak about issues that affect “women’s
responsibilities.”
My research also focuses on indigenous women because they are an unlikely
group to achieve success in most policy areas, given that in Latin America, all women are
underrepresented in politics. Therefore, where triply marginalized indigenous women are
able to overcome structural, individual, and societal obstacles to organization, their
experiences may have much to instruct on social movement organization success. The
focus on policy success is one way to measure the outcome of social movement
organization. In focusing on such concrete outcomes, certain nuances may be overlooked,
including the impact of social movements on the future movement, on people’s current
ideologies, and other social impacts. But in terms of identifying substantive, clear wins
and losses of a social movement effort, policy influence is concrete and contains
identifiable processes that illuminate how indigenous women figure into policy-makers’
calculations.
9

This research connects various relevant theoretical traits of social movements
with successful or unsuccessful policy outcomes for indigenous women. An integrated
theoretical approach is essential in uncovering certain realities present in a cursory survey
of the events in Bolivia since the mid-1990s. Between then and now, several variables of
theoretical import have shown significant changes. During the 1990s, mobilization about
mainly indigenous issues utilized moderate resources and faced partially open political
opportunity structures. These factors contributed to moderate results for indigenous
women’s mobilization efforts; especially notable is that efforts to pass indigenous
women-specific legislation were unsuccessful. Organizations since the 2000s seem to
have access to more impressive resources, the state has become decidedly more open
since 2005, and neoliberal influence is dramatically lower than in earlier periods. The
post-liberal period has witnessed more impressive successful mobilizations ignited or
supported by indigenous women’s movements. I investigate which variables among the
changing composition of organizational, state, and international variables contribute to a
more successful post-liberal period. The integrated theoretical approach highlights the
interaction of cultural and structural variables, which is key to the research presented
here, since it is unlikely that resource mobilization, political opportunity, or
cultural/framing approaches capture all of the variables of interest on their own.
The primary method of inquiry is a structured-focused comparative case study
that analyzes eight different cases of indigenous women’s mobilization, broken down into
ten separate policy moments. Policy process tracing is used to fill in causal linkages
between the variables in this dissertation. This approach allows a comprehensive view of
the policy process by looking at social movements’ influence on various types of policy
10

outcomes while breaking down policy events to assess causation between variables. My
study facilitates tests of social movement hypotheses in indigenous women’s movements
as well as the less-studied aspect of social movements and policies (but see Meyer and
Rochon 1997; Whittier 2004 and Kolb 2007; Amenta and Caren 1999). I ask questions
related to specific policy influence of indigenous social movements, in order to add to the
existing knowledge of the political, social and cultural impacts of indigenous social
movements and social movements in general.
Recent research has applied social movement theories to indigenous women’s
movements, focusing on important aspects of their organization that affect the
momentum of these groups (Rousseau 2011; Radcliffe et al; Clisby 2006; Andolina et al
2002; Hernández Castillo and Elizando 1996; Sierra 2001; Kampwirth 2002, 2004;
Hernandez Castillo 2003; Richards 2004; Speed, Hernández Castillo, and Stephen 2006;
Oliart 2008). Some of this research addresses indigenous women’s effects on land
policies in Bolivia and other countries (especially Deere and León 1998; Deere and León
2001; Deere and León 2002; Deere and León 2002a). But to date, no systematic study
has been put forth that deals with a selected span of cases from different policy arenas in
an attempt to draw larger conclusions. This study will grant insight into the causes of
social movement outcomes for Bolivia’s indigenous women, and may have important
academic and practical lessons for indigenous women and marginalized peoples’ social
movements in other states. I aim to contribute to the literature by forming a comparative
study that identifies the combinations of variables correlated with social movement
policy outcomes. In addition, it contributes to the literature on social movements by
testing the theoretical value of the variables identified by the literature in a difficult case
11

setting. Also, in focusing on policy outcomes, it fills in gaps in our understanding of how
and when social movements make an impact on policy. Finally, the attempt to integrate
most of the major theoretical approaches to the study of indigenous women’s movements
provides an opportunity to find out if an integrated approach can broaden our analytic
understanding of such movements.

Theoretical Foundations
The following sections identify the major theoretical perspectives informing this
research, and I hypothesize generally that social movement organizational resources,
frames, state opportunities and neoliberalism, and international influences condition
indigenous women’s success/failure in influencing policy. This section presents the
organizational, state, and international features that influence indigenous women’s policy
outcomes.
Organizational Features of Social Movements Influencing Indigenous Women’s
Policy Success
Various theories explain the emergence and, to some degree, the success of social
movements. I have arranged various theoretical features into two categories of structural
(resources) and cultural (frames) organizational features.
Resources
The research mobilization approach represents a fundamental step toward
answering the question of why and how social movements emerge, and this is a step in
the direction of understanding their consequences. In simple terms, social movements
emerge and change based on the nature and quantity of their resources. The resource
mobilization perspective attributes social movement emergence to expanded personal
12

resources, professionalization of leadership, and external financial support (McCarthy
and Zald 1977). The main purpose behind early theorizing in this area was to reconcile
the expectations from rational choice theory of collective action with reality. According
to rational choice theory, people would rarely be able to overcome “free rider” problems
and act in pursuit of one common goal (Olson 1971). Therefore, to explain the emergence
of strong collective action movements, scholars rationalized that those resources
mentioned above helped overcome these problems and lead to social movement
organization. While the research mobilization approach rarely stands alone as an
explanation in social movement theories, it still remains an essential foundation of the
theories, because as Foweraker identifies (1991), successful movements must have
resources—particularly organization and leadership—in order to make strategic choices
to achieve goals (16). Another important resource claimed in the resource mobilization
approach is the access of the movement to broader social networks (Klandermans 1984:
583, 588). Indigenous women’s numbers, their leadership in the movement, networks,
and financial resources will likely play a role in their ability to organize effectively in
favor of their cause, though other variables are also quite important. I hypothesize that
human capital resources like numbers participating in the organization’s activities,
networks, and women in positions will positively impact indigenous women’s policy
outcomes.
Networks as a Resource
The role of networks warrants its own discussion as a potential resource variable.
In addition to the resource mobilization approach discussed above, there is a significant
amount of work that emphasizes the role of networking as an important variable in
13

constructivist/framing theories (Gordon and Jasper 1996, Snow, et al 1986) and political
opportunity approaches (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tarrow 1983; Meyer 1993). There is
also a significant amount of work that takes a comprehensive view of networking as the
main variable in social movements (Diani and McAdam 2003; Klandermans 1993;
Shentov 2003) and some work that addresses networks with indigenous movements in
particular (Lucero 2008). Within this viewpoint, networks with other social movements
have both opportunistic, resource, and cultural theoretical relevance.
The links that social movement organizations have with external groups may have
positive or negative effects on movement organizations. Negative effects include defining
the movement’s goals (Shentov 2003: 217), competing for resources (Rojas and Heaney
2008; Olzak and Uhrig 2001), and losing resources to a large network movement by
means of “spill out” (Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Rojas and Heaney 2008). But an
important reference to how networks increase organizational resources is still quite
common (Powell and Friedkin 1986; Shentov 2003: 217; Gordon and Jasper 1996: 164;
Rojas and Heaney 2008). Networks are thus viewed as part of the resource portfolio of
indigenous women’s movements. Since they comprise a minority status population on
more than one dimension, the nature of their networks and potential alliances with other
sectors and social movements is likely to be a very important resource. Do the
networking tendencies (such as who forms the network) vary depending on issue, and
how? When indigenous women’s goals are not aligned with any other sector (and stand to
benefit only indigenous women), what options for networking are available? Can
networks have negative consequences? This connection between goals and networking is
an important link in the study of social movements. Indigenous women’s social
14

movement networks, weak or strong, combine with other human capital resources like
presence of women in movement leadership and numbers in participation to create high,
low, or moderate amounts of resources.
Indigenous Women’s Resources
Various authors have drawn conclusions about the role of resources—especially
networking and women’s leadership-- in contributing to indigenous women’s policy
outcomes. Various researchers have shown, for example, how women in the Zapatista
struggles have taken advantage of resources through transnational and national
movements (Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, 2007; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006;
Rousseau 2011). This activity has created opportunity for the “consolidation of women’s
spaces in male-dominated indigenous organizations and for the emergence of indigenous
women’s own networks” (Rousseau 2011: 10). Lucero (2008) highlights the role of
networks within the state as an important determinant of success for indigenous
movements in Ecuador and Bolivia, as social movement organizations have become key
actors in current networks of representation in Latin America. However, Brysk (2000)
argues that the approach does not fully account for the observed outcomes across
countries in Latin America. She argues that because of indigenous marginalization and
obstacles to international projection of language, transport, funding, and state sanctions,
indigenous movement outcomes (in her case, internationalization), are not explained well
by resource mobilization (Brysk 2000: 37). Something more than resources, in other
words, accounts for indigenous women’s success in Latin America. This latter point is
important, since it highlights the recurring interactions between organizational, state, and
international variables that greatly shape outcomes. Brysk’s qualification is noted.
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Resources that include high amounts of numbers within organizations, strong networks,
and a higher presence of women in leadership positions are hypothesized to be associated
with successful policy outcomes, depending on other variables, especially the position
taken by the state on any particular issue. On the other hand, the absence of these
variables is expected to contribute to failure for indigenous women’s policy goals. This
research aims to clarify the role of resources for marginalized groups in social
movements by studying their relevance to indigenous women’s outcomes.
Frames
Some scholars argue that a cultural or cognitive understanding of individual and
mass perceptions of social movement goals is important to social movement formation
and change. Framing scholars ask how language, culture, and meaning affect social
movements, and have determined that collective action frames are important for
providing diagnostic and prognostic solutions and motivation for mobilization (Snow et
al 2004; Davies 1999; Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992). But social movements
use frames to achieve other goals as well. As Caniglia and Carmin (2005) write:
In particular, they use them as a means to bridge or connect to potential members,
to amplify and clarify their existing views and beliefs as well as to shape the
beliefs of others, to extend their frame so that it is salient to a broader audience,
and to transform the way the organization is perceived either by integrating new
views or replacing those that already are present (Caginlia and Carmin 2005:
205).
Because the role of assigning meaning is an important factor in social movement
theory, the language or frames issued by activist indigenous women should have an
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impact on current and potential supporters and the larger public. These elements are
important to why social movements emerge, but these same elements (shaping public
opinion and recruiting of members and supporters) may also affect the decisions
governments make in policy. The cultural/cognitive viewpoints can be read to expect that
successful frames will be those that successfully incorporate the necessary organizational
frames of mobilization to produce broad public support and gain new activist support.
Based on their marginalized status, I would expect that frames reflecting goals of the
larger public to be more successful than those that emphasize gendered or ethnic frames.
Given the extremely marginalized status of indigenous women in Bolivia, I expect
networks and public opinion to play an important role, thus increasing the importance of
broader language that appeals to more sectors for support. Ethnic and gender-centric
frames, therefore, are expected to contribute to less favorable outcomes for indigenous
women’s policy.
Indigenous Women’s Frames
The frames of social movements define movements, and create the meaning that
inspires supporters and participants to sympathize with the movement’s goals (McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Rousseau 2011:8; Caginlia and Carmin 2005). For indigenous
women, this meaning derives from their cultural identity as key agents for preserving and
reproducing the community, and is an important emphasis of their political activities
(Cadena 1991; Radcliffe 2008; Rousseau 2011). Exploring how this identity translates
into mobilization is an interesting exploration of the role of frames in social movement
research.
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Various scholars argue for the need to examine indigenous movement identities.
Rousseau (2011) argues that the intersectional viewpoint highlights the need to
distinguish between social positioning and Andean group identities; while various groups
might be represented under an overarching classification (such as “Aymara”), the group
expression of identity may or may not reflect that diversity (8). This idea can be taken
further by exploring to what degree identity in frames represents goals of the indigenous
or of the larger public. The idea that framing of issues matter to the emergence and
support indigenous movements receive is supported by Brysk (2008), who points out that
framing and identity politics is an important part of explaining why people get involved
in politics, but also in understanding how social movements change politics (35). While
they empower members and raise public consciousness, identity-based movements can
change political institutions and behavior (Brysk 2008: 35). This viewpoint articulates
that social movement cultural components affect political outcomes, and informs my
hypothesis that indigenous women’s frames affect policy outcomes.
Lucero (2008) notes a divergence between framing approaches, one (the master
framing approach) suggesting that leaders and their opponents are engaged in a contest of
meaning production, and one in which each side seeks to situate the struggle within a
particular narrative or master frame (Lucero 2008: 16). As Lucero (2008) and other
scholars note, the new social movement perspective places less emphasis on the agency
of movement actors (or how the collective action problem is solved) and focuses on
cultural codes and the constitution of collective identities and the discursive power of
movements (Melucci 1994; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998). Lucero (2008) suggests
that both are crucial to a comparative understanding of political indigenous voice and
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finds that the framing perspectives have been successfully used to explain indigenous
identity and the question of how class identities were transformed into ethnic ones (16).
There are many reasons to expect the relationship between language and outcomes to be
complex. Indigenous women may choose to articulate their gendered, ethnic demands or
make broad public appeals to achieve their goals. In addition, there are different
recipients of every message (participants, potential supporters), so that indigenous
women’s organizations face the challenge of balancing indigenous identity with the quest
for public support. Also, the possibility exists that indigenous and gendered language
could be more important to building group solidarity than to appealing to the larger
sectors of society, and thus contribute to success. Another, more idealistic possibility is
that indigenous and gendered identity and language would not need to be compromised
because the population had begun to recognize indigenous women’s social and political
legitimacy in their own right.
The reality is that although cultural and framing scholarship has deepened our
perceptions of the importance of these variables, the evidence has not truly led to solid
expectations of how they impact outcomes. From the master framing perspective
identified above, we may assume that the group that managed to “master the public
dialogue” would be the “winner” of policy outcomes. But is that always the case, and,
besides, who wins the challenge to master the dialogue, and how? The “discursive power
of movements” view gives some insight into how framing may matter, but a lot of
questions remain. For instance, who is involved in the discourse and who needs to be
influenced by it to matter? This dissertation takes a hopeful step in the direction of
making more concrete connections between frames and outcomes. Drawing from the
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framing literature about the importance of appealing to larger segments of society, I posit
that non-gendered and non-ethnic (broad) frames are likely to be more successful than
those that emphasize the gender and ethnicity of the participants in social movements.
This hypothesis assumes that indigenous identity may need to be downplayed to win the
support of other members of society and achieve social movement goals.
State Characteristics
Social movements are of central importance to modern political systems as a force
for change, but the state and the political environment are often neglected in research on
social movements as an important causal variable in this process of change (FernandezKelly 2006 and Shefner 2006). Jenkins and Klandermans (1995) argue that success is by
and large a product of the political environment, and that “the state is therefore
simultaneously target, sponsor, and antagonist for social movements as well as organizer
of political system and arbiter of victory” (3). These considerations are especially
significant to this research, which focuses on policy victories as the outcome of interest.
The State Political Opportunity Structure
In factoring the state as a crucial explanatory variable in assessing social
movement outcomes, this dissertation contributes to scholarship that has assessed the
impact of social movements on public policy and political opportunities as measurable
outcome variables (e.g., Meyer and Rochon 1997; Whittier 2004 and Kolb 2007; Amenta
et al 1999).
My research argues that the opportunity structures (Tarrow 1983; Tilly 1978)
represented by the state and other contexts affect the chances for indigenous women’s
success in achieving favorable policy outcomes. Tarrow’s major arenas of political
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structure will affect indigenous women in terms of policy: openness of formal political
access, stability of alignments within the political system, and the availability of strategic
posture of potential alliances (Tarrow 1983: 27-33). Several scholars branch off from
these three main areas of opportunity to include state organization, cohesion and
alignment among political elites, the state of political parties (Jenkins and Klandermans
1995), the nature of relationships between the state and its citizenry (Goodwin 1997), and
the state’s ability to repress its citizens (McAdam 1996: 29). Indigenous women’s policy
efforts encompass most of these main areas of influence for policy success to occur,
including the position of alignments within the system, the formal opening of
opportunities within the state, alliances with other groups, and the state’s potential for
repression. Drawing from the political opportunity perspective, political opportunity
structural openings will make policy success more likely for indigenous women.
But my hypotheses of social movement outcomes diverges from the political
opportunity and structural approaches because I view the components of organizations as
important variables that must combine with state features to produce outcomes. While the
political opportunity approach argues, for example, that changes in organizations’
“repertoires of convention” result from changes in the political structure (Tilly 1989;
Tarrow 1998), drawing from the cultural and cognitive approach, I argue that changes in
organizations may also occur independently and in turn, manipulate state structural
opportunities. Thus, the expectation that political opportunity structures will be important
is tempered by the expectation that these variables interact with other organizational
variables to produce social movement outcomes. In addition, this dissertation will
provide information as to whether the political opportunity structure influence is
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overstated in its presumed ability to change organizational features such as frames. If
changes in organization are evident before changes in structure, then we may have a more
nuanced understanding of how social movements interact with the government. There
may, in fact, be a feedback mechanism wherein social movements and the state influence
each other. This dissertation hopes to shed light on this issue as well.
To summarize, the literature indicates that several features of the state are
influential in the degree of success or failure of indigenous women’s policy demands.
Generally, I hypothesize from the political opportunity perspective that political openings
within the state can generate more successful policy. In short, the operating theory
relating to features of the state is that the role of state opportunities are among the most
influential contextual variables on policy decisions, and that these combine with
organizational and international features to influence successful policy outcomes.
Indigenous Women’s Political Opportunity Structure
Many scholars have investigated how state political opportunity structures affect
indigenous social movement mobilization and success (Albó 1991, 1994, 2002;
Gustafson 2002; Lucero 2003; Pallares 1999; Van Cott 2000 Yashar 2005; Zamosc 1994;
Lucero 2008). While most of these studies identify the causes of mobilization and various
measures of success (from political party formation to influence on particular policies),
several scholars indicate that structural opportunities should be viewed in light of other
important variables in order to gain a full understanding of their impact.
For example, Lucero (2008) emphasizes political opportunity structure as a cause of the
rise of powerful indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador, but argues that state
political opportunity and cultural components matter to his independent variable (Lucero
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2008: 14-15). Looking to factors outside the state, Brysk (2000) finds that “although state
structures do play some filtering role in the form of movement mobilization, state
strength and capacity do not seem to adequately explain the impact of the movement”
(referring to Bolivia), but she does comment that democratic openings coincide with the
resurgence of indigenous rights movements (37). Similarly, Yashar (2005) advocates for
an approach that identifies structural causes for indigenous movements across Latin
America, but states that these are likely to present an incomplete picture of ethnic
political movements. She argues that transnational politics matter in combination with
state politics and organizational characteristics.
In addition, various scholars conduct cross-national studies of collective action in
Latin America, finding that institutional arrangements –including neoliberal institutions,
party institutionalization, weakening institutions, and electoral institutions—have strong
impacts on the political opportunity structure and the emergence of social movement
protest (Yashar 1999; Van Cott 2001, 2003; Van Cott and Rice 2006; Arce 2008, 2010;
Arce and Mangonnet 2012; Machado et al., 2009). For example, Van Cott and Rice
(2006) find that among other contextual variables, electoral variables like district
magnitude and the age of the political party affect indigenous party performance crossnationally (725). In addition, while Machado et al., (2009) find that Latin American states
with weak institutions are more likely to experience collective action protest, Arce (2008,
2010) and Arce and Mangonnet (2012) find electoral competitiveness in weak
institutional settings may curb protest. While the institutional research informatively
addresses the political opportunities involved in different aspects of social movement
mobilization, it has not addressed how these political opportunity structures align with
23

different policy outcomes. Studying Bolivia contributes to the institutional literature by
studying a case of weak institutions and their interaction with social movements in
policies. I therefore assess different levels of opportunity as suggested by the data on
political opportunities over time in order to determine whether, as hypothesized, open
political opportunity structures coincide more commonly with success or failure.
Neoliberalism, Leftist Leadership
The degree to which a state is committed to orthodox or heterodox economic
policies is believed to influence policy success among indigenous women. The next
sections investigate the roles of globalization, neoliberalism, and leftist leadership as
having possible separate impacts on the rates of policy success as well. These differences
are due to components of neoliberalism and leftism that transcend economics, and entail
significant political cultural effects that influence policy success among indigenous
women.
The issue of neoliberal economics touches on issues discussed elsewhere in this
research, including international influences and the influences of leftist leadership.
Economic crises have had a profound effect on the ability of government to meet the
needs of emerging voices, and developmental strategies (many of which originate from
modernization philosophy) have affected the survival and resources of indigenous regions
and women (Langer 2003; Yashar 2005; Jacquette 2006; Deere 2001). As Jacquette
(2006) points out, as Latin America follows the prescriptions of the IMF and the World
Bank for development, social spending is limited, regulations on private capital are
reduced, and incomes of the middle class and those below it suffer tremendously (27, 36).
Therefore, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that states with a stronger commitment to
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neoliberal economic policies will produce less policy success in the areas commonly
challenged by indigenous women. On the other hand, where states are rolling back
neoliberal economic policies, instituting nationalization projects, or pursuing other
heterodox economic efforts, policy success in these areas should be more evident for
indigenous women.
Related to the role of neoliberalism is the role of leftist leadership. Especially in
Latin America, where neoliberal reforms have produced uneven results, the twenty-first
century has seen a resurgence of leftist politics in the region. The left has a long history
of identification with indigenous and women’s claims, even if it has not always been a
genuine one (Blofield 2009; Bouvier 2009; Rice and Van Cott 2006). Leftist
governments’ association with more egalitarian gender, class, and racial outlooks lead to
the expectation that indigenous women’s policies will receive more favorable treatment
under such leadership. In light of much of the recent activities in Bolivia, we might even
conclude that leftist leadership is one of the more powerful predictors of success in policy
arenas promoted by indigenous women. Thus, I hypothesize that declining neoliberal
commitments and the rise of leftist leadership will be associated with positive outcomes
for indigenous women’s policy efforts.
Neoliberalism and Indigenous Women
Various scholars of indigenous movements document the conflicts and
inconsistencies between the goals of national citizenship within neoliberal regimes and
indigenous autonomy, which inevitably affect policy toward indigenous groups across
Latin America (Nash 2005, Speed 2006, Kellogg 2005, Yashar 1999, Lavrin 1993,
Bouvier 2009; Chong 2007; Eber and Kovic 2003; Gonzales and Kampwirth 2001).
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Yashar (1998, 2005) suggests that the combination of political liberalization, neoliberal
economic reforms, and pre-existing social networks served to trigger the politicization of
indigenous identity Latin America. She argues that economic integration and
neoliberalism create the conditions for protest by threatening economic livelihoods,
national sovereignty and/or cultural boundaries. While she finds a positive correlation
between neoliberalism and the rise of indigenous movements, when her logic is applied
to policy outcomes, my dependent variable, I expect the relationship to be negative. This
is a natural expectation if the policy outcome in question is one that opposes
neoliberalism; neoliberal governments may give rise to action, but the likelihood of
achieving success is low under neoliberal commitments. The expectation is that even
causes that do not oppose the neoliberal design should fare poorly under neoliberal
government due to the mainstreaming tendencies of neoliberalism (Clisby 2006) and a
presumed preoccupation with economic over social issues.
In the effort to understand the changing relationships between states and social
movements in the context of neoliberalism, it is helpful to understand how neoliberalism
impacts the rise and organization of social movements. But in terms of understanding the
full consequences of neoliberalism, it is necessary to understand further how social
movements’ ability to impact policy is impeded or aided by neoliberal commitments.
While Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru have all experienced ethnic
uprisings against neoliberalism, the outcomes of these uprisings vary widely from the
Zapatista’s failed attempts at influencing policy to Bolivia’s surprising indigenous victory
over neoliberal governments (Yashar 2005). Clearly, some other factor or factors
contribute to the outcome of activism aside from the outrage and mobilization against
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neoliberalism. This research thus tests the hypothesis that neoliberal commitments will be
associated with less favorable outcomes than leftist commitments by the government. The
analysis attempts to expand out knowledge of the effects of economic policies on actual
policy outcomes that matter to social movements.
International Influences
Various international factors may have positive or negative effects on indigenous
women’s goals. Much scholarship has focused on the role of economic
internationalization or globalization and international law. There are reasons to believe
that the degree of international integration with the global economy would decrease the
resources available to indigenous women that might aid in their attempts to gain policy
success. But a reading of the international economic literature relating to the role of
international trade provides conflicting evidence. One possibility is that increased
exposure of indigenous women to international firms, NGOs, and even their piece work
for MNCs can increase networking and other material and human capital resources that
assist them in overcoming hurdles to collective action (Razavi 2009; Castillo 2006; Lind
2002). In addition, in non-economic matters, various other scholars point to the role of
international law and norms in aiding indigenous women in mobilization (Brysk 2000;
Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Yashar 2005; Rousseau 2011;
Hernández Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, 2007; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006).
Thus, I hypothesize that indigenous women’s policy outcomes will be positively
impacted by international support.
However, much evidence points to the effects of globalization in increasing
pressures on indigenous women in terms of fewer opportunities for work and, ostensibly,
27

opportunities for political participation. Related to globalization, neoliberalism has
involved massive cooperation between governments and international lending institutions
like the IMF, whose influences often run counter to mass preferences (Rakowski 1994;
Oliveira and Roberts 1994; Postero 2008; Perreault 2006). Fernandez-Kelly (2006) takes
an even darker view of the role of globalization, arguing that,
Globalization is therefore more than an economic trend aimed at maximizing
capital gains through the transfer of production from advanced to less developed
countries—it is also a political strategy that atomizes and weakens labor forces in
various locations. (7)
Based on this reading of the role of international factors on social movements, I
hypothesize generally that international factors creating a supportive environment for
indigenous women will increase their chances of policy success, but significant
international opposition will decrease their ability to achieve favorable policy outcomes.
However, this hypothesis is conditioned by the expectation that international structural
forces are expected to interact with framing, organizational, and other state-level
structural factors to produce outcomes in policy.
International Influences on Indigenous Organizing
Scholarship on indigenous communities has emphasized international factors
responsible for the politicization of ethnic identity and the rise of indigenous rights
movements and political parties (Brysk 2000; Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000; Yashar 2005).
Brysk (2000) argues that internationalization has a number of influences on social
movements, to include external alliances and leverage, as well as the normative basis and
cultural impact of internationalization. Yashar (2005) argues that the rise of indigenous
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movements is aided by international influences. Globalization contributes to the rise of
ethnic movements by creating a “transnational civil society” and provides networks,
resources, information, and funds that were previously inaccessible to these groups
(Yashar 2005: 16). The role of globalization increases the ability to create international
norms and ideas about human rights, indigenous rights, and environmental rights, among
others. “These ideas shape self-understandings and legitimate the demands of new social
movements, including ethnic-based movements” (Yashar 2005: 16). Other scholars cite
international law and norms as an important source of indigenous women’s recourse in
Latin America (Rousseau 2011; Hernández Castillo 2003; Sierra 2001, 2007; Kampwirth
2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006). Thus, the findings of scholars point to two potential roles
of international influences on policy outcomes. Globalization or economic
internationalization is equated with a rise in social movement activity, but I argue that
this factor has a negative outcome on policy, because globalization and international
influences create divergent goals between states and indigenous women. The other view
of globalization is that it creates important norms and laws that also increase indigenous
women’s mobilization, and I expect that these also increase the chance of positive
outcomes. To reiterate, the hypothesis that international support increases the chances of
success for indigenous women may be conditioned by state alignment on the issue
supported or opposed by international influences. The analysis presented contributes to
the literature on transnational movements by identifying the conditions under which
international influences impact indigenous women’s outcomes in policy.
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Conclusions
The above theoretical discussion posits several explanations for indigenous
women’s mobilization and resulting policy success or failure. I focus on the
characteristics of several different cultural and structural facets affecting indigenous
women’s mobilization: resources, frames, opportunity structures, neoliberalism, and
international influences. In choosing these variables, I consult resource mobilization and
political opportunity approaches within the structural paradigm, along with framing and
cultural approaches. The framing literature’s references to culture, identity, and potential
supporters indicate that where indigenous women use broad reaching and non-gendered,
non-ethnic frames, greater policy success will be present. The structural approaches
emphasize that organizational factors unique to the social movement will be important,
including the resources utilized to pursue policies. A higher presence of indigenous
women in the movement leadership, strong networks, and large numbers in participation
are expected to contribute to their success. In addition, external structural factors,
including the political opportunity structure of the state, the commitment of states to
neoliberalism/leftist leadership, and international support or opposition also work to
increase/decrease indigenous women’s chances of achieving their policy goals.
Social movement scholars have suggested an integrative approach between
cultural and structural accounts (Lucero 2008; Eckstein 2001; Foweraker 1999). As
Lucero (2008) identifies, an integrated approach should include political opportunities,
state and international impacts, and cultural understandings from both master framing and

30

constructivist framing approaches to explain indigenous politics (15-16).2 Other scholars
(Yashar 1998, 2005; Radcliffe, Laurie and Andolina 2002, 2005, 2004) also provide more
integrated insight into the emergence of social movements, linking transnational features
of the movement and organizational characteristics like framing and identity formation.
Lacking in the expanding research on ethnic movements in Latin America is a
cultural/structural/transnational approach that systematically assesses conditions of
indigenous women’s policy outcomes. This research into indigenous women’s policy
efforts therefore builds upon the value of studies that assess policy outcomes in one arena
using cultural, resource, or structural explanations. It also applies the integrated approach,
which has been used more to explain the emergence of indigenous social movements in
Latin America than their success. In general, this analysis potentially deepens our
understanding of the role of political opportunity structures, organizational
characteristics, and international effects, which need to be explored more fully in the case
of indigenous women’s movements. To achieve these analytical goals, I test the
hypotheses listed in Table 1.

2

Master framing refers to the methodological individualism of the rationalist view of
competition between political actors to create meaning for a group. Discursive
approaches focus more on identity-construction and the “discursive power of
movements” (Lucero 2008:16).
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Hypothesis
Hypothesis
1

Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses
Relationship
Higher amounts of resources will contribute to successful
policy outcomes.

Hypothesis
1a

Higher numbers in protesters and members will contribute to
successful policy outcomes.

Hypothesis
1b

Strong networks with other social movements, society, and
government will contribute to successful policy outcomes.

Hypothesis
1c

Higher amounts of indigenous women in leadership positions
in the larger indigenous movement will contribute to successful
policy outcomes.

Hypothesis
2

Frames that appeal to broad sectors of society will contribute to
successful policy outcomes.

Hypothesis
2a

Broad, non-indigenous frames will contribute to successful
policy outcomes.

Hypothesis
2b

Non-gendered frames will contribute to successful policy
outcomes.

Hypothesis
3

State structures creating opportunities for indigenous women
will contribute to successful policy outcomes.

Hypothesis
3a

Opening political opportunity structures (especially state
reforms) will contribute to successful policy outcomes.

Hypothesis
3b

Strong neoliberal commitment will contribute to failed policy
outcomes.

Hypothesis
4

Supportive international influences will contribute to
successful policy outcomes.
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The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I present the
data, methods, and analytical strategy undertaken to evaluate my hypotheses. Chapter 3
identifies the values of the important independent variables under analysis in this
dissertation, revealing the coding of organizational resources, frames, state political
opportunities, neoliberalism, and international support or opposition. Significant
differences in independent variables are evident over the three time periods investigated
in this study. The values established for these variables provide an important piece of the
analytical framework for future chapters. Chapter 4 presents the results for the period of
1994-2000, the neoliberal period, outlining the findings from qualitative historical
analysis and process tracing, and connecting the independent and dependent variables to
assess the power of the hypotheses developed in this chapter. Chapter 5 summarizes the
results for the interim period between the neoliberal period and the post-liberal period
during the Gas War between 2003 and 2005. Chapter 6 analyzes the effects of
independent variables on the outcomes of policies during the post-liberal period. Chapter
7 assesses generally how the hypotheses perform when the time periods are compared,
and makes overall generalizations about the possible lessons for other social movements.
Chapter 8 concludes the research with a summary of findings, major implications and
contributions of the dissertation, and directions for future research.
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Chapter II
Research design: Data, Methods, and Analysis
This research uses a case study design that analyzes theoretically important
determinants of indigenous women’s policy outcomes over the course of the last eighteen
years. The overarching investigative technique is qualitative historical case study
analysis, making use of structured, focused comparisons and process tracing of different
policy outcomes between 1994-2012. The unit of analysis for this research is the policy
outcome associated with a given goal of indigenous women’s mobilization. The cases
include several policies in Bolivia, and include the outcomes of indigenous women’s
policy efforts during the neoliberal era, a brief period of transition (2000-2005), and what
is termed the “post-liberal” era (Yashar 1999). I trace the possible causes of policy
success and failure by assessing outcomes at different values of the independent variables
to test the relationships posited by my hypotheses.
This chapter presents the research methods and data used to test the hypotheses
about the role of organizational, state, and international characteristics in indigenous
women’s policy outcomes. The first section outlines the overall strategy for the research.
The next section discusses the data gathering and reporting techniques employed for the
study. The final section presents the basic rules for measurement and analytical strategies
used to test my hypotheses.

Research Design
Methods
To test hypotheses regarding the impact of organizational, state, and international
variables on indigenous women’s policy efforts, I conduct comparative historical analysis
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of policy outcomes at various moments in individual policies. As Mahoney and
Reuschemeyer (2003) point out, case studies are seen as crucial elements to building the
knowledge needed for generalizations as well as understanding the nuanced, pathdependent nature of historical progression and “causal chains.” The use of case-centered
detailed analysis provides the best opportunity to gain leverage on the intricate causal
mechanisms at work in policy results. While broader generalizations may not be possible,
this approach does allow for potential applications of these analytical lessons to Latin
American countries where indigenous women’s social movements are significant.
Additional generalizations about the role of structures and organizational characteristics
in policy outcomes for marginalized groups will also likely follow from this study.
Finally, Bolivia’s former experience in neoliberal politics may extend to the current
neoliberal governments and social movements in other countries in Latin America.
The use of case study methods is also important because, though significant in
population, many obstacles exist to collecting reliable, large-N quantitative data on
indigenous women that can answer how their social movements impact policy. Also,
case-based designs are useful in situations confronted in this research—including the
problem of multi-conjunctural causality—which scholars point out can be confronted
only through the rigorous contextual analysis of specific cases (George and Bennett
2005). As Ragin states, “in general, attention to complexity is justified whenever it is
argued that a certain historical outcome… or set of similar outcomes … is historically or
culturally significant in its own right and demanding of social scientific interpretation”
(Ragin 1987: 23). I argue that indigenous women and policy success are the types of
phenomena cited by Ragin as candidates for case study. Bolivia stands as an important
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historical example because of its large indigenous population and because of the recent
shift in power toward certain indigenous people in the country. In addition, case study
analysis provides the opportunity to investigate important interactions between political
actors in certain policy arenas (George and Bennett 2005), and is therefore beneficial to
the range and scope of issues I address here.
The methods proposed herein are ideal for testing theories of social movements
because they can explain variation over time within Bolivia on the important independent
and dependent variables. In addition, I supplement the analysis with a process tracing
approach that increases the number of observations and further identifies important
causal pathways, as illustrated by George and Bennett (2005), Goldstone (2003), and
Blatter and Blume (2008). George and Bennett (2005) also argue that the “use of process
tracing does well with cases that exhibit multiple causes” (207) and that contain
interacting causal variables that are not independent of each other. Process tracing may
provide insight into path-dependent processes, in which the identification of key decision
points is a necessary step in establishing the “causal pathways” toward an outcome
(George and Bennett 2005: 212). The complexity of the decision-making process, one of
my main points of interest in this study, is a case of multiple causation, in that many
different interactions occur during the legislative or policy-making process. Identifying
causes requires analysis of sequential events, guided by the hypotheses posited herein
regarding state, international and organizational influence on indigenous women’s policy
outcomes. Reviewing the course of events leading up to an important policy moment
(successful and unsuccessful) will also increase leverage over the question of how
outcomes are correlated with levels of resources, types of frames, political opportunities
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in the state, neoliberal commitments, and international support/opposition. Given the
“intersectional” view of causes of indigenous movement success, which in essence, posits
that multiple points of “identity” and oppression are important contributors to outcomes,
the concern over multiple causes increases (see George and Bennett 2005: 161). Process
tracing of policy may help to unpack these multiple causes and their intersecting nodes of
influence.
Case Selection
The unit of analysis is policy outcome, and several individual cases of policy
outcomes are studied within the country of Bolivia. I select the country and set of policy
outcome cases based on their ability to provide sufficient variance on the important
independent variables, applying ordinal or ranked coding to the independent and
dependent variables. The identification of probable correlations between causal variables
and indigenous women’s policy outcomes is the goal of this research. This makes
investigation of a range of variables necessary in order to assess whether lower/higher
values on certain independent variables are associated with differences in policy
outcomes. Some interactions, like policy outcomes in Bolivia, are inappropriate for
making deterministic causal inferences because multiple layers of influence and
interactions between variables must be simultaneously considered (Mahoney 2000:393).
Social movements engage several types of actors in society, the state, and the globe,
make various demands, and experience a wide range of responses to their movements.
This makes probabilistic assessments of the cases and their outcomes more reasonable
than eliminating potential causes for social movement success. The probabilistic
approach is also preferred for Bolivia and the policies chosen because the dependent and
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independent variables yield outcomes that are not dichotomous (Mahoney 2004: 84).
Bolivia and its accompanying cases are selected for the range of values on organizational
resources, organizational frames, political opportunity structure, neoliberalism, and
international influences. Individual cases also are chosen to represent a wide range of
issues that are important at local and national levels, so they are likely a good sample of
the types of demands indigenous women made on their government during the respective
time periods.
The analytical goal of this project is to test the hypotheses suggested by the
established literature in a relevant illustrative case setting. Bolivia is an example of such a
case, first, because events there signify a growing amount of indigenous social movement
influence. Indigenous people equal over half of Bolivia’s total population according to
World Bank reports (2012), but they have had to overcome centuries of apartheid-like
oppression. Bolivia also contains elements of a “machista” culture that creates tensions
between women’s interests and the state, which makes it a difficult setting for indigenous
women to succeed. Other countries experience indigenous mobilization, indigenous
political party representation, and indigenous female mobilization. But since the 2005
MAS and Evo Morales’ electoral victories, social movements, indigenous men and
women, have an unprecedented amount of leverage in government affairs compared to
indigenous groups in other parts of Latin America. Indigenous women’s emergent power
has occurred along with organizational and state structural changes that have been posited
by social movement theories to impact outcomes. These include changes from neoliberal
to socialist-leaning governments, an indigenous party leadership, and increases in
resources for indigenous women’s organizations. Bolivia has also had a changing
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relationship with international influences, including other countries and international
organizations. The case of Bolivia gives the opportunity to study these structural changes
as well.
Also interesting is that Bolivia’s return to democracy was relatively new when
this study begins—little more than a decade after the return to electoral democracy in
1982. The gradual incorporation of indigenous women, largely through their social
movement ties, into democratic consolidation processes is documented by this study.
Further, while weak institutions and government instability have been connected to the
dominant role of social movements in democratic Bolivia and Latin America (Arce 2012;
Van Cott 2005), we need a clear understanding of how social movements work within
these weak institutional structures to influence policy. Bolivia is thus an ideal setting for
studying the role of social movements and institutional changes at various stages in
democracy.
Policy moments in the past two decades of Bolivia’s history provide an interesting
setting for other reasons. Given the changes in the independent variables between 1994
and 2012, the three identified time periods in Bolivia present a comparative view of three
different “Bolivias,” politically speaking. Each of these periods experiences variance on
the independent and dependent variables in this research. Further, indigenous women’s
movements in Bolivia represent a hard case for success as theorized by social movement
theory because they traditionally have lacked many of the items theorized to be
important, including resources, responsive government and society, and open political
opportunity structures. Their struggle to gain voice in this historical context provides an
interesting setting to test social movement theories.
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Social movement theories need to be tested to verify if they stand in this
(indigenous women’s) instance of social movement mobilization if we are to maintain an
evolving sense of how social movements can shape the outcomes of politics. This
understanding requires an intersectional perspective that seeks explicitly to explain how
social movement theories operate within a framework of overlapping subalternate
identities. The selected cases highlight these intersections by analyzing indigenous and
non-indigenous networks, indigenous women in leadership within the larger indigenous
movement, what their language of activism represents, and how they relate to the larger
public in their evolving goals. These characteristics vary by time period and by case.
The range of cases within Bolivia cover indigenous-centered issues such as
bilingual education reform, land reform, territorial autonomy in the TIPNIS region, and
coca. The case selection also extends to issues of importance to larger sectors, including
domestic violence, gas nationalization, and the pricing of food and gas. These differences
allow us to determine whether such goals draw from different sets of resources, create
different frames, or confront different structural barriers, and whether these affect the
ultimate outcome. Different time periods thus have provided a cross-section of different
mobilization goals and policy arenas. The cases are representations of typical issues of
importance and offer a significant range of values on the independent and dependent
variables to facilitate hypothesis testing. Also, by analyzing time periods separately, I am
able to observe whether hypothesized relationships hold across two cases of protracted
struggles.
Indigenous women’s gender-specific goals were not successful in the neoliberal
period, although indigenous community goals fared well, along with non-ethnic gendered
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efforts in favor of a domestic violence law. This dissertation explains the difference
between indigenous women’s disappointing outcomes on one hand, and indigenous
community and women’s successful outcomes, on the other. Indigenous women have
also been successful in achieving gendered land policy in the post-liberal period, but not
during the neoliberal period, and so organizational, state, and international factors are
examined to determine their role in these outcomes. In addition, while indigenous
women faced better circumstances in the post-liberal period, when they exerted influence
over nationalization of gas and land reform, the TIPNIS territorial conflict ultimately
denied the goals of indigenous and women’s activism. In another instance of post-liberal
disappointment, indigenous women’s attempts to resolve gas and food crises obtained
mixed outcomes. These differences are examined to determine what factors combined to
influence these outcomes. Also important, this analysis spans several years of conflict
over the nationalization of gas and land reform and highlights how policy over one issue
can be affected by changes in international and political opportunity structures. In
summary, this set of cases provides perspective on a wide variety of policies, different
types of goals, the influence of time and changing structures on outcomes, and significant
changes within two policy arenas. These cases highlight the influence of changes in
organizational, state, and international factors, and, taken as a whole, allow the ability to
estimate the reach of indigenous women’s influence on government by investigating their
activities under varied structural and organizational arrangements.
The case of coca is selected for study because it represents an important effort of
indigenous women to influence policy on an issue that received significant state and
international opposition. Indigenous women’s participation expanded in the coca era
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(1990s), but still used non-gendered, non-ethnic frames and made use of moderate
amounts of human capital resources. State opportunity structures and international
features are important obstructing variables, and the case of coca provides insight into the
way these variables function. Thus, coca provides a good test of the hypotheses about the
role of organizational variables, but the emphasis is on external variables, including
international and state influences.
Agriculture reform (1994 and 2006) provides an extended view of the attempts by
indigenous women since the 1990s to ensure more equitable land distribution to
indigenous people and to indigenous women. Indigenous women used moderate human
capital resources and broad frames while ignoring gendered needs during the first phase.
They employed very high human capital resources and made use of stronger ethnic and
gendered frames during the second phase. The political opportunity structure was
partially open during the first phase, very open during the second phase, and international
influences supported the measures during both phases. The outcome of agriculture reform
in the 1990s was mixed, while the outcome in the post-liberal period was highly
successful. These instances present a relevant assessment of the role of organizational
resources, especially leadership and networks, and the impact of state structural
opportunities.
The case of bilingual education reform (1994), like the first phase of agriculture
reform, offers a chance to view the outcomes of non-gendered, ethnic claims and broad
frames. Human capital resources, as with the case of education reform, were moderate,
and this gives an opportunity to view the level of success associated with moderate
resources. The political opportunity structure, similar to the first phase of agriculture
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reform, was partially open, and the influence of neoliberalism and international factors
was strong. The outcome, as with the first phase of agriculture reform, was mixed,
representing an important victory for community, but not for indigenous women’s
gendered needs. The case of education reform is an important test of organizational
frames, as well as social movement resources, particularly the role of networks and
indigenous women in leadership within the movement.
The domestic violence law (1995) involves the opportunity to view indigenous
women’s activism that does not relate to indigenous people, but to women. Utilizing
broad, gendered frames, and pooling large amounts of human capital resources,
indigenous women confronted a partially political opportunity structure and a supportive
international environment. The outcome associated with these variables was success. This
case is very important in terms of studying the role of networks under partially open
political opportunity structures, and the role of social movement resources because of the
interaction between indigenous women’s organizations and broader women’s
organizations.
The Gas War (2003-2005) provides three separate “policy outcome moments”
that span two time periods, the period between neoliberalism and post-liberalism, or the
transition phase, and the post-liberal era. The three outcomes present a relevant use of
high amounts of human resources, strong ethnic, gendered, and broad frames, open and
closed political opportunity structures, different levels of neoliberal commitment, and
international opposition. Using similar frames as those exhibited throughout the Gas War,
deploying very high amounts of human capital resources, and under similar political
opportunity structures and minimal neoliberal commitment, indigenous women were able
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to exert less power over policy than during the final phase of the Gas War. This
dissertation investigates the reasons behind the difference in outcome between the cases
of failure and the final outcome on the case of gas nationalization. The Gas War is
especially important to testing the hypotheses about the importance of state structure,
weak and declining neoliberalism, and international opposition.
The protests erupting in early 2011 over the government’s decision to end
gasoline and food subsidies was led by indigenous women in neighborhood associations.
Utilizing the same frames as women during the Gas War, deploying a similar amount of
resources, but facing a partially open state political opportunity structure, the protests
resulted in mixed outcomes for indigenous women. While their first demand as a social
movement was met, their remaining demands were lost among negotiations between their
allies and the government. The case of gas subsidy protests gives important theoretical
leverage over the networks and resources variables, along with the state variables,
providing important tests of the hypotheses in this dissertation.
Finally, the case of the TIPNIS conflict, which involves a smaller group of
indigenous people living in territories protected by the constitution, results in failure.
Using high human resources, voicing gendered, ethnic frames, confronting a political
opportunity structure closed to the topic, and a supportive international environment,
indigenous women have failed to achieve their preferred policy outcome to end the
construction of a highway through native ancestral villages located in the TIPNIS region.
This case thus presents an interesting illustration of the role of state structure,
organizational characteristics, and to a lesser degree, international influences.
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Data
This dissertation makes use of secondary and primary source analysis,
supplemented with field research data. I test hypotheses about the role of organizational,
state, and international characteristics affecting indigenous women’s policy outcomes.
Secondary data include various types of scholarly research. I consult comparative
studies of indigenous movements in the Americas, political geographical surveys,
political anthropological accounts of various locales, and especially political and
sociological ethnographic research conducted in Bolivia. These sources comprise about
one-third of the data used for this project and were located through academic journals and
books during an intensive inter-disciplinary review of major work done on indigenous
people, and especially indigenous women, in Bolivia. Comparative studies and other
social science projects about the indigenous are valuable in that they give voice to a longsilenced, marginalized group in Latin America whose accounts are lost in many broad
histories of Bolivia. These studies provide social movement data at subnational as well as
national levels. Where researchers are not in agreement with the significance of a
particular event or policy (which was rare), I use news data and publications from social
movements, non-state and state organizations to determine if there is more empirical
support for one or the other scholar’s assessment. In the rare cases of disagreement, I rely
on the more widely accepted view among scholars. Relying on other researchers’ data
from the past means that I may be observing specific types of cases instead of all types of
cases—for example, those protests that make the national agenda or those which succeed.
To compensate for this potential issue, I include in my analysis many documents from
NGOs and social movement organizations that operate in a regional capacity to determine
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whether there are serious discrepancies between indigenous women’s goals in local and
national organizing. Where discrepancies are found, the reasons for them are discussed,
giving a richer view of indigenous women’s activism. The more plentiful, national-level
information remains very useful since indigenous women’s ability to achieve a national
agenda for their issues, given their marginalization in society, is unexpected and worthy
of investigation. Scholarly analyses are coded based on their categorizations of
organizational frames, resources, state political opportunity structures, neoliberalism, and
international influences.
Aside from analyzing other researchers’ assessments of variables, a large part of
the qualitative data comes from newspaper articles from the period of 1994-2012. To gain
perspective on indigenous women’s political participation over time, I reviewed, selected,
and translated various international and domestic news sources for the entire time
period.3 I rely heavily on the use of articles from the La Paz-based newspaper El Diario
for the period between 1994 and 2000 due to limited availability of microfilm and time
limitations in locating alternate sources. Newspaper articles from international sources
covering indigenous women’s issues were located through Internet searches for general
and topic-centered phrases suggested by El Diario (i.e., “agriculture reform and women
in Bolivia”). Unfortunately, the international coverage of Bolivian women’s issues is
limited during this time frame, so I rely heavily upon scholarly research and the
newspaper for data. I read every ninth daily newspaper from the periodical El Diario in
Bolivia from the years 1995-1999, choosing all articles that referenced indigenous

3

Unless otherwise specified, all translations, including quotes and paraphrasing of
articles, interviews, and scholarly work, are those of the author.
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women’s mobilization or the issues about which they were mobilizing. For the time
period from 2000 through 2012, more varied domestic news sources relevant to this topic
are available from El Diario, El Deber, La Razon, Los Tiempos, and La Prensa as well as
smaller online publications. These newspapers cover a larger range of ideological
viewpoints. This portion of the analysis is further supplemented by international news
coverage of Bolivia from Al-Jazeera, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Latin
American and Spanish news sources such as El Mundo and El Diario Internacional, and
U.S. news sources including more center and left publications like The New York Times
and Green Left Weekly. The search for material was conducted with the intent to gather
information from any news source that reported on an event selected through an initial
time-line building search. The reason for this approach is that I seek to build the analysis
around the stated goals of indigenous women’s movements, so I surveyed any news
report or news video clip containing a quote or reference to explicitly-stated goals by
indigenous women activists. In a second stage, I sought articles about the state’s response
to fill in information not found during the first search related to how the government
responded to important mobilizations. These articles are cross-referenced and catalogued
based on their topic of mobilization, the statements of indigenous women, statements of
officials, and discussion of any elements relevant to the hypotheses about organizational,
state, or international characteristics. To find material about indigenous women’s
mobilization, I relied upon keyword searches within newspaper archives and scholarly
search engines (Google, Googlescholar, Bing) to identify reports that outlined events in
which indigenous women were involved. Many of these search examples were derived
from the initial data gathering of microfilm news articles, during which I was able to
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hone in on relevant journalistic terms. Examples of the keywords used to locate articles
included variations of “indigenous/native/peasant women’s activism/protest,” and after
identifying the relevant policies for this study, phrases like “indigenous/native/peasant
women and the price of food and gas,” “indigenous/native/peasant women and gas
nationalization,” or “indigenous/native/peasant women and land rights.” Because the
second period of analysis involved a change in news sources and search method, I
duplicated the original search method using the newspaper El Diario during the years
2000 and 2003, two important years of indigenous women’s activism, in order to assess
the reliability of the newer search method. I drew similar conclusions about general
events from the analysis of El Diario as from other news sources, granting a reasonable
amount of confidence in the Internet search method. However, it stands to be noted that
the Internet search returned a greater volume of materials directly related to indigenous
women’s organizing than did manual searches during any period. Each of the news
sources consulted in this dissertation contains their own political biases,4 but the reliance
upon a broad range of sources—journalistic and academic—helps keep this tendency in
check. Each news source is more or less in agreement with the chain of events on topics,
even if interpretations (which are disregarded) vary. Since I investigate event reports,
and public rhetoric of officials and activists, ideological concerns are less of a concern
than the potential for omitting important cases. Reviewing the social science work about
that time period allows for some alleviation of the concern about case omission. Articles
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The national and available Bolivian periodicals tend to be center-right, while the
international, domestic, and online sources are more left-leaning,
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are coded based on characteristics or statements reflecting organizational, state, and
international characteristics affecting social movements.
Because I find a strong amount of agreement among primary and secondary
sources, particularly in the period of the 1990s when the diversity of news sources is most
limited, I am confident in the quality of information being analyzed. I supplement these
national perspectives from news reports and secondary sources with the local
perspectives of indigenous women activists obtained from social movement5
publications. These publications were accessed through Internet searches, online
publications of indigenous women’s proposals, and organizational websites. Again, focus
was on the CSUTCB (Syndical United Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia),
OMAQ Mujeres, and especially Bartolina Sisa. Searches for such documents were
conducted using keyword searches that included organizational names and important
political issues gleaned from newspaper and scholarly analysis. Where possible, I used
the Internet website “Waybackmachine” (archive.org 2013), which has archived
“captures” of old updates to websites. Using this tool, I was able to gauge what issues
were posted as important to indigenous women’s organizations at various times since
their website went online. Unfortunately, no indigenous group’s website went online
before the early 2000s, but some early goals from the 1990s were still reflected in the
materials on their websites. These data are some of the most valid assessments of the
properties of indigenous women’s activism, but are less plentiful than other sources of

5

Examples include the National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous, and Native
Women of Bolivia, Bartolina Sisa (Bartolina Sisa) OMAQ Mujeres (Organization of
Aymara Qullasuyo Women) and Mujeres Contra Violencia (Women Against Violence).
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data. It is used with field research data, where possible, as a dominant means of drawing
conclusions about indigenous women’s goals, concerns, and obstacles. As with secondary
and news data, I code these documents based on which variables are evident and what
values they indicated on state organizational features, state characteristics, and
international influences.
In addition, I incorporate information from various government documents and
legal analyses as well as data collected from international organizations, online news
sources, and websites of various NGOs and indigenous women’s activist organizations,
with a special emphasis on the most widely known group, Bartolina Sisa.6 Also included
are NGOs like UNICEF, UNIFEM, FoodFirst, Access to Land and Right to Property of
Women in Bolivia (supported by Habitat for Humanity), Center for the Promotion of
Women, Bolivia, CIPCA (Center for the Investigation and Promotion of Peasants),
OMAQ Mujeres (Organization of Aymara-Qullasuyo Women), Bolivian Women Against
Violence, and CEDLA (Center for Studies and Latin American Documentation), among
others. Among international organizations, I consulted the websites and documents of the
United Nations, ILO, and Economic Commission on Latin American and the Caribbean.
State and government organizational documents included those from the CIA Factbook,
the United States State Department, Bolivian government archived documents (i.e., the
constitutions and legal code), and documents from other Bolivian government agencies
such as Mujer Coordinadora (Women’s Coordination). I located this information through
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The most influential women’s organization in Bolivia is named after national heroine
Bartolina Sisa, wife of the famed anti-colonial insurrectionary who was executed in 1781.
Thereafter, Bartolina continued to lead natives against the Spanish colonizing forces until
her execution in 1782 (Bartolina Sisa 2011; Morales 2009).
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Internet keyword searches, through reading scholarly references to important documents,
and through browsing government and nongovernmental sites using keyword searches in
archives (where possible). These data are translated, analyzed, and coded by international
support for indigenous women’s issues, state structural opportunity openings or closings,
levels of organizational resources, and changes in organizational frames.
Field research data draws from observation of social movement organizational
activities and interviews with female indigenous movement participants and social
movement leaders. This experience facilitated collection of pertinent data related to
important variables influencing policy success. During June-July of 2011, for twelve
days, I observed the daily activities of the Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Indigenous
Native Women (“Bartolina Sisa” hereafter) in La Paz, Bolivia. The organization’s base
serves not only as a location to conduct official business, but also a meeting point for
women who travel together during daily “commutes” from surrounding areas, especially
El Alto, located 45 minutes away by car. The base also serves as a general socialization
location, and women come and go throughout the day, passing news, gossiping, arguing,
knitting, and chewing coca leaves. Many conversations and meetings fluctuated between
Spanish and Aymara, but the informal nature of the meetings made it possible for one of
the local administrative assistants to give me rough translations (a task she accepted
cheerfully). My observations of the Bartolina Sisa are the product of sitting in the
cramped main meeting room for four to six hours daily, watching women come and go
and conduct their organizational duties at the base.
I also conducted two focus group sessions, and seven informal interviews with
women who attended meetings and served in various capacities in the organization. The
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participants in these activities ranged in age from twenty-one to approximately sixty
years old, which roughly mirrored the age range of the organization’s membership.
Further, the participants in focus groups and interviews represented both rural and urban
communities (Buice 2011). Focus group sessions involved 15 women in one session, and
13 in another. The timing of the focus group was arranged during a regular mid-day
socialization time, when women were not too busy with official business or with their
work outside of the organization. During this time, I asked general questions about the
organization and individuals’ goals, the main policy efforts in which they were engaged,
and how they viewed the organization’s role within the new government. My Spanish
questions were, half the time, answered in Aymara, after which other group members
translated in Spanish (my questions did not seem to need translation). I assigned
pseudonyms to participants for anonymity and kept brief journal notes throughout the
sessions and rigorously wrote field journals in the evenings after the sessions. These
observations are coded by their characterizations of the relevant independent and
dependent variables.
Interviews were obtained by references from the executive secretary and from
other voluntary participants, who have been kept anonymous for ethical reasons. Of the
seven, three of these were elected leaders (ejecutivas) from their locales or provinces, two
were administrators for the organization based in La Paz, and three identified themselves
as “general participants” within the organization. Interviews were unstructured,
questions were open-ended, lasted anywhere from 15 minutes to an hour and a half, and
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were conducted in the respondent’s and the interviewer’s second language of Spanish. 7
Interviews were hand-written and transcribed in English, and later coded to reveal the
interest or issue mentioned, whether women experienced an opening political opportunity
structure, any organizational characteristics, international influences, or any unanticipated
themes they mentioned as significant. In addition to this data are relevant observations
gathered during six weeks in the city of La Paz, during which time I became acquainted
with various female indigenous street vendors, security guards, neighbors, and the like,
which assisted me in understanding the culture and the general political perspective of
non-activist people.

Variables, Definitions, and Measurement
Dependent Variable
For the purposes of this dissertation, policy moments at points in time are the
units of measurement and the policy arenas covered include a wide array of indigenous
issues and concerns affecting the larger society. The main dependent variable of interest
is the policy outcome for various policies during the 1990s and 2000s in Bolivia. I define
policy success as any outcome that constitutes momentary or lasting success for the
proponents of specific policies, including but not limited to temporary concessions,
litigation, constitutional provision, or legislative outcomes. My coding of policy
outcomes is drawn from Gamson’s (1975) identification of collective action “success”
(the specific type of outcome in which I am interested) as being linked, in part, with

7

Bilingualism is more common among indigenous women who travel to La Paz than in
other parts of the country, so linguistic differences during interviews were not
problematic.
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material outcomes. 8 Other researchers have identified different types of movement
success, to include agenda acceptance, agenda access, policy victories, output response,
and structural changes (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995:12). Similar to these scholars, I
conceptualize success as a change in policy in response to challenges that are either
proactive (pursuing “new advantages”) or reactive (preventing “new disadvantages”)
(Gamson 1975: 29). Other scholars in the bourgeoning literature on social movement
outcomes have expanded Gamson’s original definition of success to include social
movement effects on future mobilization and cultural outcomes (Burnstein et al 1995;
Staggenborg 1995). In essence, scholars have expounded upon the idea of assessing
social movement outcomes, but policy success or failure is the chosen dependent variable
because this allows more concrete measurement than cultural, societal, and future
outcomes. The expanded conceptualizations of movement success are necessary and we
may benefit from making a directed investigation into various influences they have on
society, the state, other movements, and future mobilization. Yet societal, government,
and future mobilizations will still likely involve policy at some level. While these various
characterizations of social movement outcomes are evident throughout this dissertation,
my focus is on the basic dimension of policy change.
Indigenous women’s success in Bolivia warrants a deep inspection into all of
their potential impact points in society. An important first step in that direction involves
the understanding of social movement interactions with the state and how they effect

8

The author identifies more than one measure of success for social movement activity,
including participatory rewards, material gains, and cultural or discursive gains. I focus
on material gains in this dissertation.
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change on state policy. Policy outcomes are coded successful if a policy, portion of a
policy, or manner of implementation of policy that coincides in time and in content with
items identified by indigenous women as goals of their movement. I define policy failure
as a situation where indigenous women’s claims fail to get addressed in policy outcomes.
But policy outcomes are also sometimes mixed at various points in the policy process;
allowing a mixed coding gives deeper insight into diverse types of outcomes of social
movement activity. To summarize, if a case achieves the majority of the social
movement’s expressed goals, then it is coded as a success. If a case does not achieve any
or most of its expressed goals, then it is coded as failure. If a case has success for a
significant number of its expressed goals but a significant number of goals remain unmet,
then the case is categorized as a mixed outcome.
Organizational Characteristics
My first hypothesis states that high amounts of social movement resources are
likely to increase the chances of success for indigenous women’s policy efforts. High
numbers of participants, strong networks with influential actors and social movements,
and high levels women’s leadership in the indigenous movement will increase indigenous
women’s chances of success. I use the variables relating to social movement resources to
measure participation strength in numbers, networks/public support, and women in
leadership in social movements. These variables assess the importance of the resource
mobilization approach (Foweraker 1991, McCarthy and Zald 2003) in predicting policy
success for indigenous women. To measure human capital resources, or the numbers of
people and organizations engaged with a particular policy arena, I examine scholars’
assessments of the numbers of people engaged in protests led by indigenous women, as
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well as the numbers of organizations or sectors that comprise the human capital support
in these protests. I measure the strength of networks for indigenous issues by following
the assessments of Latin American indigenous specialists. I measure the estimated
number of women in leadership in social movements (also shortened to women’s
leadership) using a wide variety of indigenous scholarship that comments on intraorganizational gender dynamics. These three dimensions of resources are “averaged”
together to determine the overall level of human capital resources used in a particular
case. For example, if a case exhibits high numbers of participants, enjoys strong networks
and public support, and more women have assumed leadership positions in the
indigenous movement, human capital resources are coded as very high. If, on the other
hand, one or more elements of resources are lacking, but other dimensions of resources
are high, then the case is coded as high. If the case exhibits low or moderate values on
more than one dimension, but exhibits a high value on the other dimensions, then it is
coded as moderate. The chapters reflect both the individual coding of these variables as
well as the overall human resource variable coding.
I posit that broad, non-ethnic, and non-gendered frames will be associated with
indigenous women’s successful policy pursuits. I assess the importance of the variable
relating to frames of indigenous women’s social movements to determine whether
broader-stated frames that include more of society than indigenous or women are more
likely to achieve policy success. Frames refer to the language used at various points in the
attempt to influence policy. This language can include slogans, types of public speech,
and symbols that define the social movement to the public (Benford and Snow 2000;
Davies 1999). Sometimes different types of frames overlap within cases, and at times
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they are exclusive. The data are coded as containing ethnic, broad or (non) gendered
frames, or a combination of frames. For example, the framing may be ethnic, gendered
(EG), ethnic, non-gendered (ENG), broad, gendered (BG), broad, non-gendered (BNG),
and at times, ethnic, broad and gendered (EBG) and more rarely ethnic, broad, nongendered (EBNG). The specifics of how each case is coded are revealed in the case study
chapters.
State Characteristics
This research assesses the role of organizational, state, and international variables
on the chances of policy success among indigenous women. The third hypothesis of this
research posits that opening political opportunity structures will be associated with policy
success for indigenous women, while political closures will be associated with less
successful outcomes. I assess political opportunity structure opening or closing within
the state and its relevance to policy success among indigenous women. Political
opportunity structure refers to openings or closings within the state that can produce
opportunities for social movements to increase access and influence (Tarrow 1983: 2733). Political opportunities pertaining to state structure that are relevant to indigenous
women’s movements include decisions or actions of the government, policies, or laws
that affect the opportunity for women to engage in political activity that influences
policy. I expect to find that an overall open political climate related to the indigenous is
likely to increase policy success. Data are coded based on whether they indicate a closed,
partially open, open, or very open political opportunity structure.
I also hypothesize that decreasing neoliberal commitments (and increasing
leftism) increase indigenous women’s chances of success. I use the variable neoliberal
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commitment to measure a country’s commitment to free market, capitalist policies and
austerity programs associated with capitalism. Based on the literature, I expect that
neoliberal commitment will be an impediment to policy success among indigenous
women. This variable captures as well the degree of leftism in a country, but for
simplicity, the coding of neoliberal commitment is reported here. Hence, neoliberal
influence or commitment is coded as weak, declining, and strong, depending on the data.
International Characteristics
The final hypothesis posits that supportive international environments contribute
to the success of indigenous women in policy matters, while international opposition
works against success. I investigate the impact of international influences on policy
success among indigenous women, examining evidence regarding the support or
opposition to indigenous women’s policy efforts. International influences are defined as
external countries, agencies, or other entities that interact with indigenous policy. These
may include non-governmental organizations, international organizations, international
lending agencies, other countries, and networks associated with indigenous groups in
other countries. They may exert influence through cultural information, diplomatic
relations, or financial relations. International data are coded as supportive, moderately
supportive, or obstructive.
I code an array of primary and secondary materials available on indigenous
women’s policy efforts, creating an index of sources and a summary of the evidence
presented by each source. I analyze the outcome of each case based on this data to see
how often success or failure coincide with different values on the independent variables,
while making comparisons between cases and between time periods. The remainder of
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this dissertation evaluates the proposed hypotheses by analyzing differences between
cases and time periods to reveal which variables condition the outcomes for indigenous
women’s policy efforts.

Conclusions
The previous sections have mapped out the methods, sources of data, coding of
data and variables, and analytical strategy to establish the framework for the research
conducted for this dissertation. To find out which factors influence the outcomes of
indigenous women’s policy efforts over roughly the past two decades, I organize, code,
and assess a wide variety of data to determine how organizational resources, frames,
political opportunity structures, neoliberalism, and international factors matter. The use
of qualitative historical analysis and structured, focused comparisons provides a rich,
theoretically-driven approach to establishing which independent variables likely increase
or decrease indigenous women’s chances for success. The following chapter establishes
the values of these independent variables over the time period in question, while the
succeeding three chapters address particular case coding and outcomes.
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Chapter III
From ‘Exercising Voice’ to Leadership: Indigenous Women’s Mobilization in
Domestic and International Context, 1994-2012
The discussion presented in this chapter examines the factors that I have
hypothesized as potentially influential in shaping indigenous women’s policy outcomes.
In order to establish the historical, political, and social context in which
indigenous women’s social movements have taken place, I employ a comparative time
perspective that examines the values of the independent variables over three periods
between 1994 and 2012 in Bolivia. I focus on the neoliberal expansion from 1995-2000,
the interim period between 2000 and 2005, and the post-liberal period from 2006-2012.
This discussion of the examination and measurements of the main independent variables
provides the foundation for understanding the outcomes associated with social movement
efforts, which are the focus of the remaining chapters of this dissertation. This chapter
codes state political opportunity structure, organizational characteristics, and international
influences, my main independent variables.

Organizational Characteristics: Resources and Frames
This section addresses how various organizational characteristics have changed
over the time period under analysis, 1994-2012. The broad term “organizational
characteristics” refers to two main facets of indigenous women’s organizations. First, I
investigate organizational resources like the amount of human capital resources in
numbers used on a policy arena, women in leadership positions in social movements,
networks and public support. I also examine the language used to articulate the public
rhetoric and claims or demands of the movement. The subsections below define these
more fully and map out their evolution over time.
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Social Movement Resources
I have hypothesized that indigenous women’s social movement resources are
important predictors of success in policy measures. Human capital resources are divided
into several different indicators. I present data on human capital resources in numbers,
which is predicted by the first hypothesis to have a positive impact on social movement
success. I also investigate whether networks/public support were strong or weak, as I
expect that strong networks are positive for indigenous women’s policy influence.
Finally, this hypothesis posits that indigenous women’s leadership in social movements
will increase their chances of success, so I estimate the presence of women’s leadership
in movement activities.9 The averages across these dimensions (outlined in the previous
chapter) result in a moderate, high, and very high range of human capital resources.
Human Capital Resources in Numbers
While there are no consistent data on the number of indigenous women’s
organizations in periods before the 2000s, several scholars identify the period of the early
1990s until the end of Sanchez de Lozada’s first term (1997) as one of increased
mobilization and participation of indigenous women in organizations (Pallett and
Cubieses 2004: 7; Deere and Leon 2002:71; Burt 2004:61; Lind 2003: 230). Indigenous
women began to exhibit a stronger national presence in the early 1990s, beginning with
the March for Territory and Dignity (1990) in which indigenous women displayed new
power in terms of visibility and voice. Throughout the next several years, indigenous
women would show up in waves to support various causes of importance to the

9

While this is not an exhaustive list of possible resources (see McCarthy and Zald 1973),
these focus on important measurable aspects of collective action of indigenous women.
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indigenous community. However, analysis of news reports indicates a sharp decrease in
the number of indigenous women’s protests publicized beginning in the year 1997, the
first year of Banzer’s administration. Also, scholars note that during the late 1990s and
early 2000s, peasant networks lacked the popular support necessary to mobilize the
Andean population (Van Cott 2000: 195 Postero and Zamosc 2004:200-204), and other
sources note the general decline of indigenous and indigenous women’s political
mobilization during this time (Calla1998: 77; Lind 2004:55; Burt 2009: 59; Blofield
2009: 170). The number of women involved in protests and organizations visibly grew
during the Cochabamba Water War, which was a crucial turning point in indigenous
women’s social movements because they played crucial roles as leaders in the movement
(Boelen et al 2010; Bennett et al 2006; Monasterios 2007). In addition, by 2012, the
largest indigenous women’s formal group Bartolina Sisa has increased to over 100,000
members (Monasterios 2007). By my assessment of the data over the years, all accounts
seem to note a high amount of numbers of indigenous women involved in protest during
the early to mid 1990s; this period is coded having high amounts of participants and
mobilizers. From 1997 until 2000, women’s numbers in protest and organization can be
described as low, while from 2000 to the present, the numbers of indigenous women
engaged in protests is coded as having very high numbers of participants and mobilizers.
Human Capital Resources and Networks/Public Support
Various scholars cite the March for Territory and Dignity in 1990 (Van Cott
2000; Goodale 2006; Albro 2005:443) as important in beginning the process of raising
public support and acceptance of indigenous among the lower and middle classes in the
1990s. It was also an important moment of solidarity between the diverse and numerous
62

indigenous groups in Bolivia, who participated in the march. During the 1990s, loose
affiliations and occasional coordination between indigenous groups emerged, as
evidenced in the support Andean women of the Bartolina Sisa showed for cocalera
activists (El Diario: 1995b; 1995c; 1995d; AFP 1995p18) and the eventual agreement on
the issues of land reform (Ruiz 1993:20; Chase 2002: 65) and education reform (El
Diario 1995u). However, during this time networking with other sectors was extremely
weak or nonexistent, and the majority of cooperation networks that existed remained
between indigenous groups.
By the time of the Cochabamba Water War, beginning in 2000, with the
exception of the elite class, public support for the issues led by indigenous women had
greatly increased, giving the indigenous and the women’s movement a new human
capital resource from which to draw in making demands on the government (Van Cott
2000: 45; Perreault 2006; Roper 2003: 140; Bennett et al 2005). Participating with many
sectors of society, indigenous women mobilized strongly against neoliberalism,
especially water privatization (Stephenson 2002; Boelens et al 2010; Bennett et al 2005;
Perreault 2008; Delgado 2012). As Perreault states, “Since at least 2002, indigenous
representation and leadership in public affairs appears to be broadly (though not
universally) accepted by the Bolivian public” (2008: 19). The large number of groups
with which indigenous women cooperated, along with the level of support from the
greater public, warrant the coding of the period between 2000-2006 as having strong
networks.
Today indigenous groups are divided today on issues like the TIPNIS conflict,
where many Andean groups support the president’s plans to build a highway through
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indigenous land, but some indigenous inhabitants of this territory are stringently opposed.
They also find agreement on issues like land reform during the same time period, which
shows that the degree of cooperation between indigenous groups varies. More important
than indigenous solidarity networks, however, may be the ability to network outside of
indigenous sectors. During the period following the Cochabamba Water War, indigenous
women’s mobilization has been increasingly aligned, compared to the period of the
1990s, with many non-indigenous segments of society, including labor, human rights
supporters, churches, women’s groups, parts of the middle class, and the greater public
(Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006: 154; El Deber 2005; Lewis 2005). Also, another important
network comes from the ties between the Morales administration and indigenous
women’s social movements, which played such a strong role during his election and
continues to shape the functioning of government (Vargas and Draper 2010). The period
following Evo Morales’ election (2006-present) is coded as having very strong networks.
Human Capital Resources: Women’s Leadership in Social Movement
I expect that when women have greater representation in the leadership of
indigenous movements, their goals are more likely to take priority. Indigenous women’s
issues have often been de-prioritized in favor of larger community goals, and this has
influenced the scope and type of demands made at the national level. Various scholars
and activists have remarked upon these within-organization tensions that keep women
from assuming leadership positions and muffle their specific policy interests (Nugert
2002: 216-217; Burt 2004: 61; Deere and Leon 2001: 71; Radcliffe 1990; Clisby 2005;
Bennett et al 2005: 75; Pallet and Cubas 2004:7; Dosh et al 2010). As Arvada (2010)
states,
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Indigenous women accompanied the formation and consolidation of mixed
indigenous organizations from their beginning, in front of large marches that
made indigenous villages visible from that region of the country. However, within
their organizations their participation was to advance the platform of collective
rights for their villages, as the progressive construction of their specific demands
as women was a disputed area. (9)
This dynamic has been cited as fairly obstructive to indigenous women’s interests,
especially in the 1990s. But today, women’s persistence in political uprisings since the
Water and Gas Wars (Los Tiempos 2011b; Monasterios 2007; Jiminez 2003; Liendo
2009; Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006; Vàsquez 2006), and their visible involvement in
creating indigenous women-specific clauses to the constitution in 2006 (Rousseau 2011;
Monasterios 2007) illustrates that indigenous women have taken on more positions of
leadership in recent mobilizations. Women’s presence in leadership positions is
characterized as extremely low in the 1990s, moderate during the early 2000s, and high
from 2003 on.
Human Capital Resources Summarized
For the purposes of characterizing indigenous women’s human capital resources
throughout the time period, the period of 1994-1997 can be seen as one of moderate
human capital resources because while indigenous women mobilized strong numbers, in
most cases, the networks formed with other groups were indigenous or women’s groups
that did not provide the human capital and broad-sector support witnessed during the
post-liberal period of the 2000s. The Banzer period between 1997 and 2001 experienced
diminished human capital resources, as evidenced by the scholars above. The period
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beginning after the Cochabamba Water War is characterized as one of high levels of
human capital resources. This level is established by secondary and news accounts’
evidence of growth in their organizational involvement and by the important role played
by other groups in society joining in indigenous-led protest (Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006:
154). The period after Evo Morales assumed the presidency in 2006 is characterized as
having extremely high levels of human capital resources because in addition to the
advantages of networks, leadership, and numbers in the previous period, indigenous
women enjoyed a networking advantage due to their connections with the state.
Indigenous women’s own impressive human capital was often a product of effective
networking and indigenous women’s alignment with the Morales state from the
beginning. This latter component especially allows an even greater pool of resources
from which to draw for influencing policy.
Frames—the Language of Social Movement Articulation.
I have hypothesized that the frames used by indigenous women activists affect
their likelihood of achieving success. The second hypothesis indicates that broad (nonethnic) frames will be more successful than ethnic frames, while gender-neutral frames
will be more successful than gendered frames. There are three basic types of frames
relevant to this dissertation, which are used by indigenous women in combination or
exclusively, including ethnic frames, gendered frames, and broad frames (non-ethnic
language).
These factors are closely related to identity politics of ethnicity and gender,
subjects that conjure the complexities of constructing a movement based on a group’s
marginalized status. The study of indigenous women’s activism engages the
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intersectional approach to identity politics, which draws attention to the fact that
indigenous women’s experiences are different from indigenous men and women of other
races in Bolivia (see McCall 2005; Denis 2008; Gill 1993: 74; Rousseau 2011:8;
Radcliffe 2004: 388). This is because of their dual and triple marginalization in society
and because of their particular gender ideology. In the sections that follow, I code data on
how the ethnic, gendered, or broad public interest subtexts of indigenous women’s frames
were depicted. In the next subsection, I present the findings of my analysis of interviews,
field notes, newspaper articles, secondary scholarly resources, and documents from social
movements that contain information regarding the language of articulation between the
years 1994 and 2012.
Ethnic Frames
The qualitative evidence relating to indigenous women’s organization and
mobilization shows an identifiable shift, not only in the extent of women’s involvement
in policy decisions, but in the language used to describe that involvement to the
government and to the public. One significant change in frames includes an adoption of a
more readily identifiable “indigenous” (as opposed to the peasant or campesino) label
into the public frames of indigenous women’s activism. Framing is a complex
phenomenon: although indigenous women now carry an ethnic banner more proudly and
clearly than in previous years, they simultaneously promote the interests of the broader
population in their claims, which relates to the amount of public support they enjoy.
Although an emerging public discourse about multiculturalism and indigenous
issues existed in the 1990s, the conceptualization of indigenous identity was still strongly
intertwined with peasant (campesino) politics of the 1950s. The cultural and political
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meanings associated with indigenous people had changed repeatedly over the years with
the abolition of the hacienda system, attempts to modernize the legal code, and in line
with corporatist and populist politics of the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement)
which emerged victorious after the mid-century revolution (Farthing and Ledebur 2004:
40). “Indians” were rechristened campesinos under this system, and they continued to use
this label well into the 1990s and held on to it as an important basis for emerging ethnic
mobilization even after the 1994 Bolivian Constitution declared the state a multi-ethnic,
pluricultural nation (Van Cott 2003: 170; Canessa 2007: 195; Lucero 2005: 35). As many
scholars have identified, the main political motives behind indigenous-state relations in
the 1990s were to integrate indigenous peoples through assimilative policies and rhetoric
(Choque 2000:14; Albo 2002: 74-75; Seider 2002; Van Cott 2000:158; Lucero 2008;
Albo 2002; Van Cott 2003 169; Van Cott 2000: 158). Campesino remained a political
identity for indigenous people until the late 1990s, although the use of indígena
(indigenous) as a cultural reference is found in various reports of festivals, dances, and
other indigenous events during the mid-1990s (El Diario 1995d). By the time the Law of
Popular Participation (LPP) passed in 1994, some finer distinctions between indigenous
groups had become somewhat more common, with highland indigenous adopting the
campesino label and lowland Amazonian indigenous groups more likely to associate with
and be described as indigenous (Perreault 2008: 2; Lucero 2007: 133-136; El Diario
1997a). Overall, my analyses of news reports support the conclusion that most people,
including the indigenous themselves, identified indigenous people as campesinos most of
the time during the 1990s (El Diario: 1995a; 1995c; 1995c; 1995c; 1996a; 1996b; 1997b;
1997c; 1995e; 1995f ; 1996c; 1996d; ANSA 1995). Interestingly, the issues most
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important to indigenous women during the 1990s reflects indigenous or ethnic interests,
even though the public rhetoric shied away from indigenous identification. Aside from
their attempts to pass a domestic violence law, the issues on which indigenous women
wanted the most change were those that addressed their community needs. Coca
legislation, land reform, and bilingual education are all, regardless of how they were
labeled, issues that affected indigenous communities more than non-indigenous
communities. Indigenous women’s activism in the period of the 1990s is coded primarily
as one of broad frames, as these were the common activist references, regardless of the
issue.
The difference in how women are spoken about in headlines in the 2000s is
striking, as indigenous or “originario” (native) women were far more likely to be
depicted leading broad sector strikes, mobilizing, protesting, and taking political office
than were “campesinas” or “cocaleras”10 of the 1990s (El Diario: 2012c; El Diario
2012a; El Diario 2012b; Periodico Digital 2011). Moreover, issues represented by
indigenous women’s frames in the 2000s are often non-ethnic or broad in nature,
meaning that the claims indigenous women make include, unlike earlier periods,
concerns that affect non-indigenous people as well as indigenous people (El Diario:
2012c; El Diario 2012a; El Diario 2012b; Periodico Digital 2011). However, the interim
period is interesting because there is overlapping use of “campesino” and “indigenous”
within single news stories, and this occurs throughout the period of analysis, but is more
striking in the period between 2002 and 2004 (Dellien 2002; El Diario 2002; El Diario

10

A term meaning “coca grower,” that has indigenous connotations because coca is
farmed by mainly indigenous people.
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2004). In these reports, the protagonists are indigenous women, but headlines were still
likely to label them as campesina. By 2012 and my brief field research in La Paz, Andean
women had rejected campesina altogether,11 adopting either the term indigenous
(indígena) or “originario,” reflecting their legitimacy as social leaders through their precolonial heritage in the Andes (McNeish 2003: 229; Buice 2011). In addition, the history
of naming the Bartolina Sisa is instructive. Since their establishment in 1980, the main
organization of indigenous women was known as the Federación Nacional de Mujeres
Campesinas de Bolivia—Bartolina Sisa. In 2008, the organization officially changed its
name to the Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas y Originarias de
Bolivia (Bartolina Sisa 2009), incorporating new and identifiable ethnic frames into their
activism. The period of the 2000s is thus coded as coexisting broad and ethnic frames.
The growing trend of incorporating indigenous as opposed to campesino identity
created a stronger label that placed ethnicity at the forefront of organization frames. But
why should it matter what label is used to describe their own activism? Scholars such as
Radcliffe (1996) remind us that although “campesino” made appropriate regional
distinctions for the purposes of rural justice in a country wracked with regional and class
inequities, the fact remained that “indianness” and the associations with marginalization
were not addressed by this label (113). Compared to a label imposed from alienating and
co-opting government structures, originaria or indígena manifests agency and
empowerment gained from having contested and re-defined the terms of indigenous
women’s activism in their own words.

11

When I mentioned the term “indigenous” on the first meeting observation, participants
suggested that I add “or native” to correct my terminology.
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The majority of the activists of the Bartolina Sisa exemplify the traditional visual
stereotype of Bolivian Andean women. Pollera skirts, shawls, bowler hats, and the
trademark braiding of hair mark them as indigenous women. Their devotion to preserving
their own traditions, language and music was explicit in conversations I had with
members of the organization. For example,
It’s not just about money (the reason for organizing). We want children to know
the music, the Aymaran language, and our traditions. The Aymara are connected
to a past that we pass on with our food, the Aymaran music, with Aymaran
festivals. It is okay that the schools provide bilingual courses, but it is our
responsibility, to teach everyone. (Buice 2011)
The women organizing with Bartolina Sisa expressed pride in their ancient roots
in Bolivia and felt compelled to make it part of their political agenda (Buice 2011;
Radcliffe, Andolina and Laurie 2004: 397).
Indigenous women were empowered little by the frames of non-ethnic or broad
frames used in the 1990s. Today, indigenous women have abandoned the generalized
and culturally neutral label of campesino. Instead they organize, publicize, and widely
acknowledge their cultural heritage, their language, and their indigenousness (El Diario:
2012e; El Diario 2012a; 2011a; Bartolina Sisa 2012; Buice 2011). Ethnicity has been
incorporated into indigenous women’s organizational motif in a complex manner,
meaning that non-ethnic or broad claims may be overlapped with ethnic claims (or vice
versa) in indigenous women’s activism, depending on circumstances.
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Broad Frames
Since the 2000s, indigenous women are more likely to publicize their ethnic
struggles, meaning that ethnic frames are increasingly important in contemporary politics.
But today a large part of the population shares interests with indigenous women,
particularly on issues like water privatization, natural gas, and gas and food subsidies.
The scope of the protests during the 2000s has tended to cover broader interests and make
broader claims than those witnessed in the 1990s, but during the 1990s, broad frames
were represented by the non-ethnic use of the campesino frames, as I discussed fully
above. This means that broad and ethnic frames have coexisted in the current milieu of
indigenous women’s politics in Bolivia at least since the 1990s, but with different
combinations of broad and ethnic frames. Specifically, it is common to witness
indigenous women utilizing ethnic frames along with frames that represent large parts of
the rest of society during the 2000s. It was more common to see “peasant” or
“campesino”—broad, non-ethnic frames—during the 1990s even while interests
surrounding mobilization were quite indigenous. Scholars’ assessments and news stories
show that the frames used by indigenous women ranged in inclusiveness of society over
time, becoming perhaps the most inclusive after the mobilizations of 2000 and 2003 over
gas nationalization and water privatization.
Indigenous people in contemporary times are entrusted with leadership on
cultural, environmental, and economic values in Bolivian society, and their claims are
given legitimacy because of their ancestry and long history of political struggle.
Therefore, while an increasingly “indian” face has been given to activism, the motives
behind their activism are for the people (Postero 2008: 208; Canessa 2007: 157-158). The
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2010 LAPOP survey asked why some indigenous groups had become more influential in
politics. The far most commonly identified reason for indigenous influence, with 51
percent of respondents agreeing, is that the indigenous groups represent the population.
Only 3.58 percent offered more money/resources as a cause, whereas 15 percent believed
good ideas were the source of indigenous influence, and 26 percent believed that good
leadership was an important reason (AmericasBarometer 2010). 12
Indigenous support of mining and labor struggles has long shaped the protest
landscape in Bolivia, so promoting causes that extend beyond indigenous issues is not
necessarily new, but is rather increasing in scope (Rousseau 2011:13; de Chungara 1979).
In the 1970s, indigenous women’s protests reflected the common interests held by these
groups because they shared issues pertaining to the economic wellbeing of miners and
laborers, many who are of indigenous descent. A comparison between the struggles in the
1990s over coca eradication and the recent protests over gas and food subsidies highlight
how indigenous women’s movements have shifted the substance of frames over time.
According to El Diario, the cocalera marches and protests of the 1990s were the most
publicized indigenous women’s social movement activity in the 1990s, and they rarely
resorted to the use of ethnic (or gendered) rhetoric to advance their claims (El Diario
1995m; 1995n). On the other hand, more recent indigenous women’s mobilization to

12

The actual question posed was, “In your opinion, why have some indigenous groups
been more effective in influencing politics?” Possible answers were: “Because they have
more money/resources,” “Because they can work well with groups,” “Because they
represent the population,” “Because they have good ideas,” and “Because they have good
leaders” (AmericasBarometer 2010). I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International
Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.
73

combat privatization of natural resources, highway constructions, and price hikes freely
employ rhetoric or frames that refer to indigenous heritage and rights, while representing
concerns of a broad sector of society which had been disadvantaged by neoliberalism (El
Diario 2002; El Diario 2012a; 2012d; El Diario 2011). This points to the change in
public discourse and an evolving relationship with the greater public.
Gendered Frames
One of the more significant changes in frames relates to the adoption of various
feminist goals adopted into indigenous women’s gender activism. The following
discussion addresses the gender ideology of indigenous women and the related political
frames of indigenous women’s social movements.
The types of frames indigenous women used in the 1990s emphasized the
wellbeing of indigenous groups over the specific needs of indigenous women. The topics
of activism for this time period are related to women’s leadership within the indigenous
movement, as indigenous women’s ability to promote their own issues can be influenced
by these dynamics. In addition, indigenous women’s claims remained somewhat
conservative in the sense that they did not openly challenge stereotypes of gender
hierarchies of Bolivian society. This stance contrasts with more recent efforts of
indigenous women who have pressed for a number of changes in the treatment of
indigenous women in Bolivian culture (Jordán 2010; Bartolina Sisa 2009). A significant
change in gender perspective is also evident in the amendments to the mission statement
of Bartolina Sisa in 1998, which stated that their organization stood to challenge the
assumption of male authority in political matters (Bartolina Sisa 2009).
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To understand indigenous women’s activism on various counts, diverse gender
relations in indigenous communities, and the accompanying gender ideology, are
relevant. A representative statement of indigenous women’s gender ideology can be seen
in one of the core principles advanced in the proceedings of the First Summit of
Indigenous Women in the Americas in 2003, where the concept of gender relations is:
Duality or dualism: in which the feminine and the masculine in a same deity are
two energy forces found in one. By considering the Supreme as dual, father and
mother, one can act with gender equity. This attitude is basic for the eradication of
machismo. (quoted in and translated by Hernandez Castillo 2010: 540)
The above principle of “dualism” (or “Chacha-warmi” in Andean culture) is also
related to the indigenous concept of “complementarity,” which represents principles of
valuing both male and female contributions to the family and society (Radcliffe 1990:
236; Weismantel 2001:141). Since complementarity and duality are considered
indigenous values, these concepts have often been recalled to indict
European/Spanish/mestizo society for the imposition of machismo and sexist relations
between men and women (Richards 2005: 206; Joyce 2000: 145). Indigenous gender
ideologies as expressed above have prompted some feminist criticisms of the indigenous
women’s movements as essentialist and conservative (Rousseau 2011:15; Hernandez
Castillo 2003: 541; Richards 2005: 205). The indigenous critique of feminism denounces
western feminists’ goals for their ethnocentric assumptions and their activists efforts for
the “racist reproduction of unequal social relations on the terrain of social movements”
(Hernandez Castillo 2003: 541). Resistance of feminism explicitly defines much of the
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activism of indigenous women –it relates to both the types of issues they pursue as well
as the language they use to define their activism.
The intersectional view of race and gender warns that “westernized” gender
interests may not carry the same importance among more marginalized peoples. Indeed,
activists in the early 1980s in Latin America criticized feminist theorists for their lack of
depth and understanding of the true situation facing non-white and non-mestizo citizens.
Mining activist Domitila Barrios de Chungara’s (1978) statement in Let Me Speak is
telling:
Our position is not like the feminists’ position. We think our liberation consists
primarily in our country being freed forever from the yoke of imperialism and we
want a worker like us to be in power and that the laws, education, everything, be
controlled by this person. Then, yes, we’ll have better conditions for reaching a
complete liberation, including our liberation as women. (Barrios de Chungara and
Moema Viezzer 1978)
In Bolivian culture, indigenous women (especially the more visible and urban
Quechua and Aymara indigenous women) are seen as important links between mestizo,
white and indigenous culture, between the formal and informal economy, and between
the market and the home. Mostly this role of indigenous women is assigned because of
their roles in agriculture and as representative voices of the informal marketplace (Albro
2000: 32; Widmark 2007: 85; Seligman 1993: 206; Seligman 1989: 706). Indigenous
women are a unique population in Bolivia that remains segregated from mestizo and
white culture though they operate both within and outside the norms and values
associated with the dominant culture (Seligman 1993: 197, 206). A preoccupation with
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market issues has become an important focal point to indigenous women’s increased
leadership in contemporary movements, as evidenced by many of the creative cooperative projects promoted by Aymara women in Bartolina Sisa. These activities,
though bound up with ideas of economic empowerment for women, are also related to
women’s traditional roles as agricultural providers in Bolivian society (Buice 2011).13
Women’s growing strength in social movements is related to a layering of new
onto old frames. Two statements by Sra. Barrios de Chungara (quoted above) three
decades apart illustrate how layering happens within one activist’s gender perspective
over a lifetime. When asked what obstacles stand in the way of women’s progress in
Bolivia, she stated in 2009:
Machismo, mainly. Not long ago, after finishing one of the literacy programs, a
compañera came up to me. She was sad and told me that she hadn’t participated in
the course because her husband didn’t want her to go. He told her that if her
parents had ’raised a donkey, that’s how she should stay.’ That’s why I think that
the first battle Bolivian women need to win is in the home. (Latinamerican Press
2009)
Especially in the instance of a marginalized group that wishes to be incorporated
into the larger political system, the need for continuous and recognizable aims, both
within and outside the organization, cannot be understated. Society’s perception of
indigenous women is also important, and keeping these recognizable frames are helpful

13

Among economic projects indigenous women worked on at the time were llama
product exports, guinea pig (gúy) exports, and wool. In addition, the women were
preparing for the June 21 march through La Paz to encourage promulgation of the new
agricultural reform.
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for amassing support and resources necessary to accomplish their goals. Indigenous
women’s activism has built upon these former frames in a creative effort to extend
activist’ goals without losing their philosophical origins or broader base of public
support, another vital resource for indigenous women’s social movements. The hallmark
of indigenous women’s participation in the 2000s is their organization under a
recognizable banner (as indigenous women) while clearly representing the cause of a
greater population. This factor has enhanced their leadership in the country’s social
movements. Like the emergence of ethnicity, gendered claims and frames were adopted
gradually, and because the broader public had acknowledged that indigenous women
represent the greater good of Bolivia. However, unlike ethnic frames, gendered claims
entered later, and after indigenous women had already experienced organizational
successes, such as the Cochabamba Water War (Bennett et al 2008: 109-115). While
gender strategic goals entered indigenous women’s national activism in the mid to late
2000s, these goals were not necessarily missing from their activism previously. As I have
discussed above concerning women’s leadership in movements, indigenous women
acknowledged the need to organize based on recognized gender inequality in the 1990s,
but their public, national claims were either (indigenous) community or broad-sector
based, obscuring gender problems about which they were expressing concerns at local
meetings. Later, indigenous women were more visible as leaders in the Cochabamba
Water Wars, and the issue framing and claims necessarily contained gendered
connotations since women experience the effects of privatization most harshly (Bennett
et al 2008:108-110; Lind 2003: 231). After the election of Evo Morales, indigenous
women placed their ethnic and gendered frames at the forefront of their activism. This is
78

especially evident in the frames and claims set forth by indigenous women during the
Constituent Assembly, in the language of indigenous women’s involvement in the
TIPNIS conflict, and in highly publicized demands for indigenous women’s land justice
(Federacion Nacional Campesino de las Mujeres Bartolina Sisa 2012; Rousseau 2011;
Chavez 2009; Chavez 2010). However, their critique of non-indigenous women’s
movements has been sustained. For example, as a rural activist comments:
We are participating as objects. In public life, those who have more access are the
non-indigenous women. But we’ve changed things a lot. Before, if we wanted to
report incidents to the police, we weren’t able to; a man would have to go with us,
with him exercising our rights. Now that freedom is used by liberal, feminist
women. I don’t agree because there hasn’t been feminism in the Ayllu.14 We were
more about complementarity. (Nicastro 2010: 7)
This rejection of feminism may be why gender equality in representation and
participation has emerged as a goal of indigenous women’s groups, but other feminist
issues such as abortion are not promoted by indigenous women’s organizations.
Indigenous women’s reproductive issues focus more on assured access to maternal care,
rights to make reproductive health decisions, and directives to medical staff to
accommodate indigenous birthing practices in clinical settings (Chavez 2010;
latinamericanpress 2009; Speed 2006; Rousseau 2011). “Gender strategic” goals
(Molyneux 1985) intersect with other ethnic-based claims by indigenous women in the
pursuit of policies that better their daily lives, as activist indigenous women remain

14

Ayllu references the traditional Andean form of community organization.
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motivated by the ethnic justice, autonomy, and preservation of culture, but interweave
gender parity into the substance of indigenous women’s pursuits. Although as a whole,
indigenous women in Bolivia remain perhaps the most conservative about gender
relations among indigenous women in Latin America, some indigenous women’s
organizations in Bolivia criticize machismo, indigenous women’s reproductive rights,
violence against women, and call for the creation of equal economic and political spaces
for women’s empowerment (Buice 2011; Monasterios 2007;Choque 2007; Rousseau
2011:18; Farthing 2007; Informe Ejecutiva 2008: 29-30).
As Choque (2007) comments, indigenous women are engaged in what is known
as a re-narration of indigenous traditions, seeking to strengthen their positions of
leadership by complementing these frames with strategies and ideas of middle class Latin
American feminists decades ago (Choque 2007: 173). New generations of women
activists in Bolivia are now empowering themselves uniquely by acknowledging their
traditional roles while using the concept of complementarity of the sexes to justify the
need for their empowerment. The members of the organization Bartolina Sisa exemplify
the growing trend in indigenous women’s organizations in emphasizing equality,
elimination of sexism and racism, and the promotion of a fair economic system in
addition to former essentialist claims of the neoliberal era (Rousseau 2011; Speed 2006:
38).
Because indigenous women’s gendered claims and frames were not evident in
their activism at the national level, indigenous women’s activism is characterized as
gender-neutral during the 1990s. Because indigenous women’s leadership in activism has
increasingly brought both gendered claims and gendered frames to the attention of the
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nation and to policymakers, the period between 2000 and 2004 is categorized as using
emerging gendered frames, and the period between 2004 and the present is categorized as
having gender equality frames.
Summary of Frames
Combining the gender and ethnic frames and claims of the periods, 1994-2000
represents a period of broad (non-ethnic) non-gendered frames The period between 2000
and 2006 represents a period of transitioning frames, categorized as emerging gendered,
ethnic and broad sector frames. The final period between 2006 and present represents a
period of the use of ethnic frames, broad sector and gendered frames.

The State: Ideology and Opportunity
This dissertation takes a view of indigenous mobilization and state response in the
form of policy as a means of understanding the outcomes of social movements and also
to understand the decision-making process as it relates to marginalized groups in society.
I propose that understanding the outcomes of mobilization requires close attention not
only to the features of the movement itself but also to the particular state political
opportunity structures that indigenous women face. I hypothesize that two main features
of the state political opportunity structure affect indigenous women’s success. One
feature involves the noneconomic structural opportunities created in conjunction with
attempts to consolidate neoliberalism. The other feature focuses more closely on the
neoliberal economic commitments of the executive administrations. In the subsections to
follow, I assess evidence concerning the nature of these state characteristics and explain
how these have changed over the time period in question.
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State Structural Political Opportunities
Political opportunities have fluctuated greatly between 1993 and the present, with
a partial opening between 1993 and 1997, then closing of state structural opportunities
from 1997-2005. The situation since 2005 indicates a very open political opportunity
structure. The structure of the state in the 1990s is a product of the fierce neoliberal
economic commitment of governments between 1994-2003, which I address more fully
below. In Sanchez de Lozada’s first administration (1993-1997), this commitment was in
tandem with institutional reforms intended to garner international support and to quell
indigenous unrest (Perreault 2008; Hofmann and Pereen 2010; Van Cott 2000; Kohl
2002; Albó 2002). The context of social movement organizing should also be viewed
along with the process of democratic transition and attempts at consolidation occurring
during the neoliberal period and after. The passage of the Law of Popular Participation
and Decentralization, enacted in 1994, devolved certain powers to districts and
communities by strengthening local forms of governing and also by creating a set of
rights related to political participation, including the goal of encouraging participation of
men and women and previously marginalized “campesinos.” The Law of Popular
Participation was especially important in its recognition of “indigenous” forms of
governance. It also provided funding and spaces for representation among important
social movement actors by recognizing the legitimacy of civil society groups. These
measures were especially important for indigenous people since they created local posts
for governing and leadership, whereas leadership limited to national elections had been
simply unattainable (Perreault 2008; Hofmann and Pereen 2010; Van Cott 2000; Kohl
2002; Albó 2002). The true impact of these reforms, however, on indigenous women’s
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mobilizing and policy influence, was negligible (Albro 2000: 31). Consequences of these
reforms were in some cases even harmful, when their previously occupied spheres
become contested political environments due to competition for new funds allocated to
local governing posts (Lind 2002: 242; Clisby 2006: 24-27; Widmark 2007: 87; Yashar
1998), or when resources or legitimacy failed to be properly allocated to indigenous
women’s needs (Kohl 2002: 463, 466; Quirogaflores 2010: 4).
State structural changes were also evident in the constitutional reform of 1994.
The first article in the reforms to the constitution defined Bolivia as a “multi-ethnic and
pluricultural” republic, and other articles recognized the juridical and territorial
personality of indigenous people (Articles 61, 222, 223, 224), as well as economic, social
and territorial rights to natural resources within “original” (native) communities (Bolivian
Constitution 1994 Article 171). The major reforms introduced by the Sanchez de Lozada
administration, including the Law of Popular Participation, the Law of Decentralization,
agricultural reform (INRA), and education reform, were backed by these constitutional
changes, which were responses to World Bank pressure to modernize and decentralize
government (Perreault 2008; Hofmann and Pereen 2010; Van Cott 2000; Kohl 2002;
Albo 2002).
The historical perspective gained by analyzing this period of constitutional reform
is imperative, especially since much of the involvement of indigenous people in social
movements, policy, and even the drafting of the most recent constitution can be seen as a
partial result of constitutional changes that occurred in the previous period. Thus, while
the constitutional structure of the 1990s was important by its own merit, the future
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possibilities opened by the language of indigenous rights would be the most outstanding
features of the 1990s constitutional reforms (Van Cott 2002; Lucero 2008).
The state structure provided uneven openings throughout the next two decades,
and indigenous women were slow to take advantage of the possibilities for local
leadership (Van Cott 2000: 255-57; Clisby 2005: 24-29; Lind 2002:242; Albro 2000:31;
Clisby 2005; MADRE 2012; Albo 2002; Choque 2000; Roper 2003: 140; Stephenson
2002; Yashar 1998; Bennett et al 2006). Women (and especially indigenous women)
remain vastly under-represented at the national level, a state of affairs that is still quite far
from reversing itself. However, the urbanization of indigenous people due to rural delocation in the 1980s and 1990s created opportunities for higher education, with greater
numbers of indigenous women entering into universities. This has led to the gradual
adoption of gender consciousness among urban indigenous women, who move into the
public sphere and attempt to make changes to policy (Choque 2007: 178). The political
opportunity structure is more complex than a set of public institutions and the policies
they make. It may be important to investigate the spillover effects of policy change, such
as education and migration, which may have both negative and positive consequences for
indigenous women. One positive consequence is the opportunity to engage in politics that
was not present under previously existing political and social arrangements.
During the early 1990s a series of top-down reforms introduced a newly
permissive atmosphere for indigenous women’s mobilization. But the following
governments, including Sanchez de Lozada’s second term, contributed to an increasingly
closed political opportunity structure for indigenous people. For example, as Van Cott
(2000) identifies,
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the promotion of ethnic diversity as a major theme of government lost centrality
and coherence in the Banzer government. There is no evidence of continuing state
discourse on multiculturalism outside of policy documents produced for
international consumption. (213)
Instead of the commitment to campesino justice, which had been an important (if
shallowly treated) focus of the Sanchez de Lozada administration, the Banzer
administration (1997-2001) shifted attention to generic commitments such as ending
poverty, while implementing even more stringent neoliberal reforms (Assies et al 1998:
90; Van Cott 2000: 195). Part of the blame for the demobilization of indigenous people
has been placed on the Banzer administration, citing his generic presidential rhetoric that
shifted resources and support away from the multicultural emphasis of Sanchez de
Lozada. The Banzer administration treated indigenous communities differently than the
previous president and moved from political rights and culture to a view of the peasant
communities as “productive units” of the neoliberal system (Van Cott 2000: 214; Assies,
et al 1998: 175). In addition, after Sanchez de Lozada’s presidency ended, the
organizational space for indigenous authority, which had been opened by the Law of
Popular Participation as well as the laws of decentralization, lacked the popular support
and the technical knowledge to take appropriate advantage of the structural changes that
might have benefitted them (Van Cott 2000: 195).
The specifics of neoliberal commitments are covered below, but it is important to
note that increasing neoliberal commitments following Sanchez de Lozada’s first term
caused a significant closing of the political opportunity structure for indigenous women,
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as government energy and resources became more focused on privatization measures and
means of building the economy than on ensuring the implementation of laws designed to
promote indigenous justice (Van Cott 2000: 195). It is important to note this effect of
neoliberalism on structural opportunities, since the neoliberal leaning of the government
became the very topic of indigenous women’s mobilization beginning in 2000 with the
Cochabamba Water War over privatization (Bennett et al 2005; Bakker 2008; Laurie et al
2002; Lewis and Olivera 2004). Beginning with Sanchez de Lozada’s first administration
and covering the next four presidential administrations, privatization of natural gas,
water, and other state resources, including the mining sector, was aggressive. As I argue
in future chapters, the progressively neoliberal state of government increased survival
pressures on indigenous people, while the state became increasingly closed to social
movement protest (Webber 2005;Webber 2005b; BBC 2004; Agramont 2012). I
characterize the period between 1993-1997 as a partially open political opportunity
structure. Given the state of neoliberal commitments and the lack of response of
governments to indigenous demands, I characterize the period between 1997-2005 as a
closed political opportunity structure.
The state structural opportunity facing indigenous women in Bolivia was changed
drastically during three major events between 2003 and 2006. The first was the
resignation of Sanchez de Lozada in October of 2003 over the gas issue, and the second
was eventual ousting of Carlos Mesa a mere two years later (BBC 2004; Associated Press
2005). The final events were the campaign and election of Evo Morales, whose
leadership in the mobilizations against gas privatization plans ousted Mesa. Morales
gained fame during the 1990s as a cocalero union leader and campesino (peasant)
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Aymara, served time in Congress, and served as a leader of the opposition during the war
over gas nationalization in 2003. In 2006 he became the first indigenous, most popularly
elected president in Bolivian history (Rousseau 2011: 12). Moreover, he was both elected
by and responsible to, a large, angry popular sector, often led by indigenous women,
which had crippled two previous administrations. Evo Morales’ presidential campaign
was the campaign of the indigenous social movements,15 which established an early
relationship between social movements and the administration that heavily influences the
political opportunity structure today (Mayorga 2006: 6). Given this set of
circumstances— institutional instability resulting from massive protest, coupled with a
new integration of social movements into government—the political opportunity
structure of the state is extremely open to indigenous women’s demands regarding policy.
The second wave of constitutional reforms is especially significant in terms of the
gendered interests of indigenous women represented in the text. The 2009 constitution
includes provisions that provide for indigenous women’s equal access to land titling
(Article 14), water (Article 20), health care (Article 18), protection of indigenous
medicine (Articles 41, 42), and family care as basic rights, protection against family
violence (Article 15, III), and advancement to political office (Bolivian Constitution
2009). The top-down constitutional amendments (Lucero 2008: 134; Van Cott 2005: 69)
relating to indigenous rights in 1994 failed to address indigenous women’s concerns,

15

Major campaign elements included land reform for indigenous people, increasing taxes
on natural gas for foreign companies, and constructing a new constitution (Mayorga
2006).
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whereas indigenous women have managed to secure quite specific indigenous women’s
rights in the constitution passed in 2009.
Another important structural change introduced since 2006 includes the
commitment of Evo Morales and his party, MAS (Movement Toward Socialism) to
ensure that women gain access to political office. In the 2005 elections, MAS gave over
46% of its seats to women (Rousseau 2011: 12), making it the most gender equitable
distribution in the history of party politics in Bolivia. While female politicians still do not
equal one-third of all posts, they have gained more in recent administrations than
previously in history. In the December 2009 elections, the number of women elected to
parliamentary positions rose from 14% to 28%. Six indigenous women who had
participated in workshops organized by the organizations MADRE and Bartolina Sisa
were elected to parliament (madre.org 2012). In addition, Morales swore in the most
gender equitable cabinet in 2009, with half of the posts belonging to women, and close to
a third of those belonging to indigenous women activists (Chavez 2010). These
developments, while important outcomes by themselves, are relevant to the structure
indigenous women’s social movement’s face in certain policy efforts that have taken
place in recent years. For this reason, the introduction of indigenous women into forms of
governance is expected to create an extremely open political opportunity structure for
indigenous women’s social movements.
The evidence suggests that structural opportunities were present in the 1990s
during Sanchez de Lozada’s first administration, but that these were limited in their
utility to indigenous women. This structural opportunity all but closed during and after
Banzer’s administration and remained closed until mass frustration led to the water and
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then gas uprisings, which unseated Sanchez de Lozada’s during his second term. After
the election of Evo Morales, indigenous women faced the most open political opportunity
structure encountered in Bolivia due to constitutional changes that protected indigenous
women’s rights and because of the commitment of the administration to form
partnerships with indigenous women’s social movements (Monasterios 2007). Because of
these noted changes in structural openings, I characterize the early period of the 1990s as
a partially open political opportunity structure, the succeeding three neoliberal
presidential administrations (1997-2005)16 as possessing closed political opportunity
structures, and the period between 2006 to the present as a very open open political
opportunity structure.
Neoliberalism and the Leftist Reaction
In Bolivia neoliberal economic reforms included the transfer of state-owned
industries to privately owned enterprises, cuts in social spending, and a turn toward
retracting state intervention in the economy. Like many other Latin American countries,
Bolivia adopted structural adjustment programs as conditions for International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank financing in the 1980s. By the time of Sanchez Sanchez de
Lozada’s first cabinet appointment during Paz Zamora’s administration in 1985, the
country was experiencing crisis level inflation and was in the throes the “lost decade”
which resulted from the debt crisis in Latin America. To pay off debts, the Bolivian
government instituted privatization and capitalization laws (as conditions for loans from
the IMF and World Bank) that resulted in massive firing of public workers in education,

16

These include Hugo Banzer (1997-2001), Sanchez de Lozada’s second term (20012003), and Carlos Mesa’s term from 2003-2005.
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transportation, sanitation, and health, the displacement of over 20,000 miners, and the
loss of close to 35,000 manufacturing jobs (Sanabria 2000; Perreault 2008; Postero and
Zamosc 2004: 24; Postero 2005:129; Kohl 2002: 456). In addition, privatization meant
that land could be purchased by foreign and local agribusiness, and “pro-business” laws
allowed local markets to be flooded by cheap U.S. products that made small-scale
farming impossible. Privatization of public service jobs in energy, transportation and
utilities led to multinational corporation control over vital sectors of the economy and
lay-offs of additional 14,000 workers in these industries (Sanabria 2000; Postero and
Zamosc 2004: 24; Postero 2005:129; Kohl 2002: 456). These factors had a devastating
impact on the indigenous population of Bolivia. Urban migration due to rural
unemployment and unfavorable farming conditions increased, as did the number of
makeshift communities on the outskirts of towns to accommodate informal housing. The
real income of Bolivians dropped significantly during this time period, and by the end of
the 1980s, the informal economy became the major source of income for 70 percent of
the working population (Sanabria 2000; Postero and Zamosc 2004: 24; Postero 2005:129;
Kohl 2002: 456; Perreault 2008). Though Bolivia was long cited as a success story of
IMF lending due to its achievements in stifling inflation in the early 1990s, the Bolivian
public, and specifically, the indigenous public, grew disillusioned by the limited recovery
of the economy and growing unemployment (Romer 2008). While other sectors of the
economy (industry, mining, petroleum) protested as Bolivian industries were sold off, the
government remained closed to anti-neoliberal demands to end privatization, and this
attitude was maintained even as more and more sectors, including, finally, the
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indigenous, joined in protest against the government’s neoliberal policies (Kohl 2004:
889-893).
The era of neoliberal commitments in Bolivia stands in stark contrast to the
commitments of the government today. For instance, following the mass demonstrations
regarding natural resource privatization in the early 2000s, Evo Morales ran for president
and won on a platform of nationalizing the country’s natural resources. While
privatization, capitalization, and lowering inflation were the important landmark
accomplishments of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s administration, emphasis on internal
markets, social inclusion, and redistribution of land stand out as the major attempts of the
Evo Morales administration.
Figure 1 illustrates the decline in neoliberalism from the point of view of the Wall
Street Journal’s Economic Freedom Index, which scores and ranks countries based on
trade liberalization, inflation control, internal market controls, business freedom, social
spending, labor protections, and like components. I utilize this together with the more
qualitative assessments above to measure the country’s neoliberal commitment. Higher
scores denote higher levels of economic freedom and neoliberal commitment.
The graphic portrayal of the changes in economic freedom assessments traces the
neoliberal experience for the period in question. It indicates that during Sanchez de
Lozada’s (1993-1997) and Banzer’s administrations (1997-2001), Bolivia’s Economic
Freedom score was increasing rapidly until it dropped dramatically in the year 2000,
reflecting both the government’s compromise over water privatization and the unease of
foreign investment due to massive unrest. This is expected given the ideological leanings
and goals of these presidents and the policies enacted during the 1990s. The score
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recovered somewhat until 2004, while the Carlos Mesa government continued
negotiations with other countries on privatization of natural gas, and began a steady
decline with the onset of new protests and the president’s resignation. These scores
coincide with the Gas War in 2003, and the election of Evo Morales as president marks
another swift decline in 2006. The scores have continued to drop throughout the
president’s re-election and subsequent years to lower than in 1995, the first year of the
analysis. Because I observe a steady decline in neoliberal scores, I categorize neoliberal
commitment from 1995-2002 as strong, declining from 2002-2004, and weak after 2005.
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Figure 1: Economic Freedom
Data are from the Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom /www.heritage.org
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This section has illustrated the justification and coding for two major
characteristics of the state. The first variable relates to the state structural changes that
introduced political opportunities to indigenous women’s mobilization, and these are
coded open between 1993 and 1997, closed between 1997 and 2005, and very open from
2005 on. The second variable of interest is neoliberal commitment of the executive
administration, found to be strong during the 1995-2002 period, declining between 20022004 and weak between 2005-2012.

International Forces 1994-2012
To test the hypothesis that international forces impact indigenous women’s ability
to influence policy, I investigate various facets of the international environment,
including international women’s organizational meetings, foreign state influences,
influence of international lending agencies, and characteristics of the international
indigenous rights movement. The international networking capabilities (and additional
financial and membership resources) provided to indigenous women, and increase in
international support for the cause of indigenous rights should create an atmosphere
where indigenous women are more likely to succeed. In the period of the 1990s, this
dialogue was only emerging, but in the 2000s, the idea of indigenous rights was more
pervasive. This positive influence has been somewhat hampered by international lending
agencies’ prescriptions for future lending.
International Indigenous Movements
During the 1990s, a very significant international influence, from the perspective
of indigenous people in Latin America, was the Zapatista’s indigenous uprising in
response to Mexico’s signing of NAFTA in 1994. Various facets of the Zapatista struggle
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resounded with indigenous people in Bolivia. Like the Zapatistas, indigenous people in
Bolivia shared the outrage against the adoption of neoliberal economic policies that
disproportionately disadvantage indigenous people in rural areas. They also shared a
condemnation of colonizing forces and made demands on governments to recognize
indigenous rights, including their rights to culture and autonomy as indigenous citizens,
as important elements to democracy. The Zapatista uprising is relevant to the emergence
of indigenous social movements elsewhere in Latin America not only because of its wide
coverage as an international issue that garnered support from many countries and regions
around the world, but also because it represented the beginning of transnational
indigenous identity (Stephenson 2002; Choque 2007; Andolina et al 2005; Brysk 2000).
The references to the Zapatistas entered indigenous public rhetoric in local and national
spaces in Bolivia. For example, in 1995, Guido Anez Moscoso of the MIR party stated
publicly that forceful eradication was leading to greater violence—“turning Chapare into
another Chiapas!”-- because of the government’s unilateral action to eradicate crops (El
Diario 1995k). These statements are important, because, as Stephenson (2002) argues:
The importance of international ties among indigenous organizations cannot be
overestimated…indigenous peoples throughout the Americas are engaged in “un
desnacionalismo de estado,” looking to interlocutors beyond the nation-state with
the desire to construct alternate forums of political and cultural identification.
(Stephenson 2002: 114)
The internationalization of indigenous movements was also cemented through the
hemisphere-wide mobilization of indigenous organizations to protest official celebrations
of the 500th anniversary of Columbus in 1995. Also important was indigenous women’s
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participation through many of the international organizational meetings that formed broad
agreements on internationally recognized rights of indigenous people and women.
International Organizations and Agreements
In the 1990s, other important international factors also changed as indigenous
women in Bolivia seized upon the opportunity for participating in the 1995 United
Nations Women’s Conference in Beijing, in which the Declaration of Indigenous Women
demanded:
1) Recognition and respect for indigenous self-determination, 2) recognition and
respect for the right to indigenous territories and development, education, and
health, 3) stopping human rights violations and all forms of violence against
indigenous women, 4) recognition and respect for indigenous cultural and
intellectual inheritance and the right to control biological diversity in indigenous
territories, and 5) assurance of the political participation of indigenous women
and to amplify their access to resources. (United Nations 1995)

This declaration came after Bolivia’s ratification of CEDAW (United Nations
Convention to End All Forms of Discrimination Against Women) in September 1989,
which subjected the laws and practices of Bolivia to review under subsequent
conferences (United Nations 1995b). In 1995, the convention’s meetings addressed
several issues which motivated indigenous women’s mobilization during the period,
including the domestic violence law, the Law of Popular Participation’s effects for
indigenous women, concerns about the effects of economic development on women
(United Nations 1995a: 2; United Nations 1995b: 2-4), and the issues surrounding
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indigenous girls’ and women’s barriers to primary education and reproductive health care
(United Nations 1995a: 2-5). While CEDAW is concerned with the rights of all women,
the themes of “indigenous” women’s rights run throughout the documents, which
question and analyze the legal situation of Bolivia (United Nations 1995a, 1995b).
Questions were repeatedly raised by convention members on the gender implications of
bilingual education, rural indigenous women’s access to reproductive health care and
contraceptives, as well as mechanisms within Bolivian law to allow for the integration of
indigenous women into the political sphere. The representatives from Bolivia indicated
that while in 1995,
Bolivia’s judges and judicial authorities had very little knowledge of the
Convention and did not often invoke its provisions in handing down judgments…
the situation was changing and a growing number of lawyers were using the
Convention to defend women’s rights. (United Nations 1995b: 2)
The 2008 meeting lauded a number of Bolivian political landmarks for indigenous
women, including intentional acts by Evo Morales to ensure indigenous women’s
representation in the cabinet and an increase in congressional elections of women, but
also suggested that there were continued cultural, logistical, and political barriers that
remained to women gaining representation and leadership in local and national posts in
Bolivia (United Nations 2008). CEDAW is a significant accord in its ability to influence
states to recognize forms of discrimination and in the international consensus to enforce
the convention, signified by its ratification by 186 other countries by 2010 (ACLU 2010).
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Beginning in the 1990s, there has been a striking process of state integration and
hemispheric and global growth of indigenous rights movements, with a series of UN
projects and ILO attempts to change standards and rules for governments’ treatment of
indigenous peoples (Brysk 2000:249). These agreements give an approximation of the
growth of the strength of the indigenous movement internationally, especially in
comparing two different indigenous rights accords and the number of signees. ILO
Convention 169, which recognizes the rights and territories of indigenous peoples, was
signed by Bolivia in 1991 and 22 other countries at various times (ILO 2011). In fact,
many of the changes in the legal code, which came under Sanchez de Lozada’s
administration, were responses to the ratification of the convention. Twenty years later
Bolivia made the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into
national law. The law dictates an extensive set of standards for indigenous rights to
autonomy, indigenous forms of justice, and land rights (ILO 2011). This declaration
passed the United Nations General Assembly in 2007, with 144 states in favor (United
Nations 2007).
Foreign States
Various international factors affected the specific issues about which indigenous
women mobilized over the time period in question. Sometimes international forces were
overtly exercising control over Bolivian policy, as in the case of coca policy and the
United States’ war against drugs during the 1990s (Farthing and Ledebum 2004; AFP
1995e5; El Diario 1995j1). In other cases, international influences were subtler, and
included, for example, the unpopularity of selling natural gas to foreigners California and
Mexico via a Chilean pipeline and Brazilian petroleum companies during the early 2000s
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(Energy Information Administration 2012; Webber 2005a; Hodges-Copple 2007; BBC
2004). Similarly, resentment over foreign construction companies from Brazil in the
disputes over the highway through the TIPNIS territory represents tensions with foreign
businesses as an important political influence (Echazú 2011; Saucedo 2012; L. Press
2012). Finally, while the United States held significant power over Bolivian domestic
policy during the 1990s, by the time the cocalero union leader Evo Morales became
president, the United States was exhibiting much less influence. President G.W. Bush’s
and Barak Obama’s “decertification” of Bolivia as a drug war ally, the subsequent
ceasing of foreign aid from the U.S. and the International Monetary Fund, and the
expulsion of the U.S. Ambassador from Bolivia (Wolff 2011; Corz 2012), are all factors
that decreased the ability of the United States to impact Bolivia’s domestic policy, which
has contributed to a more supportive international political environment for indigenous
women’s issues.
International Lending
International companies and lending institutions placed a great deal of pressure on
the Bolivian government to increase privatization measures related to natural resources in
the country as conditions for further lending (Kohl 2004; Eurodad 2006; PBS
2002;Samper 2003). As Kohl (2004) and La Razon (2003) report, in early 2003, the IMF
demanded that the Bolivian government reduce its deficit from 8.5% to 5.5% of its GDP,
or by $240 million. The major issues of contention in the 2000s interim period included
bitter disputes over the privatization of water and natural gas reserves, with IMF and
World Bank continuing to press for policies that were largely unpopular with the
indigenous, women’s, and broader sector social movements (Kohl 2004: 902; Hodges99

Copple 2007; BBC 2004). The IMF cut off new lines of credit to Bolivia in 2006, due to
failed negotiations with the Morales government (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2006; Weisbrot
2007), effectively stifling their influence on the country. Thus, for the period of the Gas
and Water Wars in Bolivia (2000-2005), the international environment is coded as
obstructive to indigenous women’s policy goals, and supportive after Evo Morales’
election.
International Influences, Summary
Because international accords were signed in the period between 1991 and 2000,
but because few countries committed to these accords, and because significant opposition
to certain indigenous mobilizations (coca, specifically) was present from foreign
influences, I consider the international environment as supportive of indigenous women’s
policy issues. Largely because there were no international agreements to analyze during
the period between 2000 and 2007, and because of the evidence that the World Bank and
IMF strongly opposed nationalization of natural resources, the transition period is coded
as having an obstructive international environment. Because the international community
has grown more favorable to indigenous women in the post-neoliberal period, and
Bolivia has maintained its efforts to keep these indigenous and women’s rights accords
ratified in the legal code, I characterize the period between 2006 and present as highly
supportive of indigenous women’s issues. This period is also categorized as highly
supportive since international opposition includes tensions with states that have little
actual control over Bolivian policy, and there is also limited influence exercised by the
United States since the election of Evo Morales. While I expect international influences
to be important, it can also be noted that the international dialogue exists everywhere in
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Latin America, to different ends. Responses within Bolivia may also be less impacted by
international events than other Latin American countries because their indigenous
movement is large and relies less upon transnational support than many in the region
(Brysk 2000: 16, 76).

Conclusions
This analysis places independent variables selected for study under investigation
to assess their values at different times during the period between 1994 and 2012. This
chapter has addressed the status of the major independent variables over the time period
in question, and determined that several important changes have occurred. The increase
in important resources such as membership and women’s leadership in social movements,
the adoption of gendered and ethnic along with broad frames, and the increase in public
support stand out as important changes among my independent variables. Changes in
state structure –the decline of neoliberalism and state reforms--that allow for indigenous
women’s mobilization, have also experienced significant changes through this time
period. Finally, the adoption of the indigenous rights discourse by a growing number of
countries indicates a more supportive international environment for indigenous women’s
mobilization. The values of the independent variables are presented in Table 2. These are
explored more fully in future chapters.
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Table 2: Summary of Independent Variable Coding
Time Period

Organizational
Variable Scores
Resources:
Moderate
Frames: BNG

State Variable
Scores
POS=Partially
Open
Neoliberalism:
Strong

International
Variable Scores
Supportive

Transition
Period

Resources: High
Frames: EBG

POS=Closed
Neoliberalism:
Declining

Obstructive

Post-Liberal
Period

Resources: Very
High
Frames: EBG

POS=Very Open
Neoliberalism:
Weak

Supportive

Neoliberal
period

*Frames: BNG= Broad, Non-Gendered; EBG: Ethnic, Broad, Gendered
POS=Political Opportunity Structure
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Chapter IV
Struggles for Land, Literacy, Coca and Justice: a Record of Indigenous
Women’s Mobilizing in the 1990s
In the early 1990s, mobilization of indigenous women in Bolivia surged
significantly, exhibiting a number of protests, strikes, and demonstrations against the
government’s discriminatory policies and practices. Much of this mobilization was in
response to failed policies on agricultural reform, education, and the mission to eradicate
coca plants in impoverished regions that were home to both tropical-born indigenous and
displaced indigenous tin miners (Yashar 2005:185-185; Brysk 2000: 117). The election
of Sanchez de Lozada and his intellectual, indigenous running mate Victor Hugo
Cardenas, signaled a shift in Bolivian policy toward pacifying the indigenous population.
A former cabinet member to Paz Zamora’s administration, celebrated for ending
hyperinflation in the 1980s, Sanchez de Lozada carried twin objectives of capitalization
and modernization, which necessitated appeasing intensifying indigenous tensions. While
instituting a range of privatization measures for the economy, the Sanchez de Lozada
administration also amended the constitution in favor of indigenous recognition and
territorial rights and passed the Education and Agricultural Reform laws. Each of these
reforms contained both neoliberal and indigenous-inclusive elements. These laws
combined clauses of indigenous recognition with decentralization and municipalization,
which, to some degrees, created political opportunities for indigenous women and other
marginalized people.17
This chapter analyzes the impact of indigenous women’s mobilization in
17

But see Clisby (2005), Nugent (2002), and Radcliffe (2004) for arguments about the
unevenness of the impacts of these reforms.
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particular “policy moments” in the mid-1990s related to the cocalera movement, the
INRA, education reform, and the domestic violence law. This research hypothesizes that
several features of women’s organization, the state, and the international environment are
likely to influence indigenous women’s policy outcomes.
First, greater human capital resources are expected to enhance indigenous
women’s probability of achieving their policy goals. I assert that greater numbers in
protesters, strong networks, and women’s leadership will increase indigenous women’s
chances of policy success. My second hypothesis posits that the language of activism, or
frames, influence the success of indigenous women’s policy efforts. Frames that appeal to
the non-indigenous sector of the public are expected to be more successful than frames
and claims that represent indigenous people, or indigenous women specifically. Further,
non-gendered frames will be more successful than those containing claims for the rights
of women. The third hypothesis posits generally that state structures creating
opportunities for indigenous women will help produce outcomes in their favor. Reforms
or other structural changes that create political opportunities will positively impact
indigenous women’s policy success. However, neoliberalism will be negatively
associated with most indigenous women’s claims, due to the fact that neoliberal aims are
often at odds with the demands that indigenous women make. Finally, I expect that
international support for indigenous issues will increase indigenous women’s chances of
success by influencing state structures to extend justice to indigenous people. However,
in some instances, international influences that oppose indigenous women’s policy efforts
are expected to decrease their chances of favorable outcomes. This chapter tests these
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hypotheses with the cases of the cocalera movement, the INRA, education reform, and
the domestic violence bill of 1995.
The evidence in this chapter is based upon qualitative analysis of newspapers,
secondary research, social movement organizations’, NGO’s, state ministry’s, and
various other organizations’ publications.18 In addition to coding of organizational, state,
and international characteristics as outlined in the previous chapter, I analyze historical
records, scholarly accounts, and news reports to determine the outcome of cases as
successful or failed. If the policy outcome is successful, then it incorporates the claims
made by indigenous women during mobilizations. If the outcome is failed, then policy
has excluded the demands of indigenous women from the policy outcome. Mixed cases
are those policy outcomes that incorporate part of women’s goals while neglecting other
important goals.
The outcomes associated with the INRA and education reform are considered
mixed due to the fact that indigenous women’s activism for their community was
successful, but attempts for gendered justice in land reforms fell short of meeting their
goals. Both of these movements expressed concerns that related to the entire indigenous
community as well as to indigenous women’s particular concerns. The case of domestic
violence is successful due to the fact that the singular goal of passing the law was
achieved by indigenous women and their co-protesters. Finally, the case of coca

18

Sources include Foodfirst, CEDLA-Bolivia (Center for Labor and Agricultural
Studies), the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, Bartolina Sisa, UNIFEM (United
Nations Development Fund for Women), the Bolivia legal code, the Bolivian
constitution, Ministry of Gender documents. The procedure for coding of the
independent variables is the same as outlined in Chapter 3.
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represents a clear case of failure, due to the fact that during the time period investigated
here (1994-2000), indigenous women’s efforts to influence coca eradication policy
consistently fell short of their goals. Table 3 offers a view of the cases and their outcomes
on the dependent variable, policy success/failure.
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Table 3: Selected Cases and Coding
Policy Moment
Outcome
INRA passage

Mixed

Education reform passage

Mixed

Domestic Violence passage

Success

Cocalera Conflict (1995-96)

Failed
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Coca Mobilization
The Law of the Coca Regime and Controlled Substances, Law 1008, adopted in
1988, established the prohibition and criminalization of the coca leaf as well as the
guidelines for forced eradication and penalties for cultivation of the plant (Bolivia 1988).
The law reflects restrictions the United States placed on aid to Bolivia, an important part
of the U.S. war on drugs. Eradication efforts escalated in the Andean region during the
1990s, creating massive unrest among indigenous peoples (United States Congressional
Report 2007). Because indigenous people have a cultural connection with the use of the
coca leaf, the conflict relates as much to the need for cultural autonomy as for economic
subsistence. The issue of coca cultivation in the country has greatly influenced the
political landscape since the 1990s (United States Congressional Report 2007).
Indigenous people have demanded that the government stop forced eradication and have
accused the government of rampant human rights abuses in the process of eradicating
coca crops. This section focuses on the height of indigenous women’s efforts in the mid1990s, and explains how organizational, state, and international influences affected the
outcome of coca eradication policy. The value of the dependent variable, as described
above, reflects whether or not indigenous women’s demands were considered at an
important policy moment. This particular “policy moment” covers an intense but
protracted battle during 1995-96 and its culmination in government negation of
indigenous women’s goals. The government’s refusal to adequately address human rights
abuse accusations or respond to indigenous women’s demand for an end to forced
eradication indicates that indigenous women’s policy efforts resulted in failure.
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Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement: Numbers, Networks and
Leadership
The issue of coca eradication in the 1990s presents an interesting case for
indigenous women in Bolivia. No other issue garnered as much activity among
indigenous women as did the issue of coca. The news reports from the 1994-1996 period
reveal a strong presence of thousands of female indigenous coca growers in protests,
marches, and demonstrations. The news reports also refer to ongoing protest against the
government’s eradication policies since the early 1990s. During the years 1995-1996,
working alongside the CSUTCB (Syndicated Campesino Workers Union of Bolivia),
indigenous women from coca growing regions organized numerous massive marches.
Sometimes they protested, conducted roadblocks, and participated in other acts of
rebellion with their male counterparts, but many times they conducted activities on their
own, for example marching from Cochabamba to La Paz on foot, with in tow (El Diario
1995a; 1995g; 199d5; 1995o; 1995o1). This activity reflects a historical tendency among
indigenous organizations to mobilize women as an extra force on behalf of the wider
community. Indigenous women were highly regarded as meaningful contributors to
larger goals, even while gendered obstacles within the organizations kept women from
sharing in positions of power and having their goals integrated with those of the larger
community (León 1990: 143-144). The combined local coca growers’ union, the Six
Federations of Coca Growers of the Tropics of Cochabamba, which served as the base for
cocalera activism in the 1990s, was originally based on male participation, with women
taking on roles of food preparation and childcare. Though Evo Morales, then president of
the Six Federations, began calling female members into more active roles like protests
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and marches in 1994 and 1995, it was not until 1997 before women leaders were elected
to lead alongside male leaders (Vargas and Draper 2010).
The mobilization of significant indigenous women’s resources in numbers was
not enough to overcome women’s low presence in leadership positions and weaker,
ethnic-based network ties. Although cocaleras gained the support of networking allies in
Andean groups Bartolina Sisas and the CSUTCB (El Diario 1995a; 1995b; 1995c;
1995d; AFP 1995p18), these particular ties signified a narrower ethnic base, and thus, a
weaker one that did not include broad sector involvement. Moderate amounts of
resources deployed against the state resulted in failure for indigenous women’s goals, as
the state ultimately refused to respond to their demands. The hypothesis that high
amounts of human capital resources are more likely to contribute to favorable outcomes
gains support from this evidence. Similarly, indigenous women’s lack of leadership on
the coca issue supports the hypothesis that high numbers of women in leadership
positions in the movement increase indigenous women’s chances of favorable policy
outcomes.
Organizational Characteristics: Frames
While the numbers of marchers represented impressive resources, and the
networks with other women’s and indigenous groups in El Alto (especially Bartolinas
Sisas) created a support base for indigenous women coca activists (El Diario 1995i),
several other organizational features were also displayed in the news reports of
indigenous women’s mobilization. The coca issue carried broad frames related to
campesino rights, and the interchanging of the term cocaleras and campesinas in the
coca-growing region is pervasive in public reports of the conflict in coca growing regions
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(El Diario: 1995f, 1995g, 1995d; 1995i). Second, the news reports documenting
women’s frames emphasize their suffering at the hands of the government (El Diario:
1995j, 1995k, 1995l). This was an important framing tool in that it diagnosed the social
problem faced by women and called for action to address it (Snow et al 2004; Davies
1999; Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992). Indigenous women publicly denounced
kidnappings, rapes and beatings of women, in addition to alleged looting, robberies and
dispossessions from homes due to the presence of soldiers and the militarization of the
tropical region (El Diario 1995e, 1995q, 1995r, 1995s). Important to note is that the
human rights violations were broadly situated frames that were notably absent of ethnic
and gendered references, consistent with the coding of frames as broad and non-gendered
for the time period. Indigenous female coca growers in the 1990s also relied upon an
accusatory and derogatory framework that held the government and U.S. “imperialism”
to blame for the policy of forced coca eradication (El Diario: 1995a, 1995n, 1995o). In
addition, indigenous women and their organizations disputed the government’s
statements about the militarization of the Chapare zone, and argued that the government
was only giving lip service to the plans for “alternative development” that were never
fulfilled (El Diario 1995r).
The noteworthy language of frames of their activities was neither ethnic, nor
gendered; coca was not framed as an issue that included gendered human rights in
referencing the rights of the coca-growing region. In the march from Cochabamba to La
Paz, cocaleras named their protest “For Dignity, Sovereignty, Life, and Coca” (El Diario
1995w). Further, a statement released by the Bartolina Sisa in El Alto called for all
Bolivian women to show solidarity for the cocaleras, stating that while the government
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“energetically continued the brutal repression,” the children and women were
experiencing “the disgrace of living without protection or guarantees in a country where
they say total democracy rules” (AFP 1995p18). These non-ethnic references to
repression and suffering resonate throughout the news reports of coca activism. Such
frames for are somewhat contradicted by the fact that the substance of the claims related
exclusively to issues that affected an indigenous group.
The government forcefully discredited indigenous women’s claims of human
rights violations by the government officials of UMOPAR (Unidad Móvil de Patrullaje
Rural/Mobile Rural Patrol Unit) and the ecological police, who were in charge of
executing eradication plans in the region of Chapare. Repeated demands by the
CSUTCB (Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) and COB (Center for Bolivian
Labor) for the government to investigate human rights violations and the constitutionality
of Ley 1008 (the law establishing eradication goals of hundreds of thousands of hectares
of coca) were eventually recognized by the government, but the government’s decision to
modify the law was restricted to clauses regarding double jeopardy and the innocence of
the accused. In the later months of 1995, the government ignored the human rights
violations that included more brutal acts against coca growers, especially against women
(AFP 1995p18). The failure of the movement’s appeals to broader issues such as human
rights and U.S. interference contradicts the expectation of the hypothesis that broad, nonethnic frames would increase indigenous women’s chances of favorable policy outcomes.
The coca movement provides some important insight on what issues in the 1990s could
be pressed and gain public and government support. First, coca mobilization failure alerts
us to the fact that the language used to represent a movement is important, but the actual
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content of the demands also matter, both to the government and to potential supporters of
the cause. Second, as I investigate in coming subsections, international and state
characteristics are important components that shape the final outcome.
State Characteristics: State Political Opportunity Structure (Reforms)
The effects of the state structure on indigenous women’s success on the coca issue
are reflections of international pressure to control narcotics trafficking from the U.S. and
the requirements from international lending institutions to modernize the state, including
instilling the rule of law. Repeatedly, news reports quoted officials within government
citing the rule of law and U.S. agreements as important principles to be considered in the
eradication controversy. For example, repeated references by government ministry
officials revealed a preoccupation with meeting the established eradication goals in order
to remain eligible for aid from the United States (El Diario: 1995e5, 1995f6). Various
officials quoted in April of 1995 denied the militarization of Chapare and insisted that the
government was following the law in eradication of coca. These officials justified state
action with various references to nationalism and building a stronger, more stable Bolivia
(El Diario 1995n). The COB and CSUTCB countered with accusations that the
government was repressing peasants in the region of Chapare, citing the death of an
innocent elderly man and thirteen-year-old girl in the skirmishes as proof of the
government’s transgressions against cocaleros (El Diario 1995e5). In addition, the COB
and CSUTCB publicly denounced the government’s reaction against various peaceful
marches by women and children from coca growing regions. According to these
organizations, military and police dispersed women and children using tear gas, pepper
spray, intimidation, and violence (El Diario: 1995f6, 1995n). As mentioned above the
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government negated indigenous women’s demands to end forced eradication, and only
addressed the language of Law 1008 in order to make it accordant with the standards of
domestic and international human rights watch groups on double jeopardy and innocence
of the accused (El Diario: 1995n; 1995h8; 1995i9). By the beginning of 1996, when
cocaleras made the long march from Cochabamba to La Paz, the government showed no
signs of compromise toward indigenous women, publicly stating that the discussion of
ending coca eradication would not happen (El Diario 1996g). In the previous chapter, I
identified the political opportunity structure as partially open during the neoliberal period,
but case-specific details reveal more nuanced differences in opportunity structures. When
indigenous women confronted the state about coca, its stance was closed, resulting in
failure for their policy objectives. This fact highlights the importance of political
structural opportunities, which supports the political opportunity hypothesis.
International Features
A variety of international events and agreements created a favorable atmosphere
for indigenous mobilization, motivating women to push for policy change. The ILO 169,
already mentioned, was a vital force in creating both international and state cooperation
on the matter of indigenous rights. Bolivia’s adoption of statutes both in the constitution
of 1994 and in the INRA that reflect indigenous rights to territories and land are
examples of that particular international influence overlapping with domestic pressures to
alleviate ethnic inequalities in Bolivia. As referenced in the previous chapter, the
Zapatista uprising was making international headlines along with a general atmosphere of
protest in the American continent surrounding the “celebration” of Columbus’ 500th
Anniversary, making indigenous complaints internationally significant.
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Considering the international pressure and direct intervention coming from the
United States on the issue of coca may provide some clues as to why the issue failed
where others did not during the neoliberal period. The United States first began trading
aid for eradication with Bolivia in the 1980s as an effort to combat the supply side of the
United States’ drug use epidemic. Although protest against the policy was high, Bolivia’s
government continually entered into and enforced the eradication agreements forged with
the United States (El Diario1995j; 1996h). On the national level, the direct international
influence of the United States is apparent, but a more indirect international influence
relates to the ways in which international influence catalyzed indigenous mobilization.
“Neocolonialismo,” “imperialismo” and a shaming rebuke of the Bolivian government
for kneeling to the United States’ foreign policy were common cries of protest during the
cocalera movement’s marches during the last months of 1995 and early 1996 (El Diario
1995e5; 1995o; 1996). International forces have been coded as supportive for indigenous
women’s causes over the course of the 1990s. However, as with state structural
opportunities, further breakdown of case-specific environmental factors indicates that
international forces look different than the overall international environment for the
period. Coca is the only policy arena discussed in this chapter that was the source of
international opposition, and it was the only protest to be so harshly put down. This rare
deviation from the general coding of independent variables draws attention to the fact
that there may be different structural factors to consider with different types of policies.
The evidence that international opposition can be detrimental to indigenous women’s
efforts supports the hypothesis that international opposition may interfere with
indigenous women’s policy objectives. In addition, I argue that international influences
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are best seen as mitigated by organizational and state characteristics, and that the closed
opportunity structure combines to create an especially unfavorable outcome for
indigenous women’s goals.
Summary of Coca Policy Outcome
The previous sections have outlined the major factors influencing the outcome of
coca policy. Exhibiting high numbers of protesters and participants, but weak network
ties and low presence of women in leadership, indigenous women’s overall assessment of
resources is coded as moderate. State structural opportunities were considered partially
open during the 1990s, but the closed nature of structures for this particular issue resulted
in failure for indigenous women’s efforts. In addition, while international forces were
largely supportive of indigenous women’s issues in this period, the coca-specific
response from the United States interacted with the political opportunity structure to
prevent indigenous women from changing eradication policy. Together, moderate
resources, broad, non-gendered frames, closed political opportunity structures, and
international opposition obstructed indigenous women’s attempts.

Education Reform
The Law of Education Reform in 1994 established a new set of policies to
modernize the education system. A large part of the reform was to address the lagging
access of indigenous people to primary education, particularly that of girls, who have an
especially hard time getting education in Bolivia due to poverty, distance from schools,
and especially, being non-Spanish speaking. Along with the land reform measure, this
piece of legislation was specifically designed to bring legal statutes in line with
constitutional revisions passed in the same year to recognize indigenous peoples’ rights.
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These reforms were made to respond to growing indigenous pressure in the country,
which had culminated with the March for Territory and Dignity and the mobilization
against the celebration of the 500th anniversary of Columbus’ “discovery” of the
Americas (Brysk 2000: 77; Lucero 2008: 96, 166; Deere and León 2002a: 65; Van Cott
2000: 170; Postero and Zamosc 2004:195-196). Although the policies were top-down
reforms that could be controlled by the state, indigenous women were nonetheless
extremely vocal through their participation in the larger indigenous groups CSUTCB and
Bartolina Sisa. Through their organized protest activity, they attempted to persuade the
government to include various measures (such as bilingual education) and to pass the law
into legislation (El Diario: 1995t, 1995u). Moreover, in response to indigenous demands
to implement the law (El Diario 1995u; El Diario 1995m2), the government also
responded with bilingual and distance education programs to benefit indigenous people
(El Diario 1995x2). The outcome of indigenous women’s attempts to shape education
reform policy is mixed: on one hand, they advocated for, and got, bilingual education
policy, but they also advocated more quietly, and less successfully, for measures that
would address the inequalities in women’s access to education.
Organizational Characteristics: Human Resources Variables
In the previous chapter, I established the values of resources in numbers as high,
but network resources are coded as weak (for reasons identified below) while indigenous
women’s leadership is coded as low. This mixed outcome for indigenous women is
associated with moderate amounts of human capital resources.
Although the concern over the access to education for indigenous girls appeared
as an imperative issue for indigenous women with the plan for bilingual and intercultural
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education (Law #1553) in 1994, Luykx (2000) finds that in major national mobilizations
regarding education reform and other initiatives,
When the movement and its participants face scrutiny over the solidarity and
identity of indigenous culture, indigenous women are likely to place higher
salience on indigenous people’s concerns over their specific concerns as women.
(Luykx 2000:161)
Therefore, while indigenous women mobilized in support of the reform, the
strength of their activism was limited in the degree to which they pushed gender issues.
Although records of some interactions at local meetings and international meetings
indicate that they were aware that cultural, economic, and geographical obstacles
prevented girls from attending school (World Bank 1993; Luykx 2000), community
needs nonetheless were the items broadcast most loudly by indigenous women (Luykx
2000). Thus, the degree to which the law addressed gender was limited to “nonsexist
language” that discussed equal access of education for girls and boys (Bolivia 1994:
Article 1, #5)19. Although the pursuit of gendered objectives by indigenous women was
limited, it should not be taken as a sign that gender issues, “as a question of the social
construction of relations and identities of men and women, are absent from indigenous
communities” (Luykx 2000:161). While education reform failed to address the roots of
discrimination against indigenous women, the benefit to the entire indigenous community
represents progress. By addressing one of the long-standing causes of indigenous
peoples’ continued marginalization, education reform would provide opportunities by

19

Translated in Hornberger 2000
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opening a range of knowledge through bilingual education that had not previously existed
(El Diario 1995v).
When women attempted to improve indigenous women’s situations with low
leadership in the movement, the government was less likely to respond to their full
demands, which were unlikely to be fully articulated anyway. Women’s lacking
leadership and mixed outcome of education reform during the neoliberal period supports
the hypothesis that various human capital resources matter to the policy pursuits of
indigenous women. Women’s mobilization in favor of community goals may meet
community needs, but not on issues that are gender-specific, as the case of education
reform illustrates.
Networks
Education reform contained fragmenting elements for the indigenous movement,
related to the loyalties of highland indigenous groups to teachers’ unions, who were
adamantly opposed to the 1994 legislation (El Diario: 1995u; 1995t; Van Cott 2000:
295). Amazonian indigenous groups were supportive of bilingual education and had
begun a campaign for such in 1992 (Gustafson 2008: 213). These indigenous groups did
not ally with teachers and other unions, and had less confrontational interactions in the
past with the state (Gustafson 2002: 278; Gustafson 2008: 213; Lucero 2008: 117-118).
In addition, in the early stages of education reform (late 1994 to early 1995) there was
significant speculation by lowland and especially highland indigenous leaders that
education reform was another trick by the government to co-opt and manipulate
indigenous voters (El Diario 1995s2; 1995t2; Gustafson 2002: 278). In fact, the
indigenous leadership was suspicious of all of Sanchez de Lozada’s proposed reforms
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that addressed indigenous issues, which were nicknamed the “leyes malditas” (“damned
laws”) by many indigenous indigenous organizations (El Diario 1995z; EFE 1995t).
However, by late January 1995, the CSUTCB, which had stood by teachers’ unions
during their protests of the law, were now calling for implementation of the education
reform (and agricultural reform) in their protests (El Diario 1995u; El Diario 1995m2).
The importance of networks as important human capital resources is illustrated by the
challenge to the relationship between long-time allies in teachers’ unions, and the
indigenous-centered plan for bilingual education. Because of these difficulties, the overall
value of human capital resources is coded as moderate. When these resources confronted
the reforms in education, they resulted in mixed outcomes. My first hypothesis argues
that various organizational resources matter to the success of mobilization by indigenous
women. The initial fragmentation between highland and lowland groups, as well as the
lack of women in leadership positions, slowed progress on women’s issues in education
reform, and led to less cohesive efforts to achieve gender parity in education.
Organizational Characteristics: Frames
My hypothesis that broad claims and frames increase chances of policy influence
is somewhat corroborated by the fact that education reform achieved significant gains for
goals that identified the needs of indigenous people. It is also interesting to note that even
though these laws addressed ethnic inequality in the country, the language of protest and
organization—the frames-- remained expressive of “campesino” activism (El Diario:
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1995v, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d; 1996k).20 News reports reveal that the concerns of
indigenous women who were in favor of education reform aligned with the major
indigenous leaders about increasing access of bilingual education to indigenous people.
The women of Bartolina Sisa expressed this solidarity with the CSUTCB and the COB in
statements that called upon the government to implement education reform, but these
statements did not reflect women’s need to address gender inequity in access to education
(El Diario 1995m; 1995d). However, undeniable messages about ethnic inequality were
present in indigenous claims pressing for education without discrimination and to ensure
that indigenous people receive education in their native language. This case illustrates
that non-ethnic or broad framing can achieve some goals for the community, since the
government responded to these claims by initiating reforms to accommodate indigenous
needs. However, these types of frames did not ensure complete success, which introduces
some doubt about the hypothesis that broad and non-gendered frames are more conducive
to success.
State Characteristics: Political Opportunity Structure (Reforms)
The indigenous protests since the early 1990s had resulted in partially successful
outcomes for their goals. Even after the promulgation of the law, government continued
to respond to indigenous demands for the implementation of the reform. Bilingual
education reform fit into the multicultural project and the aims for modernization because
it included “the sociocultural heterogeneity of the country in an atmosphere of respect for

20

The emerging language relating to indigeneity began to emerge during battles over
education reform; it was inevitable in passing as references to “indigenous languages”
(Reforma Educativa 1994), but it would not be commonplace for print news to
consistently reference people as indigenous until the mid-2000s.
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all, male and female” as an important principle (Bolivia 1994: Article 1, #5)21. Nonsexist language can be found in other parts of education reform, including one of the
eight overall objectives: "to construct an intercultural and participatory educational
system that facilitates educational access by all Bolivians, with no discrimination
whatsoever" (Bolivia 1994: Article 2, #5).22 The inclusion of indigenous—and
indigenous women, however marginally—into policy language falls in line with the
hypothesis that state restructuring presented opportunities that would increase indigenous
women’s access to political processes in the country. Research at the time was clear in
making a connection between increased education and economic development, and the
causes for failing indigenous education were also thoroughly researched and documented
(World Bank 2000; El Diario 1996g). Again, given the need to modernize, and given the
fact that bilingual education itself was a program specifically promoted by the World
Bank (Gustafson 2002), the political will existed to support a clause that ensured equal
access of bilingual education to men and women. However, the state structure also
influenced the degree of success in following the neoliberal tendency toward
mainstreaming policies that were rarely effective in achieving goals of gender parity. The
openness of the opportunity structure is reflected in Bolivia’s passage and
implementation of the law between 1994 and 1995. These laws have been criticized
because they only nominally factored girls’ education needs into the policy, while
ignoring the geographical, economic, and cultural reasons that girls were often excluded
from education (Contreras 2003). And while today there is evidence that years of primary
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education for girls is now closer to that of boys, and the educational gap between
indigenous and other groups closing, sizeable gendered and ethnic gaps remain
(Contreras 2003:8). Because of the somewhat progressive stance of the Sanchez de
Lozada administration toward indigenous issues in the mid-1990s, education reform was
able to achieve partial success. News reports indicate this success continued through
implementation of the reform in response to indigenous demands (El Diario 1995y2),
There is therefore some evidence for the hypothesis that political opportunities are
important factors. At the same time, the failure to include gendered specifics into policy
may also be evidence of the “partial” nature of the political opportunity structure’s ability
to obstruct gendered success.
State Characteristics: Neoliberalism
Education reform was undertaken in a period of neoliberal reforms intended to
limit intervention in the economy, but education was seen as an acceptable arena for
government intervention because of its importance to development and modernization by
improving human capital (Gustafson 2002: 277). Although neoliberalism might be seen
as obstructive to indigenous women’s interests, the reforms undertaken to meet state
goals of political development and economic growth created a political opportunity
structure that was open to some of the demands of impoverished indigenous
communities. Sanchez de Lozada lamented teachers’ and universities’ resistance to the
education reform bill, arguing that states must become educated to become wealthy and
that there was a “necessity for bilingual education for speakers of indigenous languages
to become educated and contribute to development” (El Diario 1995t). The government
of Sanchez de Lozada hastened to respond to the proposals that gender equity be built
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into the letter of the bilingual education policy because these goals aligned with the goal
of national neoliberal development, which requires a more educated population (El
Diario 1995t). The high neoliberal commitment of the period and partial success of
bilingual education gives some reason to doubt that neoliberal governments must always
be at odds with indigenous women’s success. However, any optimism to be gained from
this is clouded by the fact that more specific measures to address indigenous women’s
educational status were not addressed, and this is likely due to the mainstreaming
tendency of neoliberal reforms.
International Features
Education reform was an internationally and domestically promoted issue
addressed by policies from Sanchez de Lozada’s first term as president. Various
organizations, such as UNESCO and the World Bank supported the plans for Educational
Reform in Bolivia, creating a more favorable international environment for indigenous
women’s policy influence (Gustafson 2002: 277; Gustafson 2009: 38, 154, 149, 166167). In addition, the International Labor Organization Convention 169 on Indigenous
and Tribal People proposed state-funded education programs at all levels to teach
indigenous languages and make educational materials available in native tongues (ILO
169 1989).
There were no gender-specific clauses within the language of the ILO 169 (Chase
2002: 28). However, the World Bank recognized the problem of gender inequality,
arguing that deficiencies in Bolivian education resulted from the problems with
government cuts in education spending. Other causes included,
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various barriers to access and obstacles to educational attainment, including
materials, inadequate teacher training, inattention to the needs of non Spanishspeaking populations, and deficient infrastructure, which particularly affect girls
and rural populations. (World Bank 1993: v)
Therefore, while the need to educate girls is recognized by the World Bank’s
projects in Bolivia, the end result is “legally equal” language that fails to address
underlying causes of women’s lack of access to education (including cultural, economic,
and geographic obstacles). Again, such tendencies are insufficient to ameliorate the
disadvantages of indigenous women because the measures failed to address their
underlying causes. The supportive international environment results in a mixed outcome
in the case of Education Reform, which partially supports the hypothesis that
international forces can affect indigenous women’s outcomes. On the one hand,
international support does seem to be important to the passage of the law from the
standpoint that the laws reflect ILO and World Bank recommendations for indigenous
rights. On the other hand, Bolivia’s failure to re-iterate the more extensive view of the
World Bank’s gender concerns into domestic policy indicates that international support
may have a limited effect on policies that affect indigenous women.
Summary of Education Reform Policy
With large numbers of participants, but weak networks and low women’s
leadership, the coding of indigenous women’s resources in the 1990s was moderate, and
indigenous women were able to achieve a limited victory for their community. However,
they made less impressive advances toward treating the issues that affect indigenous
girls’ lagging education. The mixed outcome in this case is consistent with my hypothesis
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that the amount of social movement resources employed affects policy outcomes. Also,
organizational frames of broad, non-ethnic, non-gendered public rhetoric surrounding
quite specifically indigenous demands indicated a fragmented public message that was,
regardless, able to attain a measure of success. The hypothesis that broader frames would
be more likely to succeed receives mixed support from this evidence. The public rhetoric
(the frames) surrounding education reform was non-ethnic or broad, so the mixed
outcome on education reform receives some support for the hypothesis that broad nongendered frames increase social movement success. Gendered frames, on the other hand,
were not an important factor in the attempts to influence policy, and to the degree that
community needs were met, there is limited support for the hypothesis that non-gendered
claims would contribute to indigenous women’s success. State political opportunity
structures were partially open, and indigenous women’s policy efforts for their
communities were conducted in an environment that was moderately favorable to their
outcomes. Similarly, neoliberal influence may actually have promoted education reform
to the degree that education is seen as a positive force for development, contradicting
expectations of my hypothesis. Finally, support from international forces spelled out
explicitly in agreements and meetings about indigenous women, indicates that while
support for education reform on the whole was helpful, international influence on the
treatment of women’s issues was less successful. Indigenous women’s ability to promote
these issues in their own spheres met with limitations because of their low leadership in
indigenous movements during this time. This point is relevant to the fact that the
independent variables under scrutiny interact with each other differently at different times
to affect outcomes.
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Land Reform (INRA)
Initial land reform in Bolivia was brought about through the land-takeovers
during the revolution in 1952, in which indigenous women played a well-documented
role (Kellogg 2005: 137; Bartolinas Sisa 2012). One of the most highly lauded successes
for indigenous groups during the 1990s was the passage of a new agricultural/land reform
bill, the INRA (Instituto Nacional Reforma Agraria), which, at least on its surface,
signaled a willingness of the Bolivian government to negotiate fairer dealings with
indigenous people. The issue of land distribution exploded in Bolivia during the 1990
March for Territory and Dignity, which was joined by all major indigenous groups (men
and women) in Bolivia.23 In response, the government of President Paz Zamora issued
four supreme decrees recognizing the rights of the major indigenous groups of the
Amazon and their rights to indigenous lands, a step that had never been taken in Bolivian
law at that point. The following year, Bolivia ratified the ILO’s Convention 169, which
recognized indigenous peoples’ rights to ancestral lands and territories. Still, the
government reserved a loophole for itself in declaring the lands as “original communal
lands” instead of “indigenous lands” because, according to the ILO Accord, indigenous
land rights included the right to subsoil, which includes mineral rights (Chase 2002: 65).
However, much to the frustration of indigenous communities, several years passed after
these political moves, without the development of necessary implementation mechanisms
(Ruiz 1993:20; Chase 2002: 65). In 1992, another major march from the lowlands of
Bolivia to La Paz resulted in another eight decrees issued by the government, recognizing
23

This major protest had originated with Amazonian, lower tropic groups (i.e., the
Guarani), which had been excluded from earlier land reforms.
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lands of other indigenous groups (Ruiz 1993:20; Chase 2002: 65). These commitments
were cemented in the 1994 constitution and the Law of Popular Participation (LPP),
which recognized the rights of all indigenous people to their original communal lands, the
inalienable character of collective property (Bolivia 1994: Article 171; Bolivia 1994:
Article1) and the recognition of Bolivia as a multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural state (Bolivia
1994: Article 1). The subsequent passage of the Law 1715, or the INRA, in 1996 (Bolivia
1996) in order to make policy commensurate with the LPP and the constitution was seen
as an important victory for indigenous movements. This outcome qualifies as a partial
success because the policy promised a more equitable land distribution among the
country’s poorest people. However, because indigenous women’s own concerns land
titles were not addressed, the outcome of the INRA policy is coded as mixed.
Organizational Characteristics: Human Capital Resources
In August 1996, indigenous women were highly active in demonstrations to press
for promulgation of a new agricultural reform bill. Law 1715 of the National Service of
Agrarian Reform (or INRA) was promulgated on Oct. 18, 1996 to put fair land
distribution into practice, a goal that had been on the statute books for decades but never
realized (Bolivia 1996; Inter Press Service 2008; El Diario 1996e). While an estimated
half of these protesters were women, women’s access to land was not addressed in
national mobilizations (Deere and León 2002a: 66).
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Indigenous women lack access to land for a number of reasons, which they
articulated in the 1995 Beijing Conference preparatory meetings in Bolivia. 24 The main
obstacles for land ownership identified by indigenous women in the 1990s included the
preference of men for inheritance of property within families, denial of credit to women
without property titles, denial of the right to own the land one works, and local cultural
traditions which view women as having relationships to the land through male relatives
(Deere and León 2002a: 71-72; Chavez 2009). In addition, many indigenous women lack
access to land reform institutions because they are illiterate and lack legal documentation
of their births (Deere and León 2001: 206; World Bank 1997). These problems are
exacerbated by male migration patterns, because access to credit depends upon land
ownership, and without male family members present, women and the family suffer
economically. The same situation holds for women who are abandoned by their
husbands—they often lose access to and benefits from lands they have managed for years
(Deere and León 2002a:72; Zoomers 2001:49-51).
While the concerns of indigenous women were voiced at the local and regional
level, when indigenous leaders entered national meetings to negotiate with policy makers,
they privileged the more general demand for recognition of indigenous territories and
defense of communal land (Salguero 1995:48; Deere and León 2002a: 72). To return to a
concept that helps shape indigenous women’s gender ideology, it is important to refer to
the role of complementarity in shaping women’s views of their oppression as something
external to their societies (Joyce 2000; Kellogg 2005). From this viewpoint, gender
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In the period 1956-1994, women represented 17% of the beneficiaries of Agrarian
Reform (Fundación Tierra 2010).
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oppression is not a part of the complementary relations between indigenous men and
women, but comes from the colonizing forces and mestizo society. The attempt to
include the distinctive issues of women in land reform was seen as divisive to indigenous
unity, and women viewed their responsibility in activism as important to recognizing
collective land rights and defending their communities (Salguero 1995:48; Deere and
León 2002a: 72). While scholars have identified that the number and membership of local
women’s groups had grown by the 1990s, indigenous women failed to gain power in
decision-making processes in larger mixed-gender indigenous groups, and they failed to
include a gendered perspective in the reforms of the 1990s (Deere and León 2001: 5052). Further, the proliferation of local-level women’s organizations since the 1980s had
resulted in greater participation of women—but their participation was in maledominated institutions that made negotiations with the government over policy (Deere
and León 2002a: 71; Burt 2004: 61). Nugert (2002) identifies the problems associated
with local organizations and women’s roles within them, finding that even in the rare
cases where women are titled property owners25 and therefore permitted to attend
political syndicate meetings, they are marginalized and segregated from men and
excluded from decisions on political issues (Nugert 2002a: 216-217). Other ethnographic
and qualitative research on indigenous women’s gender ideologies and participation
concludes that within-organization dynamics can hinder women’s advancement in mixedgender indigenous organizations (Radcliffe, et al 2003: 393; Clisby 2005; Deere and

25

Property ownership is a requirement for participation in government recognized
Organizational Territorial Base (OTB), or local units of decentralized governance within
smaller villages and indigenous communities.
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León 2001: 44-49). This dimension of organization deserves emphasis, since my
hypothesis about mobilization resources posits that increasing mobilization resources,
including female leadership in the movement, increases the likelihood of policy success.
Indigenous women mobilized numbers to push their claims for land justice, which
contributed to their success, but the lack of female leadership interfered with a larger
success related to gender discrimination in land practices. The coding of human capital
resources as moderate includes the consideration of weak networks of mainly indigenous
actors and lacking leadership of women in the 1990s. The outcomes associated with these
qualities include success for community matters and failure for gendered concerns. A
mixed outcome is fairly consistent with the expectation that resources matter; moderate
resources produce moderate results.
Organizational Characteristics: Frames
Even though indigenous female leaders and activists recognized a unique plight
facing women with regard to access to land, protests by indigenous women were situated
around the frames of land justice for the entire indigenous community (Deere and León
2002a; Deere and León 2001; Chavez 2009; Suarez 2012:195).26 Thus, their mobilization
shared broad frames of peasant, rural justice, instead of relaying issues that directly
affected them in terms of equitable distribution of land. Indigenous women’s ability to
employ gendered frames was impeded by the tendency of the larger indigenous

26

El Diario’s reports of women involved in activism on the INRA reform made no
mention of women’s access to land, even though women were highly publicized political
actors in the protests and organizational efforts to make reforms to agriculture law.
Reports on the concerns of women were made at local meetings and organizations, and at
the preparatory meetings for Beijing, according to researchers.
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organizations to sideline women’s interests as well as women’s own sense of obligation
to the greater community. This interaction provides some support for the evidence that
women’s leadership in movements is an important resource contributing to the success of
indigenous women’s goals. These difficulties highlight the intersectional nature of the
experience of indigenous women in social movements. As the discussion of
complementarity and women’s goals related to land rights illustrates, the obstacles facing
indigenous women are different than those facing whites or mestizas in Bolivia, because
they are fighting oppression on more than one dimension. Indigenous women’s ethnicity
and their gender create a marginalized situation for them in mainstream society, whereas
they experience discrimination based on their gender within their ethnic communities.
If the lack of gendered rhetoric is striking in relation to women’s pursuit of
agricultural reform, it is also curious that news reports illustrate that indigenous and
campesino persons were still referred to interchangeably, even in the same stories that
present a discussion of “native territories” (El Diario: 1996e; 1996f; 1995j; 1995k;
1995x). Therefore, an interesting set of circumstances is presented by indigenous
women’s mobilization on land reform. The evidence about women’s mobilization
provides mixed support for the hypotheses about language of activism. Broader frames
such as the use of campesino and few references to the indigenous are associated with
partial success. Non-gendered frames are associated with success for the community and
failure for gender parity goals. This only provides limited support for the hypothesis that
success follows the use of broad and non-gendered frames. The issue of land reform in
this and the next chapter illustrate possible lessons for how indigenous women can
successfully petition for rights that are specific to their needs.
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State Characteristics: Political Opportunity Structure (State Reforms)
Land reform has long been part of the political agenda in Bolivia, and a number of
protests were influential enough to initiate government response. In 1996, the
government passed the INRA into law (Bolivia 1996), and earlier decrees in 1990 and
1992 had also been responses to indigenous protest (Ruiz 1993:20; Chase 2002: 65). All
of these occurred because of administrations’ partial acknowledgement of the need for
indigenous justice and rule of law in the name of modernization. However, the legal
reforms discussed in this chapter all incorporate language that seeks to ensure women’s
equal access to political and economic resources, but nuances to the incorporation of
gender rights were not taken into consideration. Scholars have emphasized how the
incorporation of gender-neutral language is insufficient to create women’s leadership
roles for women in society, and how the policies themselves fall short of creating true
opportunities due to policy makers’ blindness to the issues which create women’s
marginalization in the first place (Lind 2003; Yashar 1998; Clisby 2002; Deere and León
2002; Deere and León 2002a; Deere and León 1998).
The failure of women’s issues to emerge coherently in land reform policy is in
part due to the inefficiencies of earlier structural reforms, especially the Law of Popular
Participation (LPP), which intended to empower local communities and even, to some
degree, women.27 In addition, the changes made to the constitution in 1994, by granting
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The language of the Law of Popular Participation included the phrase “strengthening
economic and political tools towards a more perfect representative democracy,
incorporating citizen participation in a participative democratic process and guaranteeing
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rights to indigenous people to own and administer ancestral lands, created the opportunity
for indigenous people to make claims against the government’s system of distributing
land. The result of the decentralizing reforms was to empower indigenous communities to
some degree. These reforms theoretically could have presented greater opportunities for
indigenous women to increase their influence as well, but in some instances created a
dual face of oppression for indigenous women, wherein they had to confront local as well
as national manifestations of discrimination. Echoing the earlier case of education
reform, the partially open opportunity structure facing indigenous women resulted in a
mixed outcome wherein indigenous women’s specific goals fell short while greater
community gains were achieved. This evidence supports the idea that the political
opportunity structure is an important contributor of social movement success.
Neoliberalism
Multiple scholars have remarked upon the impact of neoliberalism on land reform
efforts of indigenous people in Latin America, identifying the contradictions between
“free market” land titling logic and indigenous claims to communal land ownership
(Deere and León 2001; Deere and León 2002; Deere and León 1998; Chase 2002; Brysk
2000; Postero and Zamosc 2004; Kohl 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Van Cott 2000:198). The
ways of enacting or creating reform in the 1990s with respect to agriculture often resulted
in failure to recognize or honor indigenous autonomy and dignity, and in many cases the
schemes were carried out in such a way as to strengthen neoliberalism (Kohl 2002,
2003a, 2003b). However, the case of Bolivia offers an interesting example, because the

equality of opportunities in representative levels for both men and women (Bolivia LPP
1994: Article 1) (translated in Irahola 2005)
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1996 land reform and the 1994 constitution preceding it had made the most advances in
Latin America in terms of acknowledging indigenous territories, guaranteeing land access
for indigenous people, and committing to issuing titles to communal ancestral or
traditional original lands. This occurred under the period coded as strong neoliberal
commitments, which casts doubt on the hypothesis that neoliberalism necessarily
damages social movement policy efforts.
International Influences
The international effects of the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995 also
presented numerous points of organization and mobilization for indigenous women, as
five separate meetings were set in preparation for the conference (El Diario; 1995j2;
1995k1). It was in these preparatory meetings where indigenous women voiced their
concerns about the inequitable land situation in Bolivia (Deere and León 2002:53).
Unfortunately, indigenous women reported a similar situation in the Beijing as they had
faced in the national indigenous federations in their own country: their issues were
sidelined. UMBO (Unidad Mujeres Populares de Bolivia) complained that no real
presence was given to Bolivian women in the Beijing Women's Conference. In their
opinion, the conference ignored the violence in Chapare, the ongoing genocide of
cocaleros, the Bolivian “fixed state,”28 government corruption, impunity, and extreme
poverty of Bolivian communities (El Diario 1995l1). Interestingly, although indigenous

28

According to numerous El Diario reports, the “Estado de Sitio” went on from April
until October of 1995, declared by President Sanchez de Lozada due to widespread
marches against coca eradication, privatization, and education reform, mainly. The “fixed
state” –or state of siege--consists of suspension of civil society organizations, and
includes curfews, strict police control, and other losses of citizenship rights.
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women voiced their gendered land rights locally, on the international scene (and
ironically, the scene which favored gendered rights most specifically), they remained
committed to community efforts. This is evident in the critique of the undertakings of the
Beijing women’s conference, and is highly typical of indigenous women’s viewpoint on
oppression in the 1990s.
This fragmentation of Bolivian women’s claims between local and international
levels provides an interesting insight into the impact of organizational features that
overlap with international dialogue and influence on policy. On the national scene,
indigenous women’s needs were ignored, and on the international scene, their
communities were ignored. This indicates that there is an increasing awareness of
indigenous women’s specific issues emerging, and being articulated in the 1990s, but also
points out inconsistencies between local and international organizing.
Another component of the international environment of the time is also evident in
President Sanchez de Lozada’s goal of modernization for the state. This necessity was
introduced by the conditions for modernization and decentralization imposed for World
Bank loans in the 1990s. For example, the World Bank financed and supported the
agricultural reform bill proposed by Sanchez de Lozada, although the World Bank did not
favor communal land titling that was part of the original package of land reform (World
Bank 1997). The World Bank’s preference eventually won out in the structural
environment provided by the succeeding Banzer administration, who amended the INRA
to include individual ownership and taxation of indigenous land (Postero and Zamosc
2004: 202). For the purposes of the policy moment I am discussing here, indigenous
causes gained some support from international sources, and this support translated into a
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moderate policy outcome. This was possible due to the fact that international forces
contained influence especially in regard to neoliberal advice, and land reform had
received some support from neoliberal lending agencies. The influence of international
features matter when states internalize the norms associated with international
agreements and internationally promoted goals like modernization and economic
development. This evidence thus provides conditional support for the role of international
forces in promoting the success of indigenous women in policy. That international forces
supported agriculture reform indicates some support for the hypothesis that international
support can increase the chance of favorable policy toward indigenous women. However,
the differences between indigenous women’s mobilization at the local versus the
international level, and consequent outcomes of policy that fell short of the proposed
needs of indigenous women, provide evidence that organizational and state
characteristics may mitigate international effects.
INRA Summary
Indigenous women’s efforts, and the outcome of those efforts to influence the
INRA resemble the efforts and outcomes associated with education reform. Numbers of
indigenous women mobilized in the effort are coded as high, while networks and
women’s leadership are coded as weak and low, respectively, and these moderate
amounts of resources contribute to the mixed nature of the outcomes of the INRA. For, as
mentioned earlier, while the community benefitted from changes in the law, indigenous
women’s equal access to land remained unaddressed, resulting in a mixed outcome for
indigenous women’s policy efforts. In addition, the mixed outcome of the INRA is also
associated with a partially open opportunity structure, and neoliberal influences, contrary
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to the expectations of my hypothesis, do not interfere with indigenous women’s ability to
make a difference in policy. Finally, the international community was supportive of
indigenous women’s goals during this time, and this tends to support the idea that
indigenous women fare better when international support is present. However, the ability
of international support may be limited due to the nature of other important variables like
state political opportunity structures.

Domestic Violence
In 1995, indigenous women, along with various other sectors of women,
organized widely to promote a new law that criminalized domestic violence. The
government responded with the first legal instrument for the prevention and punishment
of domestic violence, put in place with the adoption of Law 1675 in 1995. The law
establishes the fight against violence as a policy of the state, and establishes measures
and mechanisms for penalties and protection of victims (Bolivia 1995b). Responsibility
for implementation of the law and educating the population was placed on the Office of
Gender, Generational and Family Concerns, created in 1993 (Bolivia 2001:2). The
attention paid to domestic violence during this time reflects an emerging consciousness
about women’s concerns, about which indigenous women and other activist women were
becoming increasingly vocal. These problems included education, health care, and legal
issues confronting women. Domestic violence was a vital problem facing women of all
classes and ethnicities, as an estimated fifty percent of married women experience
domestic violence in Bolivia (Bolivia 2001:1). The law was passed in response to
research gathered by the newly created Office of Gender and Generational Affairs, and
the mobilization of tens of thousands of women activists reinforced the pressure on
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government when progress on the bill stalled. The final outcome of the bill is coded as
successful, because of the fact that indigenous women engaged in, and accomplished
their stated goals on the domestic violence law.
Organizational Characteristics: Human Capital Resources
The engagement of indigenous women in protests regarding domestic violence
represents a unique perspective on the ways in which human capital resources in
numbers, networks, and leadership affect the ability of indigenous women to succeed.
Domestic violence is a potentially divisive community issue because it inevitably resorts
to treatment of women by men, who are seen as allies in the fight for indigenous rights.
Indigenous women faced challenges not only on the issue of confronting and punishing
men for violence, but in convincing Andean women themselves that domestic violence
was unacceptable in a culture that views violence in family relationships as “normalized”
(Kellogg 2005: 135; Canavire-Bacarreza and Avila 2010:2; Deere and León 2001:53;
Lucashenko 1996: 378; Van Vleet 2008: 163; Weismantel 2001). These cultural issues
created a rift between indigenous activist women who wished to raise awareness of the
problem, and those who felt it unnecessary to fight for what was viewed as a western
feminist goal (Radcliffe and Laurie 2003: 393).
Regardless of the cultural obstacles to mobilizing on the issue of domestic
violence, indigenous women recognized an urgent need for a domestic violence law in
Bolivia. Various indigenous groups, including the Bartolina Sisa, merged with nonindigenous women’s groups in several marches in 1995, demanding that the government
pass the Law Against Domestic Violence or Violence in the Family, which had been
introduced in earlier sessions and postponed (El Diario 1995k1). This measure outlined
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the parameters of domestic violence offenses, enforcement and family aid centers, and
punishment (El Diario 1995y, 1995b2). The issue of domestic violence was particularly
salient among women from El Alto and Oruro, where studies had confirmed that Andean
women of all classes and ethnicities suffered from domestic violence (El Diario 1995k1).
In Cochabamba, dozens of indigenous women staged a demonstration in September
1995, dressed in black and carrying signs memorializing women who had been abused
and/or murdered by their spouses (El Diario 1995b2).
The participation of indigenous women and progress on the issue of domestic
violence deserves a closer inspection. Like land reform, domestic violence poses a
potential threat to indigenous solidarity for ethnicities that feel that all participants should
be united in their claims to achieve success. This is the logic behind sidelining women’s
issues in larger indigenous organizations. However, in the instance of domestic violence,
indigenous women found themselves participating with other women’s organizations.
While this fact contains its own historical class contradictions and tensions between
feminists and other women’s groups, it is striking that indigenous women were able to
put their gender issues up for government consideration in the absence of indigenous
men. The overall coding of resources for the 1990s was moderate, reflecting high
numbers, low women’s leadership, and weak network ties. However, the case of domestic
violence diverges slightly from this because the networks between women were
indicative of broader, non-indigenous alliances, which makes the coding of networks
strong. In addition, as referenced above, indigenous women were able to lead on issues of
importance specifically to women, and this means women’s leadership should be coded
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as high in this instance.29 Therefore, high amounts of resources contribute to a successful
outcome of domestic violence law, indicating support for the hypothesis that resources
can increase the chances of a movement’s success.
Organizational Characteristics: Frames
Indigenous women’s mobilization for a policy affecting all women relates to the
frames of mobilizers. Indigenous women were a strong presence in getting a new
domestic violence bill passed through Congress, but their claims were in favor of all
women and made no specific ethnic claims, even though ethnographic evidence from the
time period indicates that they were acutely aware of the special situation they faced in
confronting domestic violence (Kellogg 2005: 135; Canavire-Bacarreza and Avila
2010:2; Deere and León 2001:53; Lucashenko 1996: 378; Van Vleet 2008: 163; Radcliffe
and Laurie 2003: 393). Indigenous women’s involvement in protests centered on
“…urging the Legislative Power to promulgate the law against intra-familiar violence”
(El Diario 1995b2).
An unnamed Cochabamba organizer comments:
This law is a conquest of the struggle of Bolivian women and its (the law’s) content is
the result of long years of experience of feminine institutions in the work with victims
of domestic violence and we will not permit the distortion of the very essence of any
one of the articles. (El Diario 1995b2)

29

The degree to which indigenous women were able to lead in non-indigenous women’s
groups is uncertain, but the coding on the independent variable still warrants a “high”
ranking since indigenous women were able to successfully mobilize about women’s
issues outside of mixed-gender indigenous groups.
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Throughout the effort, ethnicity does not enter into domestic violence frames. In this
instance of indigenous women’s mobilization on behalf of all women, the outcome was
positive; the government of Sanchez de Lozada ceased the delays on the bill and
promulgated it in December of 1995 (EFE 1995c3). This information can be taken to
support the hypothesis that broader frames (non-ethnic) are more likely to result in
successful outcomes, but contradicts the expectation that indigenous women would not
successfully mobilize with gendered frames. While no specific measures in the bill
addressed the indigenous population as a particular target of improvement, the
recognition and attempted repair of a social problem facing all women is viewed as a
success in terms of policy influence. In line with the coding of indigenous women’s
activism in the 1990s, the frames used by indigenous women were broad (non-ethnic),
and non-gendered. But in the case of domestic violence, the frames employed were broad
and gendered, which somewhat supports the hypothesis that frames designed to appeal to
the broad, non-gendered and non-indigenous portion of society succeed. This information
contradicts the hypothesis that gendered frames are damaging to women’s success.
State Characteristics: Political Opportunity Structure (State Reforms)
In the case of the domestic violence law passed December 15, 1995 (Bolivia
1995), the state structure and neoliberal commitments work together to advance the
success of indigenous women’s policy ambitions. The Sanchez de Lozada administration
viewed the domestic violence bill as an important move toward a “harmonization of law
with modern circumstances” and responded favorably to women’s (including indigenous
women’s) claims for gendered justice (El Diario 1995c3). This aligns with the
government’s decision to include gender equality as part of laws that modernized the
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state. Previous legal changes in Bolivia that contributed to this framework included the
creation of an Office of Gender Concerns, the 1994 constitution’s provisions on human
rights, the Law of Decentralization, and the Law of Popular Participation. While authors
credit NGOs and civic organizations for national efforts to address the issue of domestic
violence, the government also adopted a strong role in educating the population and
creating a greater consciousness in society about the problem of domestic violence (Van
Vleet 2008: 161; Moravek de Cerreto 2001:3; Bolivia 1995). Neoliberal commitments
and a partially open political opportunity structure responded favorably to indigenous
women’s demands. This provides support for the importance of political opportunity
structures and some doubt regarding the harmful role of neoliberalism. It is important to
note that the state structure was relatively more open toward this particular issue than in
other instances of women’s activism for policy change. The restructuring of state
processes that came from the need to accommodate neoliberalism with modern legal
codes and institutions created a structural political opportunity that was advantageous to
the policy efforts of indigenous women regarding domestic violence.
International Influences
Demonstrations by indigenous women on the issue of domestic violence
coincided with the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995, as preparatory meetings
began to create the forum for considering Bolivian women’s issues. During 1995, El
Diario reported research on the conditions of women in the country during the months
leading up the conference, including meetings discussing the poverty of women and the
problem of domestic violence (El Diario 1995k1). As with agricultural reform, these
preparatory meetings introduced the opportunity for indigenous women to coordinate,
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plan, and to disseminate research findings on specific issues within the consideration of
the domestic violence laws that affect indigenous women.
The language involved in drafting the law includes the important features of
previous international conferences within the United Nations and the Organization of
American States. For example, the Domestic Violence Law included special language
about the intent to “diffuse the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women and the Inter-American Convention of the Organization
of American States for the Prevention, Sanction, and Eradication of Violence against
Women” (Bolivia 1995: Chapter 1, article k). Therefore, while the government’s action
on the domestic violence law can be seen as a response to domestic pressure, the
transference of international agreements about women into domestic law indicates that
international support can contribute to positive outcomes. The case of domestic violence
policy reflects the adoption of the ILO Accord 169 and CEDAW into Bolivian legal code
in the constitution and the INRA, and supports the hypothesis that international
influences, when aligned with state intentions, can further indigenous women’s interests.
Domestic Violence Summarized
The case of domestic violence law indicates that high amounts of human resource
capital may have a strong impact on the outcomes of attempts to change policy, and this
is especially highlighted in this chapter since only the case of domestic violence deviates
from the general coding of moderate human capital resources. Networks and women’s
attainment of leadership in the movement seem to be important factors that increase
indigenous women’s chances of success, in line with the hypothesis about the importance
of human capital resources. In addition, gendered, broad frames are consistent with
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success for indigenous women’s movements, according to the analysis presented here,
which contradicts the hypothesis that gendered frames would not be successful. This
information does support the hypothesis that broad frames are positive features for
indigenous women’s mobilization. The effects of a partially open political opportunity
structure were positive in the case of domestic violence law, which confirm the
importance of political opportunity structural openings. The effects of neoliberalism,
however, are seemingly in contradiction with my hypothesis that it would negatively
affect indigenous women’s outcomes, since neoliberalism is coded high during this
period, and indigenous women’s efforts achieved limited success. Finally, the
international environment was supportive of indigenous women’s concerns about
domestic violence, and this supports the hypothesis that indigenous women’s policy
efforts are influenced by international support, especially where state initiatives favor the
goals.

Discussion and Conclusions
My hypotheses about organizational, state, and international characteristics find
mixed support from the evidence. Social movement variables are highly contextualized
and inter-dependent with other factors that affect policy success. Thus, high amounts of
human capital resources, broad, non-gendered frames, partially open state structural
opportunity structures, neoliberal commitments, and international influences all play
varying roles within each case to produce varying outcomes.
During the neoliberal period, indigenous women’s advancement as indigenous
women was slow—for most cases, their cases of success would have to be swallowed
under indigenous rights in general (as was the case of land and education reform) or
145

commit to a banner that included all women (domestic violence). Even with significant
support from other indigenous groups, they may fail altogether (cocalera movement).
Because of these complexities, characteristics should be viewed in the context of the
relationship within organizations as well as those from without.
I hypothesized that frames—the language of activism—that appeal to the broader
public would be more successful than those representing interests of indigenous women,
throughout all periods of research. Specifically, broad, non-gendered frames were
expected to increase the ability of movements to impact policy whereas ethnic and/or
gendered frames were expected to decrease the ability of movements to succeed. The
analysis in this chapter finds that indigenous women experienced mild success in the
neoliberal period with broad, non-gendered frames. In the exception to this coding,
domestic violence, where indigenous women used broad and gendered forms of
expression, they were successful, which presents doubt about the hypothesis that nongendered claims would be more successful than gendered claims. While indigenous
women were also successful to some degree in achieving success based on indigenous
interests, indigenous women’s interests were not salient enough within organizations to
increase their influence on policies (the INRA and Education reform). In the case of the
cocaleras and their quest to end eradication, their impressive concerted efforts relied
more on broad frames and met with failure. Unlike the issue of agriculture reform,
however, there is no evidence that indigenous women even possessed their own frames
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and interests related to coca, as women.30 For the case of Bolivia these findings do not
support the hypothesis indigenous women’s frames need to be non-gendered or broad to
succeed. If anything, the coding of the frames in this period as mainly non-gendered and
broad seems to coincide with, at best, partial success (mixed outcomes).
The question of the role of resources—particularly in the numbers mobilized for
protest—is found to be an important one in this chapter. Resources are coded as moderate
for the period of the 1990s, due to the combined effect of high numbers, low women’s
leadership, and weak networks. The one exception to this was the domestic violence law,
where women experienced strong networks and higher numbers of women in leadership
positions, making the coding of resources high. The hypothesis that increased resources
contributes to success is also supported by the failure of coca, wherein moderate amounts
of human capital resources failed to impact policy. In the case of agriculture reform and
education reform, moderate amounts of human capital resources are consistent with
moderate results. On the other hand, the case of complete success in policy outcomes was
domestic violence, which exhibited higher amounts of human resources than the other
cases in this chapter. This indicates a rather strong correlation with the combined
resource variables of this research.
With regard to state characteristics, the first surprising finding is that the coding
of neoliberalism as high may be correlated with mixed outcomes overall for indigenous
women, a somewhat larger degree of success than expected. Partial successes on the
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But the case could be made that women are perhaps more vulnerable to eradication
schemes since they are poorer and experience the loss of property and crops more
acutely.
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INRA and Education reform create some doubt about whether or not neoliberalism is
decisively detrimental to outcomes. However, the failures of the cocalera movement, and
domestic violence, did not seem to be directly harmed by neoliberal commitments. In the
case of cocalera failure, the explanation lies with international and state structural
opportunities, while the case of domestic violence success indicates that organizational
features, like networks and women’s leadership, and opening state structural
opportunities are important factors. Taken as a whole, however, the neoliberal
environment may be thought of as less obstructive than expected. The combination of
two mixed outcomes, one failure, and one success, at this point, provides little support for
the hypothesis that neoliberalism harms policy outcomes for indigenous women.
The political opportunity structure emerges as an important feature in the
neoliberal period. Where political opportunities were closed, in the case of coca
eradication, indigenous women’s broad frames, moderate resources, and international
opposition created the conditions for failure. Where political opportunity structures were
partially open, as with education and land reform, broad frames, moderate resources, and
international support contributed to mixed outcomes. Open political opportunities also
combined with broad and gendered frames, high amounts of resources, and international
support, in the successful domestic violence case. Thus, the findings so far indicate that
political opportunity structure plays a strong role in influencing outcomes, alone and with
other variables. The case of domestic violence indicates that resources, neoliberalism, and
international support are more influential under the right political opportunity structures.
Like most of the other influences on indigenous women’s policy success, the
international factor contains both contextualized and generalized lessons. International
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support sometimes coincides with favorable outcomes for indigenous women, as was the
case with the Beijing Women’s Conference and the influence of indigenous rights from
ILO standards. While the ILO 169 contains no gender measures (Chase 2002: 28), it was
nonetheless an important international structural feature that aided women in achieving
their organizational goals of extending land rights of indigenous people. In other cases,
particularly the case of cocalera protesters in the 1990s, international opposition seems
highly influential, but this was largely because the state structure aligned with
international interests on the matter. As the discussion of the state’s opportunity structure
shows, the effects of international influences are not always detrimental, even under
neoliberal auspices. In the cases of education and agricultural reform, indigenous women
were able to press their claims with the support of international organizations (the UN
and international lending agencies). However, it can also be noted that the
acknowledgement by the World Bank of indigenous women’s special needs was not
sufficient to promote the inclusion of affirmative action measures in those policies. The
cases of INRA, domestic violence and education reform provide limited support for the
international influence hypothesis. The three mixed and successful cases indicate that
political opportunity structures must be sufficiently open for international factors to
matter. While the cocaleras’ failure indicates that international influences matter in some
instances, especially when international opposition combines with animosity from the
state, when taken together, these cases provide little support for a direct role of
international influences on policy.
This chapter has addressed the evidence related to the hypotheses outlined in the
introduction to this dissertation. In the following chapter, I assess these hypotheses with
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data from the period following Banzer’s second administration, 2001-2012. These cases
provide additional analytical leverage on the dependent and independent variables
addressed in this dissertation.
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Case

Table 4: Cases and Coding of Independent and Dependent Variables
Organizational
State
International
DV Score
Variable Scores
Variable
Variable
Scores
Scores

Coca

Resources:
Moderate
Frames: BNG

POS: Closed
Neoliberalism:
Strong

Resources:
Moderate
Frames: BNG

POS: Partially
Open
Neoliberalism:
Strong

Education
Reform

Resources:
Moderate
Frames: BNG

POS: Partially
Open
Neoliberalism:
Strong

Domestic
Violence

Resources: High
Frames: BG

INRA

POS: Partially
Open
Neoliberalism:
Strong

Obstructive

Failure

Supportive

Mixed

Supportive

Mixed

Supportive

Success

*Frames: BNG= Broad, Non-Gendered; BG: Broad, Gendered
*POS=Political Opportunity Structure
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Chapter V
Interlude: Indigenous Women’s Social Movements 2000-2006
This chapter investigates hypotheses about organizational, state, and international
characteristics and their effect on the outcomes of women’s mobilization during the Gas
War beginning in 2003. I analyze the outcomes of indigenous women’s policy efforts in
the interim period between the neoliberal period and the post-liberal period after Evo
Morales’ election. There are three phases of the Gas War that are discussed here. The
final phase overlaps into the next period of post-liberal politics, but is discussed here for
efficiency. The overall coding for the first two phases of the Gas War period were high
organizational resources, ethnic, gendered frames, closed political opportunity structures,
declining neoliberalism, and obstructive international environment. The last phase of the
Gas War completes with very high resources, the same frames, a very open political
opportunity structure, and an opposed international environment. The following pages
address these independent variables and the outcomes on the Gas War, assessing the
consequences for the hypotheses of this dissertation. Table 5 offers the outcomes of the
Gas War at various time points.
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Table 5: Selected Cases and Coding
Policy Goal, Relevant
“Moments”

Outcome

2003 –Social movements
demand end of
privatization of gas
revenues

Failure

2004 –Referendum on gas
revenues

Failure

2005/2006—Social
movements protest
referendum results and rearticulate demands for
Hydrocarbons Law

Success
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Nationalization of Natural Gas
While the importance of indigenous women’s protests and their contribution to
the victory over ending water privatization practices is well documented (Bennett et al
2005; Bakker 2008; Laurie et al 2002; Lewis and Olivera 2004), indigenous women’s
protest over the nationalization of gas in vital policy moments in 2003, 2004 and 2005 is
less documented and yet equally important. Indigenous women were visibly engaged in
protests against the decision of the Sanchez de Lozada government to privatize the
natural gas reserves found within the country during 2003. They were also important
figures in protests to urge Mesa to nationalize gas in 2004, and later to protest the
referendum on gas issued by the Mesa administration in 2005. As scholars, NGO
organizations, and journalists argue, the leadership of indigenous women was vital to the
success of the movement (Monasterios 2007; Jiminez 2003; Liendo 2009; Paco et al
2009; Vàsquez 2006). Their involvement was also indicative of a major shift in the power
of indigenous women, as they became acknowledged as legitimate representatives of a
large part of society (Monasterios 2007; Vàsquez 2006).
Plans to privatize Bolivia’s natural gas reserves go back as far as Sanchez de
Lozada’s first term in the 1990s (El Internationalista 2003; El Diario 1995a, 1997a,
1997b, 1997c). In 2003, one year after his second election to office, the president faced
massive national protests against the privatization of natural gas that shut down
government offices and trade routes into cities. After his flight from La Paz to the United
States, Sanchez de Lozada’s vice president, Carlos Mesa, assumed the presidency and
attempted to resolve the nation’s crisis by putting the nationalization issue to referendum
in 2004. The referendum, which was worded in confusing terms, was returned in favor of
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the privatization of natural gas. This prompted even more protest by the nation’s
indigenous people, who claimed the government intentionally misled voters (Dangl
2005). On May 6, 2005, Congress passed a new law raising taxes from 18% to 32% on
profits from foreign companies. However, Mesa refused to take any action on the bill,
which meant that the Senate President had to sign the bill for it to be legitimate,
according to Bolivian law (Gomez 2005). However, social movements rejected the law
(which failed to be implemented anyway) and subsequent attempts by the Mesa
government to call for a constituent assembly and a referendum on autonomy in the Santa
Cruz region. Two years after Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation, Mesa resigned amid
protests involving as high as a half million people, leaving the country under temporary
rule of Supreme Court President Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé (El Mundo 2005; El Diario
2005). This event opened the way for the election of Evo Morales and his executive
decree on May 1, 2006 that nationalized hydrocarbons resources and declared the state
the owner of the revenues (DeShazo 2006; Perreault 2008; CEDIB 2006).
While the Gas War is viewed as one case, it exhibits several distinct data points to
analyze. The first “policy moment” identified is the 2003 mobilization against
privatization, ending with the ousting of Sanchez de Lozada. But this policy moment is
coded as a failure, even though the president was replaced in response to the protests,
because the end result was not policy change. The next important moment came with
Mesa’s referendum, which is coded as a failure for indigenous women’s policy efforts.
The final outcome and policy moment is defined in 2006 with the instatement of the new
hydrocarbons executive decree. This moment is coded as a success for indigenous
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women, who had not only participated in the successful mass sector uprising, but had
taken on more prominent roles to accomplish this goal.
Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement
Organizational resources up until the 2006 election of Evo Morales are coded as
high, due to the fact that high numbers of participants, high presence of women leaders in
the movement, and moderately strong network ties existed to support indigenous
women’s policy ambitions. Indigenous women’s resources were very high following
2006, exhibiting high numbers, strong networks (this time within the government as well
as the broader sector), and higher numbers of women in leadership positions. According
to scholarly and news reports, the two most important sources of human capital resources
throughout the conflict were indigenous women’s organizations and neighborhood
associations (Monasterios 2007; Jiminez 2003; Liendo 2009; Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006;
Vàsquez 2006). Neighborhood association politics are referred to as “basic needs”
politics, and these survivalist motives cohabitate with the demands for indigenous
sovereignty. This has resulted in a new kind of nationalism and citizenship built on reappropriating natural resources for the benefit of Bolivians. In addition, both
neighborhood and indigenous movements find common ground for decolonization and
mobilize on the basis of their ethnic subaltern status (Monasterios 2007; Vásquez 2006).
Indigenous women joined forces with groups who had protested the privatization
measures taken in the late 1990s (El Diario 1995a, 1995b, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). In El
Alto, these groups coalesced and organized marches, protests, roadblocks, and strikes
during the Gas War of September–October 2003 with Aymara peasants, laborers,
cocaleras, miners, the poor, indigenous residents, and eventually the middle class of La
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Paz. Together, these diverse groups converged upon La Paz, creating enough turmoil to
send President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada into exile in the United States. Nationalizing
natural gas gained support among some middle-class residents of La Paz who led hunger
strikes in rebuke of the government’s actions that had resulted in the death of over
seventy people (Kohl 2004; Perreault 2006: 154). By June 2005, close to seventy-five
percent of the population was in favor of nationalizing the gas industry in Bolivia (El
Deber 2005; Lewis 2005), and by May 2006 that figure had grown to eighty-one percent
(EFE 2006). This exhibits a broader range of support than perhaps any other cause
supported by indigenous women in recent or distant memory. The evidence suggests that
the broad range of networking with other groups in support of gas nationalization is a
relevant resource to be considered. Indigenous men and women became important
symbols of the movement, and were seen as representing the interests of the whole
country (AmericasBarometer 2010, see Chapter 3). Furthermore, the leader of the MAS
during this time was to be future president, and his agenda was identical to the highland
natives with whom he had organized. Further, his well-documented history of mobilizing
and promoting gender equitable policies goes back to his leadership of the Six
Federations Coca Union in the 1990s (Vargas and Draper 2010). This extraordinary
alliance would serve to benefit indigenous women’s goals for policy. One reason why
ousting Sanchez de Lozada was not enough to change policy is that protest networks,
while strong, did not yet possess strong roots within the government that was introduced
with the MAS and President Morales’ electoral victories. Social movements may have
other political effects with different levels of organizational resources, such as driving
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presidents from office. But actual influence on policy requires high amounts of resources
and a strong sense of agreement between the government and social movements.
Women’s activity during mobilizations in the 2000s over natural resources,
including gas and water, were remarkable exhibitions of a new indigenous female
leadership emerging in civil society and social movements. Roles of indigenous women
in this effort ranged from providing supplies, food, and childcare, to organizing and
maintaining street occupations in the face of soldier and police violence (Vasquez 2006;
Monasterios 2007; Jiménez 2004; Cabezas 2006). However, their strong presence in this
struggle is not necessarily due to the elimination of barriers to indigenous women’s
leadership within mixed gender organizations (local and national). As various scholars
and indigenous women themselves have argued, indigenous organizations still contain
many of the cultural dynamics that keep indigenous women from leading and from
pressing the claims that affect indigenous women specifically (Bennett et al 2005: 26;
Liendo 2009: 130-132; Vásquez 2006; Ramirez 2003; Americalatinagenera 2010). An
extremely important determinant of their success is women’s emergence as leaders of the
movement, which originated in survivalist activism within informal neighborhood
associations and the larger and more organized indigenous women’s organizations. These
organizations represent spheres where women do not confront mixed-gender group
dynamics that interfere with women’s leadership. As Vásquez (2006) argues, “the fact is
that the formal political institutions, especially the state, limit an even participation of
women, they encounter a better space in collective actions, and as such (this) continues to
be a favorable medium of expression and participation of feminine politics” (27).
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While the majority of women’s duties remained in child-care and food provision
during the marches, new leadership spaces were opening up for indigenous women, as
evidenced through their strong roles in the Gas Wars (Vásquez 2006). Indigenous women
from neighborhood associations and indigenous women’s organizations such as the
Bartolina Sisa and OMAK Mujeres represented an unprecedented amount of mobilization
and participation in protests and roadblocks. Indigenous women persisted even in the
most dangerous confrontations with soldiers during which at least 67 people were killed
in the massacre of October 2003 (Paco et al 2006; Vásquez 2006; Al Jazeera 2011).
Human capital resources have been coded as high for the period covering the first two
policy moments in 2003 and 2004, including high numbers of participants, high presence
of women in leadership positions, and moderately strong network ties built within
broader society. When these resources confronted the Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa
administrations, their policy efforts were failures. This was largely because of a closed
political opportunity structure. At various times, these two presidents were confronted
with indigenous women’s powerful movements, and each time, the government treated
their demands with superficial promises and delayed action. Once indigenous women’s
resources included very strong networks, and as the political opportunity structure began
to open after Morales’ election, changes in favor of the movement’s goals occurred.
Taken together, this evidence provides support for the hypotheses that high levels of
human capital resources are important factors affecting social movement success.
Network ties within the government, as intuition would support, create better political
opportunities, as well as greater amounts of resources for indigenous women.
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Organizational Characteristics: Frames (Activist Language) of the Movement
The first major solidified efforts against the gas privatization scheme were
organized among the large indigenous population of El Alto, located near the capital of
La Paz. Vásquez (2006), Hylton et al (2004), Cabezas (2006) and Monasterios (2007)
find that ethnicity was an important basis of identity and motivation for organizers and
community supporters. The wiphala—the flag of Bolivia’s highland indigenous groups—
became a common sight at roadblocks and protests. “Pollera women participated holding
their children while giving speeches in Aymara or castellano” (Ramirez 2003: 4). These
same women fought to maintain control of their neighborhoods during the onslaught of
military and police attacks (Ramirez 2003:5). While an opening occurred in political
positions of all organizations for women during the natural resource conflicts, women’s
leadership in the “politics of needs” generated more opportunities. Indigenous women’s
activism is conducted in a framework that does not question the arrangements of mixed
organizations dominated by men. These factors reflect indigenous women’s success in
organizing around their reproductive roles, while emphasizing a discourse of
complementarity and collectivity that rejects any feminist or individualistic positions
(Vásquez 2006). For example, as Aymara activist Norah Quispe from El Alto comments,
“we do not mediate our force without the force of all, with much affection and much
compromise (MujeresLideres 2012).
While based on traditional roles as family care providers, indigenous women’s
activism began to more clearly represent a gendered and ethnic dimension because it
related to their roles as indigenous women, even while they took on roles in representing
the interests of their own communities and all of Bolivia (Cabezas 2006). The neglected
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spheres of their organizing were enhanced by the nature of the issues of natural resource
privatization because these issues were elemental to basic individual and community
survival (Cabezas 2006). Cabezas’ (2006) recording of indigenous women involved in
the Gas War reveals the painful experiences for indigenous women in providing for their
families, and the discrimination they face in doing so, which provided partial motivations
for their participation:
As women, when we have a “wawa,”31 in work, they do not accept you. “With
your pollera you are lumpy like a cow.” They (employers) always criticized us
like this. My husband does not work anymore, and does not maintain me. Now I
have four children. My children are in school. I have returned to work, but I earn
little. In Bolivia, women work, but earn little. The man earns, say, one thousand
and women earn four hundred bolivianos…And what our husbands earn does not
cover us, and because of that we work hard for those four hundred bolivianos to
maintain our children, so they do not suffer from (want of) food, so that they do
not suffer from (want of) clothes. The “wawas” ask for clothes, health, shelter and
food. Four things. We women have suffered much. (Cabezas 2006:77)
Women’s desperation resulting from economic problems has become an integral
part of their activist message: government policy must change because their role in
carrying on generations and providing for them is seriously threatened. Thus, as the
activist above describes, indigenous women’s suffering created the motive for organizing

31

Aymaran word for baby or small child.
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about national issues; it also created the frames around which they based their legitimacy
to influence public opinion and government action.
The frames of the movement throughout the gas nationalization struggles have
been coded as gendered, ethnic, and broad, and these are associated with success and
failure in the Gas War. Women’s frames adopted gendered, broad, and ethnic language
during the many protests throughout the Sanchez de Lozada or Mesa administrations, but
these frames did not result in successful policy outcomes. Broad, ethnic and gendered
framing was not conducive to successful outcomes until after the election of Evo
Morales. This points to the fact that organizational characteristics interact with state
characteristics to produce outcomes on policy efforts. Thus, the hypothesis that
indigenous women need broad frames receives little support from the analysis of the case
of gas nationalization. Indigenous and gendered framing does not harm indigenous
women’s efforts; the combination of ethnic frames and generic claims produce success
under the right circumstances, especially political opportunity openings in the state.
State Characteristics: State Structural Opportunities/Reforms
The two presidential resignations in Bolivia between 2003 and 2005 are events
representing the consequences of heightened social movement protests against a closed
political opportunity structure. Even though protests over Sanchez de Lozada’s plans to
nationalize gas drove him out of the country, the end result was little more than a change
in personnel instead of policy. As Aymara activist Benita Quispe poignantly lamented:
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“the same chola in another pollera: nothing has changed” (Cabezas 2006: 83). 32 The
pressure boiling over from unyielding government attitudes on the gas nationalization
issue created chaos and even momentary collapses, but these events did not reflect an
open political opportunity structure. Instead, they reflected the government’s failure to
negotiate. Carlos Mesa succeeded Sanchez de Lozada as president, but failed to follow
through with what was named the “October Agenda,” in which he agreed to address
nationalizing the production and distribution of natural gas, bring Sanchez de Lozada to
trial for deaths of civilians, and to convene a Constituent Assembly to address the
inequalities of the poor indigenous majority (Perreault 2006: 150-151; Webber 2005b).
However, Mesa’s referendum and continuance of the plans for the sale of gas dictated
only eighteen percent royalties to be paid from reserves handled by foreign petroleum
companies, an insulting decision for the nation’s indigenous (Webber 2005b). Thus, the
time period saw no significant change in policy on gas privatization. The political
opportunity structure within the state from Sanchez de Lozada’s second term until the
end of Mesa’s term is coded as closed. This feature coincides with failure for indigenous
women’s policy efforts in the first two major outcomes on this policy (the demand for an
end to privatization and Mesa’s referendum). These outcomes are consistent with the
expectation that closed opportunity structures would create obstacles for indigenous
women’s policy goals, while openings would yield greater policy successes. Movements
proved themselves strong enough to impact the political system through forcing
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“Chola” is a more derogatory term for indigenous woman, and the “pollera” is the
traditional indigenous skirt.
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presidents out, but change in policy required a significant change in political opportunity
structures.
In May 2005, women marched along with various other sectors of society in the
tens of thousands to protest Congress’s promulgation of the new hydrocarbons law. The
law had actually symbolized the legislature’s willingness to cooperate with social
movement demands in the sake of government stability. However, the move was too
little, too late, and protesters re-iterated the call for full nationalization (Gomez 2005). El
Alto and La Paz once again became the sites of violent confrontations with police over
attempts to take crucial sites like the Plaza Murillo, which contains the Presidential
Palace (Lewis 2005). This period also saw the mobilization of regional right-wing forces
that campaigned for a referendum on autonomy in the gas-rich department of Santa Cruz,
which still threatens secession from the Bolivian state (Webber 2005b; Lewis 2005). This
region housed the main opposition to the nationalization of gas. As protests and
roadblocks effectively shut down the capital city of La Paz, President Mesa was forced to
resign from his presidential post in June (Associated Press 2005). This opened the way
for the election of President Morales, who quickly moved to nationalize natural gas
during the first months of his presidency. In response to overwhelming mass support,
Morales issued a decree that companies must turn over field operations to Bolivia’s
national oil company (Weintraub 2007: 1; Perreault 2008:1). The connection between
social movements and the election of Evo Morales based on the platform widely
campaigned for by indigenous women reveals that the structure of the state has an
important impact on indigenous women’s policy success. The opening of state structural
opportunities results in policy success after social movement politics become national
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politics. As hypothesized, opening (closing) political opportunity structures—in this case
a very open political opportunity structure in the form of an indigenous and highly
beholden president—greatly impact women’s policy efforts. During the last phase, the
variable of state structural opportunities interacts with the presence of networks between
indigenous women and the government to create more favorable outcomes for indigenous
women. This instance of social movement mobilization is also instructive to the fact that
political opportunity structures not only affect social movement goals, but can be
changed by them, as the protracted nature and eventual success of indigenous women
within the indigenous movement illustrates.
State Characteristics: Neoliberalism
Sanchez de Lozada’s and Mesa’s decisions to advance the neoliberal and
economic project of preceding governments and continue with plans coordinated with the
IMF and private international companies for the sale of gas are representative of the
impact of clinging neoliberal commitment (Webber 2005; BBC 2004; Perreault 2006,
2008). When these governments met with protest about allowing natural resource
revenues to leave the country, their reactions ultimately led to failure to change the policy
in favor of indigenous women’s preferences. In response to Mesa’s failure to fulfill the
October Agenda in 2005, popular social forces, led by Evo Morales and the movement
MAS (Movimento a Socialismo) remobilized against the state. They struck first with the
El Alto Water War in January and March, and, second, with the Second Gas War of May
and June (Webber 2005; Webber 2005b; BBC 2004; Agramont 2012). These events,
culminating with Evo Morales’ election, brought about weak neoliberal commitments of
the state, as the coding revealed in Chapter 3.
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The neoliberal variable changes through the period of the Gas War, beginning
during a declining neoliberal era (2003), which covers the first two failed attempts to
influence policy. As long as governments remained committed to neoliberal policies,
extreme measures like nationalization could not take place. Changes had to go beyond
individual leaders and include the overarching goals of the government—including the
decline of neoliberal commitment. This substantial change was accomplished with
overwhelming MAS victories during the 2005 presidential and congressional elections
(electionguide.org 2013). These victories signaled the beginning of the fusion between
social movements and a new, leftist government. This change all but sealed the final
successful outcome. To summarize, the importance of the role of neoliberalism is
illustrated by indigenous women’s failures under neoliberal governments and the
eventual success of their efforts after neoliberal commitments had become weak.
Indigenous and indigenous women’s success in achieving gas nationalization shows
remarkable increases in indigenous women’s influence on policy, especially compared to
the previous period when no amount of protest was able to halt the neoliberal march
toward privatization.
International Forces
Two major components of the international environment affected outcomes on the
issue of natural gas: international trade and international lending. The international
environment is coded as obstructive due to relevant international actors in opposition to
the nationalization of gas. The historically antagonistic relationship between social
movements and international trade reached crisis levels in the case of newly found
natural gas reserves in 2003. These reserves had been found subsequent to the partial
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privatization of the YPFB (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos) and other stateowned sectors of the economy during Sanchez do Lozada’s first term in office during the
1990s Private companies laid claim to the rights to profits from these resources (Webber
2005). Previous experience with privatization and resulting lay-offs decreased public
acceptance of privatization schemes and led to a new nationalist movement that promoted
nationalizing natural gas for Bolivia (Webber 2005; Energy Information Administration
2012; Perreault 2006: 152). According to news reports and scholars’ analyses, several
factors conditioned indigenous women’s response to natural gas privatization plans. The
first related to the initial plans to export gas through an agreement with Chile, with whom
Bolivia’s relations have been tense since the loss of territory in the war of 1879 (Energy
Information Administration 2012; Webber 2005; Hodges-Copple 2007; BBC 2004;
Hylton et al 2004; Perreault 2006, 2008). Similarly the agreements were also unpopular
because they benefitted Californian and Mexican industries. Initial proposals by Evo
Morales, then a member of Congress, included a pipeline agreement with Peru instead of
Chile and a larger amount of gas revenues to be kept in country by increasing taxes and
royalties by 32% on the two largest natural gas producers (Energy Information
Administration 2012). However, indigenous women and other social movement
organizations pushed further and demanded nationalization. As Kohl (2004) reports,
before the 2000s, popular reactions against agreements with the IMF were scattered and
sector-centric, with unions of each sector protesting at the time of sale of their industries
throughout the 1990s. These protests were ineffective in halting sales or preventing the
loss of 14,795 jobs during the second half of the 1990s (Kohl 2004: 899). International
influences were a visible (and audible) part of indigenous women’s agenda in the 2000s,
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as each cycle of protest between 2003 and 2005 concerning gas nationalization created
“increasingly broad coalitions of an increasingly clear critique of privatization” (Kohl
2004: 893).
International companies and lending institutions placed a great deal of pressure on
the Bolivian government to increase privatization of natural resources in the country as
conditions for further lending (Kohl 2004; Eurodad 2006; PBS 2002; Samper 2003). As
Kohl (2004) and La Razon (2003) report, in early 2003 the IMF demanded that the
Bolivian government reduce its deficit from 8.5% to 5.5% of its GDP, or by $240
million. The government agreed to cut spending by $30 million and to raise another $80
million from hydrocarbon taxes, as well as $90 million from a new universal income tax
(Kohl 2004: 894; La Razon 2003; Samper 2003). As various sources describe, as budget
problems resurfaced in the country, new rounds of negotiations with the IMF and World
Bank occurred. These negotiations created more embittered protests from the indigenous,
women’s, and broader sector social movements (Kohl 2004: 902; Hodges-Copple 2007;
BBC 2004; IMF 2003). The agreements forged between the Mesa government and the
IMF expired in March 31, 2006, and Evo Morales declined to sign a new memorandum
of understanding with the agency, after which the IMF cut off new lines of credit to
Bolivia (Weisbrot and Sandoval 2006; Weisbrot 2007). Instead, he issued a decree
nationalizing the country’s natural gas reserves.
While Bolivia remained committed to neoliberalism and the IMF and World
Bank, international opposition to nationalization acted in concert with other political
structures (especially the Executive) to impede indigenous women’s goals. In the last
phase of the Gas War, Evo Morales’ government de-aligned with these institutions and
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the neoliberal design in general, resulting in favorable outcomes for indigenous women’s
goals. The inability of the same level of opposition to block indigenous women’s efforts
in the final phase shows that international opposition must require other variables to be
influential. When indigenous women confronted the 2003 and 2005 governments,
international factors had more influence on neoliberal governments, which consistently
responded with policies that kept them in IMF and World Bank favor. In the final phase
of the Gas War, international opposition was unable to impede social movement efforts
because of opening structural political opportunities as well as weak neoliberal
commitments.
It is also useful to pay attention to the amount of protest and mobilization that
international forces cause. International forces may have less power to impede social
movements’ progress when they are the cause of social movement protest. In accordance
with the expectations established in this research, international factors require an
alignment of state and organizational factors—but especially the state—in order to be a
real support or obstacle to indigenous women’s outcomes.

Conclusions
Several variables of interest are highlighted by the case of gas nationalization.
First, very high resources, brought about through strong networks with the government,
were present during the final success, but less so during the previous attempts to change
policy. Indigenous women’s use of gendered, ethnic, and broad frames during the Gas
War indicates that gendered and ethnic claims do not damage indigenous women’s
chances of success, contrary to the framing hypothesis. This is true especially when these
types of frames reach a government that has created political opportunities, as did Evo
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Morales’ government. The existence of political opportunities within the current
administration and the positive outcome for indigenous women also increases confidence
in the hypothesis that political open opportunity structures increase indigenous women’s
chances of favorable policy outcomes. Weak neoliberal commitment occurs with the
successful outcome on the dependent variable, while failures are associated with stronger
neoliberal commitment. Interestingly, however, international influences are conditionally
important. International opposition to the nationalization of gas succeeded when
neoliberal commitments were high and political opportunity structures were closed to
indigenous women. The IMF was unable to stop the momentum of social movement
demands once neoliberal commitments within the state had become much weaker. The
Gas War illustrates the importance of understanding the interactions between
organizational, state, and international characteristics, as specific combinations of coding
on these variables result in different outcomes. Specifically, broad, ethnic and gendered
frames, very high resources, closed political opportunity structures, neoliberal
commitments, and international opposition result in failure. Changing the state variables
to open political opportunities, neoliberal decline, and strong networks with the state,
results in success. This observation leads to the conclusion that state features are
especially important determinants of social movement success in policy.
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Chapter VI
Organizational, State, and International Influences on Policy,
2006-2012
In this chapter, I investigate the impact of organizational, state, and international
characteristics on the outcomes of indigenous women’s efforts to influence policy. The
subsections below discuss findings of process tracing and historical analysis of
indigenous women’s policy efforts regarding gasoline and food prices, the TIPNIS
conflict, and land reform. Each policy illustrates some innovation in organizational
features, including high amounts of human resource capital and women’s leadership in
the movement. This analysis also illustrates newer forms of language and differences in
demands made on the state and the corresponding high amounts of public support gained
by the movements. The sections below consider the state’s role—especially
neoliberalism’s decline and the openness of state structures—in whether policy
succeeded or failed, and provide evidence that state features are critical influences on
indigenous women’s policy outcomes. In addition, policy tracing includes the influence
of international factors that might impact the outcome, and as hypothesized, international
factors matter conditionally. They can contribute to positive outcomes in a favorable
domestic environment and political opportunity structure. Table 6 presents the cases and
their outcomes.
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Table 6: Selected Cases and Coding
Policy
Outcome
Land Reform (2006)

Success

Gas and Food Prices

Mixed

TIPNIS Conflict

Failure
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Gasoline and Food Prices
After indigenous women and the rest of civil society had won the war against gas
privatization in the early 2000s, their ability to tackle government policy on other issues
was illustrated well by the protests they led during the early months of 2011. Plans to end
government subsidies on gasoline in the country had been announced and abandoned
previously by the Morales administration, until the government unexpectedly acted to
remove the subsidies in late December 2010 (Shahriari 2011). Bolivian consumer prices
grew 1.76 percent from November to December 2010, the highest jump since May 2008
(Shahriari 2011). Massive protests in response to the immediate hikes in food prices
(including sugar, chicken, rice, and beef) sent the government scurrying to reinstate the
gasoline subsidy. While this initial victory was hopeful, the price hikes continued to crisis
levels, leading to further and wider protest. Eventually, the government signed an
agreement to quiet the unrest, but this time the compromise, a minimum wage increase,
would not improve the situation faced by indigenous women. The government also failed
to respond adequately to the resulting food shortages and price increases, which most
affected indigenous women. Therefore, the outcome of these protests was mixed; it
counts as a success in that the government rescinded its decision to cut subsidies, and it
counts as failure in that the government did not respond to alleviate the rising food prices
for indigenous women.
Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement
The number of indigenous women participants in protest has been coded as high,
women’s leadership is high and networks are coded as strong, resulting in a coding of
moderate human capital resources. In one protest alone, Los Tiempos estimated that
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eighty percent of the protesters were “peasant” women (Los Tiempos 2011b). Gas and
staple food items soared in price, and the production of food decreased by 35% from
earlier seasons, despite government attempts to control prices by prohibiting exportation
of food products (Vreeken 2011). According to news reports, organizations’ attempts to
get government attention on the issue continued until at least August (ANF 2011), with
protesters demanding that the government instate price controls to alleviate the suffering
of the poor communities (La Jornada 2011; ANF 2011). While initial efforts to influence
subsidization policy were successful, demands that the government alleviate the food
crisis went largely unmet. Indigenous women were aligned with informal sector vendors,
teachers, laborers, and transport drivers to press their claims against the rising costs of
feeding families (Alcoreza 2011; ANF 2011; Los Tiempos 2011). These alliances with
other sectors were evidence of the broad appeal of indigenous women’s activism that at
least initially increased the amount of human capital resources available to them.
In May 2012, the government reached agreements with unions over salary
increases that were initially demanded because of increases in the daily cost of buying
food (ANF 2012). In this instance, the issue of gas shifted into opportunities for other
sectors to make demands of the government, and before the food crisis could be solved in
favor of indigenous women and neighborhood associations, the Centro Obrero Boliviano
(Center for Bolivian Workers) had seized upon the opportunity to shift public attention to
the situation facing workers. While concessions to workers, including teachers, police,
and medical workers, were made (including a salary increase across the board), few
tangible concessions were given to indigenous women who had mobilized in reaction to
the government’s decision to end gas subsidies. The concessions made to increase
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salaries only affect workers in the formal economy, which constitutes a small part of the
overall economy. In the early 2000s, the estimated size of the informal economy in
Bolivia was among the largest in the region, accounting for 67.1% of the Gross National
Product of 1999/2000 (Schneider 2002: 12). The World Bank (2004) reports that about
84% of the indigenous population and 67% of the non-indigenous population are
informally employed (World Bank 2002). In addition, over 60% of indigenous women
are informally employed, compared to less than 40% of indigenous men, 40% of nonindigenous women, and 28% of non-indigenous men (World Bank 2009:13). Thus, many
indigenous women would not benefit from wage increases.
Human capital resources are coded for this period as very high, considering the
broad networks in support of indigenous women as well as their impressive leadership on
the issue. The mixed outcome due to indigenous women’s efforts on the problem of gas
and food subsidies reveals that high amounts of human capital resources, including those
gained from broad networks, do not, as hypothesized, clearly lead to policy influence for
indigenous women. The evidence from this case does not support the hypothesis that
indigenous women’s efforts will succeed when their needs are placed at the front of the
agenda d. While women were able to advance their claims from within their own
organizations and with their own voice, their ability to lead on the issue was still not
productive in terms of creating a solution to the problem they confronted. Perhaps
counter-intuitive to the expectations of the role of strong networks and wide-ranging
support, indigenous women’s efforts were used to further the goals of other
organizations, while their own demands went largely unmet. This represents a potential
risk to organizing for broader issues in the hopes to advance indigenous women’s claims;
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ultimately their voices may be lost in future protest cycles or in negotiations with the
government.
Organizational Characteristics: Frames of the Movement
Indigenous women’s frames of activism on the issue of gas and food subsidies
were very much aligned with their roles as indigenous women, reflecting not only
gendered, but also ethnic, language in their framing of issues. For example, Adriana
Salamanca, president of the Female Civic Committee in Cochabamba, stated,
“…(indigenous women) in Cochabamba now we are treating the theme of the family
basket because we are the most affected by the administration of the home economy”
(ANF 2011). Corina Ramírez of the Bartolina Sisa stated, “As women, we are going to
rise up because we are passing crisis. For this reason, we have entered into a state of
emergency” (ANF 2011).
Indigenous women acknowledged their relationship to the situation at hand and
found their relevance and their influence in this practical relationship. It is important to
note that although indigenous women’s frames are related to their roles as indigenous
women, the substance of their claims relates to issues that affect the entire country. Since
indigenous women experience poverty most acutely and act as home administrators, they
have a special knowledge of the needs and demands of the broader social sector.
Although indigenous women related their roles as women to gas and food subsidies, they
acknowledged the importance of the issue to the whole of society, and the framing of
their activism effectively communicated this intent.
Much like the story of the Gas War, gas and food subsidies constituted causes that
generated concern within, and then activism from, a wide range of indigenous women’s
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neighborhood associations and organizations, including Mujeres Creando, Bartolina Sisa
and OMAK Mujeres (Organization of Aymaran Kollasuyo Women). Indigenous
women’s mobilization regarding the gasoline subsidy cuts occurred because of crises in
basic nutrition, an arena of life that indigenous women are more likely to feel first, and
most acutely, during times of scarcity or price hikes (Bennett et al 2005; Godoy 2004).
Indigenous women’s frames have been coded as containing ethnic and gendered
language combined with broad sector frames during this period. My hypothesis that the
language of participation influences indigenous women’s policy success –particularly the
expectation that broader frames would be more likely to succeed—gains little support
from the evidence presented here. Indigenous women’s mobilization was not particularly
ethnic-centric, although their claims to legitimacy stemmed from their experiences as
indigenous women. But the framing of the issue was one of broader community interests,
as were the actual demands put forth by indigenous women. This strategy met with initial
success but ultimate disappointment. Analyzing a case of failure points out that while the
language of activism and human capital resources are quite important facets of
indigenous women’s policy efforts, they do not capture the entire puzzle of what leads to
social movement success.
State Characteristics: State Structural Opportunities/Reforms
The 2009 elections resulted in a profound victory for Evo Morales and the MAS
(Movement Toward Socialism), which produced an open political opportunity structure
for indigenous women. The social movement of MAS put forth the first president to be
re-elected in successive terms with more votes than in the first election. After 2009, MAS
now controlled 25 out of 36 Senate Seats and 82 out of 130 seats in the House of
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Deputies (Bolivia National Electoral Court 2010). This electoral victory solidified both
the power of the left and the social movements that had supported MAS’s ascent during
the 2005 elections. This was an impressive structural change in favor of social
movements because the MAS government held onto important alliances with social
movement organizations. These organizations included the Bartolina Sisa and indigenous
and labor federations, such as the COB (Central Workers Union of Bolivia) and
CSUTCB (Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) (Rockefeller 2007; Bueno and
Datta 2011). But this structural change presented limitations. News reports and public
statements by indigenous female activists indicate that the government’s decision to end
gas subsidies had sparked opposition from a significant base of his support (BBC 2011),
and this included indigenous women’s and neighborhood organizations. The state moved
to end gasoline subsidies, thus raising the price of gasoline by close to 70 percent, in an
effort to prevent gasoline smuggling to countries with higher prices and to bolster the
Bolivian economy (Valdez 2011; Los Tiempos 2011; Martin 2011). According to
Namecia Achacollo, the government’s rural development minister, food export controls
had been adopted in order to prevent food being smuggled to countries “such as Peru”
(Valdez 2007). While Bolivia produces most of its own food, the imports of corn and
sugar during 2011 increased by 68% to compensate for the lack of domestic output.
Floods and severe drought during 2010 created even more shortages and a 10 to 50
percent increase in the cost of all foodstuffs (Valdez 2011; Van Auken 2011). These
conditions continued to fuel protest against the government. The evidence that the state
only conceded to a small, formally employed sector of society after an early
reinstatement of the gas subsidy, is a somewhat surprising outcome given that indigenous
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women had made a great deal of headway prior to this movement. Their advances were
evident in the Constituent Assembly of 2009, and in the previous gas war. The political
opportunity structure is coded as extremely open during the period of protest, making this
outcome unexpected. In effect, indigenous women had made great strides in altering the
political structure to their advantage, so that they faced an environment that should have
been conducive to their claims.
One possible contributor to the government’s action and non-action on the gas
subsidy case is the small commitment symbolized by the minimum wage increase, which
was decidedly lower than the overall demands of the population to curb food prices. In
addition, Morales’ decision on eventually ending the subsidy has been publicly re-iterated
(ANF 2011), indicating that despite the overall political openness to indigenous women’s
claims, on this issue, the political opportunity structure is only partially open. Thus, the
government’s over-riding commitment to budgetary soundness is the primary explanation
for why indigenous women’s efforts achieved the moderate or mixed result.
State Characteristics: Neoliberalism
Neoliberal commitments have been coded as weak during the 2000s, especially
after the period of Evo Morales’s election. The expectation that declining neoliberalism
would be a positive factor for indigenous women’s success is not borne out by the
outcomes associated with gas subsidies. The government of MAS and the election of
Morales may have signaled an important shift in the commitment to neoliberal policies,
but the ending of subsidies was a market solution to budget imbalances. This indicates
the presence of a mixed economic strategy (Filho 2012). This means that a declining
favor toward privatization as witnessed during the social upheaval over natural gas and
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water is not necessarily associated with triumph over market problems in every situation.
Evidence of this comes from the fact that, throughout the crisis, Morales apologized for
the government’s abrupt move in eliminating the subsidy, but insisted that it had created
a drain on the government that would have to be scrapped (ANF 2011). The initial
response to rescind the gas subsidy decision was not enough to end massive and angry
protests, two of which were powerful enough to have Morales removed from public
appearances by his security forces (Van Auken 2011; Valdez 2011; BBC 2011). While
the government discussed possibilities of using its food stockpiles to accommodate the
shortage (Shahriari 2011), protests continued, with unions (represented by the COB) now
demanding even greater action by the government: increases in salaries for state
employees of 15%. Protesters demanded price controls or increasing subsidized food
provision (La Jornada 2011; ANF 2011; Alcoreza 2011; ANF 2011; Los Tiempos 2011).
Instead, the government reached a pre-agreement with the COB (Centro Obrero
Boliviano or Central Bolivian Workers) in April to commit to an 11% increase in
salaries, after which the workers agreed to suspend strikes and roadblock activities for
twelve days (AFP 2011a). The public scuffle over wages, ultimately overshadowing the
issues around food and gas, finally came to an end in January 2012 when Morales issued
Supreme Decree 1213. The executive order increased the minimum national salary to
close to U.S.$143, under an agreement with the COB (ANF 2012). As mentioned above,
these moves were insufficient to address the crisis that had occurred for indigenous
women, the group that originally led the social movement activity on the issue. The
existence of minimal neoliberal commitments during the Morales administration did not
signal the success of indigenous women’s policy efforts on the matter of gas and food
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subsidies. Conceding to the smaller group of formal workers who constituted indigenous
women’s network entailed less expense and effort from the government than conceding
to indigenous women, neighborhood associations, and other popular groups in the nation.
But this strategy is not unique to the neoliberal form of government, because all
governments must make budgetary decisions, and the decision to cut gasoline subsidies
was, according to the state, aimed at eliminating subsidies for the middle and upper class.
This case indicates that declining neoliberalism and leftism are not enough to ensure
indigenous women’s success in policy efforts. A government structure that has a
commitment to other aims, regardless of the leftist ideological leaning, may create
sufficient political closure to impede a movement’s goals. Therefore, political
opportunity structures emerge again as important interaction terms with the variables
investigated.
International Forces
The mobilization against gas subsidy cuts and food costs is portrayed in news
reports as a domestic issue, but while the role of international influences seems muted,
there are international subtexts to the need to raise gas prices in the first place. The role of
international influences overall for this period is coded as supportive of indigenous
women’s issues, but the details involved with gas subsidies reveal differences from the
overall environment. As alluded to in the previous section, the smuggling of food and
gasoline to neighboring countries such as Peru, Chile, and Brazil was a significant
concern to Bolivian authorities (Harrington 2011; Rimero 2011). Unlike Venezuela,
which heavily subsidizes gasoline but is an oil-rich country, Bolivia’s high subsidies
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must be financed by other sources, such as their natural gas exports. In addition, the New
York Times reported that,
Energy analysts say the low domestic fuel prices in Bolivia have dissuaded
foreign energy companies from drilling new oil wells and increasing production
inside the country. Mr. Morales’ nationalist policies have also limited foreign
investment in Bolivia’s natural gas industry, prompting neighboring countries like
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile to seek new sources of fuel. This has deprived
Bolivia of revenue and left Mr. Morales with little choice but to try to raise
gasoline prices, a market-oriented move that his supporters immediately rejected.
(Romero 2011)
While the IMF33 and World Bank have not made removal of gas subsidies part of
Bolivia’s loan conditionality, both lending institutions have made public their position
that the practice of subsidizing gas in Bolivia and other developing economies constitutes
a drain on resources that disproportionately benefits the upper classes (Croady et al 2010;
IMF 2007; World Bank 2010). At the November 2010 G-20 summit, the International
Energy Agency, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the
World Bank argued that removing subsidies is a "triple win solution" that enhances
energy security, reduces greenhouse gas emissions, and produces overall economic gains
(Martin 2011; International Energy Agency et al 2010). The report from these
proceedings agrees with other IMF and World Bank publications that well-designed rural
electrification subsidies and better-targeted compensation packages for the poorest

33

The IMF suspended new credits for Bolivia in 2006 (IMF 2012).
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households are more suitable for protecting the most vulnerable from rising gas prices
(International Energy Agency et al 2010; IMF 2007; World Bank 2010).
International forces for this period are coded as highly supportive for indigenous
women’s policy interests based on international support for indigenous issues and the
ratification of international accords surrounding indigenous and women’s rights.
However, the basic characterization of international forces on the issue of gas was
unsupportive, or obstructive of indigenous women’s interests. While on its face, this
seems to confirm the hypothesis that international forces may impede or contribute to
indigenous women’s success, comparisons with other cases reveal the flaw with this
assumption. The case of the Gas War was one where indigenous women first encountered
international opposition and an unfavorable political structure, but they overcame these
conditions. Thus, the existence of international opposition, which was by all accounts
lower than it had been during the Gas War, is unlikely to be a major reason for the
decision to remove or reinstate gas subsidies.
Gas Subsidies Summary
The initial success and later failure for indigenous women’s claims during the gas
subsidies protests is a surprising mixed outcome, given that similar organizational, state,
and international characteristics provided successful outcomes on similar issues during
this period. But while resources are coded as high, including strong network ties, the
existence of these networks made a remarkable difference by creating a range of
preferences for the government to consider. The mixed outcome is likely due to the
nature of the networks and the political opportunity structure regarding this issue.
Important is that political opportunities are relatively closed in the case of gas and food
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subsidies as a result of the government’s determination to accomplish other goals (in this
case, budgeting). Finally, while international opposition aligns with a moderate outcome
in this case, the actual weakness of international influence on Bolivia gives reason to
doubt that it makes a substantial impact on the outcome.

Land Reform Revisited
The reforms made to the INRA since the election of Morales have signified
victories for indigenous people and indigenous women, and INRA policy is coded as a
successful case of policy influence. Indigenous women’s mobilization to demand gender
equity in land distribution gained new momentum during the post-liberal period.
Inequitable land titling for indigenous people as a community was still the operating
norm, and despite previous reforms (including INRA), land inequality in Bolivia
remained the most extreme in Latin America (CEDLA 2010). In addition, land titling for
women was a focal point of indigenous women’s involvement during their supportive
activism throughout Morales’ presidential campaign and during protests calling for a new
constitutional assembly (Bueno and Datta 2011;Villarroel 2011). Morales began working
on indigenous reform during his first year as president, producing Law 3545 in revision
to Law 1751 (INRA). The law mandated redistribution of nearly 48 million acres and
appropriation of illegally held or idle lands (Bolivia 2006). It also gave,
guarantee and priority to the participation of women in the processes of clearing
and distribution of lands. In case of marriage and free conjugal unions or titles
executed will be emitted in favor of both conjugees or cohabitating partners that
work the land, consigning the name of the women in the first place. Equal
treatment will be offered in other cases of joint-ownership between men and
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women who work the land, independently of their marital status. (Bolivia 2006:
Final Disposition 8)34
Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement
Indigenous women’s resources are coded as very high for the case of land reform,
reflecting large numbers, strong networks, and high amounts of women’s leadership in
the movement. While there was initial success for the demands for gender equality in
land titling, indigenous women’s movements argued that there was need for more
extensive reform to address the difficulty women faced in acquiring property titles. A
web release from Ukhamawa Noticias (2009) revealed that 60 organizations, including
governmental, non-governmental, and local, supported and sent delegates to the National
Meeting for the Access of Women to Land, which met on October 30, 2009. In their
press release, the combined activist groups argued that:
56 years after the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Degree, and 13 years after
the INRA law, our right to access to land is not guaranteed. In the period 1997 to
2006, out of 29,063 titles issued, only 4,973 were done for women. That is to say,
that only 17 of every 100 titles that were issued were for women. (Ukhamawa
Noticias 2009: 2)35
In addition, indigenous women called upon the state to honor the constitution’s
protections against discrimination, the state’s adoption of CEDAW (Conference to End
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), and to make the political decisions and
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Ssee also Köppen 2008; Jordán 2010, and Fundación Tierra (2010).
This data is corroborated by information released by Fundación Tierra (2010)
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create administrative and technical methods that would guarantee their right to access and
the titling of land. They further acknowledged that these goals required indigenous
community and village organizations to eliminate practices that limit rights of women to
land (Fundación Tierra 2010; Ukhamawa Noticias: 2).
Human capital resources, including networks and women’s leadership, have been
categorized as very high during this period. But while broader networks were an
important feature of the movements discussed in this chapter, the resources of networks
for land reform remained quite rooted within indigenous organizations and the
indigenous movement. While these were powerful organizations, the networks with
broader sectors of society were not a major resource from which indigenous women drew
during the demonstrations to pass reforms to agricultural law. But while indigenous
networks might have signified “weak” networks during the 1990s, these networks now
have strong relationships to the government, and these relationships emerge as important
resources for indigenous movements in themselves. The massive involvement of
indigenous women’s organization Bartolina Sisa and the lower tropical indigenous
groups over the land issue (represented under the umbrella organization CIDOB or
Indigenous Confederation of Bolivia) provides support for the hypothesis that large
amounts of human capital resources increase indigenous women’s chances of influencing
policy. The case of land reform also provides an encouraging piece of evidence that
indigenous women’s leadership and networks are important human capital resources.
Organizational Characteristics: Frames of the Movement
Indigenous women’s frames of the land issue were mostly gendered and ethnic.
During the National Meeting for the Access of Women to Land, rural women interviewed
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by Inter-Press service complained that, in practice, laws and declarations, including the
recent revision to INRA in 2006, were largely ignored in male-dominated sectors of rural
communities. They also referenced the habits of governmental institutions to put up a
host of excuses to evade compliance with land titling regulations. In addition, in the
Andean highlands in western Bolivia, where the population is largely indigenous,
requests by single women to own land individually were rejected by their communities,
further disadvantaging women who were not married (Chavez 2009; Jordán 2010).
UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) investigator Verónica Navia
reveals that in addition to concerns that land is still not being equitably distributed, in the
lower eastern lands, the legal aspect of giving indigenous women land titles has not
overridden the culture and customs that persist in obstructing women’s access to the land.
“The access for women to land is almost zero” (Navia 2010). Although these
impediments still exist to women’s ownership of land, by 2008, Evo Morales’
government had distributed over 10,000 land titles to indigenous women, more than any
of the previous governments (Amazonia.bo 2008; Chavez 2009). Indigenous women’s
groups, international NGOs and domestic organizations, also implemented programs tot
assist women in the quest of attaining land titles in their name (Bartolina Sisa 2011;
UNIFEM 2011).
While gender remains forcefully on their agenda, indigenous women also
maintained pressure on governments to make additional changes to INRA that benefitted
the entire indigenous community. Also, as Navia (2010) states,
In some lowland communities where they have lands, it is insufficient. For
example, in the community Sotos La Vertiente there are thirty families in one
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community, and communal property is only one hundred and four hectares, and
that leaves only approximately three hectares per family. (Navia 2010)
Therefore, the gendered problem of land titling continues alongside a general scarcity of
land titles for certain groups.
During field research conducted in June 2011, I was present during plans by
indigenous women at a Bartolina Sisa meeting to organize a march to pressure the
government to make additional changes to the INRA (Ley 1715), including establishing
new firms dedicated to fertilizer production, seed bank provision, communal
commercialization support, and support for farming mechanization. These items were
integrated into Ley INRA in June 2011 (ABI 2011). When questioned about the
perceived benefits of the protest marches and proposals made to the government, a couple
of informants from within the group indicated two major factors. First, the early 2011
hike in food pricing had clearly necessitated their action on food security in Bolivia.
Second, the relationship between agriculture and the people who worked the land was
going through a much-needed change in the country. While the “cities” (especially La
Paz), produced the important monetary business of the country, they also experienced a
strong dependence upon the countryside for basic foodstuffs. During the food revolts of
2011, indigenous women had already maintained that their own experiences as
indigenous women authorized them to speak on the real issues and demands made on the
government. The basic food insecurity encountered in 2011, they argued, was a result of
ethnic and gender discrimination in land ownership. As producers of agriculture, and thus
important providers to the country and the economy, they argued that they should be
given land to work that would increase their economic opportunities while solving the
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domestic food crisis (Buice 2011). The ability to press for further changes to the statutes
for the improvement of their community communicates their involvement and leadership
on more than specified, gendered dimensions. Much of their involvement in the 2000s
highlights this new role within social movements and the government itself. Indigenous
women’s frames surrounding agriculture reform contained ethnic, gendered frames, and
were associated with successful outcomes. This finding contradicts the hypothesis that
broader frames and claims would be necessary for a marginalized female group to gain
significant influence.
State Characteristics: State Structural Opportunity/ Reforms
A vitally important structural factor affecting indigenous women’s success in land
reform issues is the unique relationship between the Morales government and the MAS
social movement, which is comprised of mainly indigenous social movement
organizations. Analysts point out contradictions between the MAS as a social movement
and a “state actor” (Mayorga 2008:6).36 MAS, which identifies itself as a social
movement and not a political party, engages in decision-making within the governing
apparatus and holds powerful positions in terms of influencing policy (Mayorga 2008:6).
As Larson (2008) argues,
Ultimately… the legitimacy of this government rests with the MAS’ broadest and
most volatile constituency—the nation’s indigenous underclass, which makes up
almost two-thirds of the nation’s population (and which correlates, almost exactly,
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Analysts have expressed concerns that a governing social movement may begin to lose
its participatory, bottom-up organization in favor of the pattern of hierarchy and cooptation that occurs in many populist parties (Mayorga 2008:6).
189

with that two-thirds of the population that lives below the poverty level). (Larson
2008:9)
In addition, action by the state on land reform was inevitable given the fact that
land reform goals resounded within the earlier movements regarding natural resources
(water and gas). These had been keynotes of MAS’ political campaign during the 2006
elections (Urioiste 2007:1). The evidence that state structure highly favored indigenous
women on the issue of land reform supports the hypothesis that an open political
opportunity structure is likely to lead to success.
State Characteristics: Neoliberalism
Weakening neoliberal commitments affected land reform in various ways.
Specific to the reforms of 2006, two main principles stand out as anti-neoliberal. The first
was the mandate that all new land grants must be under collective titling and that those
communities that wish to have access to a given community territory must renounce their
family property rights. The second was that the new reform made large landholdings
illegal and provided for the state appropriation of “idle” lands. The attack on “idle” lands
is actually directed at landholders who maintain properties upon which they draw a
continual stream of credit: these speculation lands are now subject to appropriation by the
state, which has, incidentally, along with the issue of nationalizing natural gas from the
eastern region, fueled opposition coming from the landed elite (Urioiste 2007:5).
Indigenous women had been denied land by government foot-dragging and elite
opposition for many years. The new anti-neoliberal stance of the government meant that
goals dismissed by previous governments could be re-articulated and accommodated.
Mandating that property titles be either joint or in women’s names is an affirmative
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action move that goes above and beyond the prohibitions against discrimination found in
many bills (Education Reform and the Law of Popular Participation, for instance) during
the 1990s. Aside from the economic implications, the move to make land more genderequitable falls in line with many other affirmative action moves by the Morales
government, including his appointment of indigenous women to the Constituent
Assembly’s committee, Pacto Unidad, and his appointment of indigenous women to his
cabinet. Thus, the coding of weak neoliberal commitments coincides with a positive
outcome for indigenous people on the issue of land reform, as hypothesized.
International Influences
International influences for the issue of land reform are coded as supportive. The
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples establishes that “states
shall provide effective mechanisms for the prevention of, and redress for … any action
which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources
(United Nations 2008: Article 8, Section 2b). In addition, ILO 169 contains specific
provisions regarding the rights of indigenous peoples to indigenous lands and territories,
which were addressed by the legal changes in the 1990s regarding indigenous peoples.
One measure includes the first passage of the INRA in 1996. In addition to these
agreements, indigenous women called upon the state to honor the signing of the CEDAW
and prevent discrimination on land titling (Ukhamawa Noticias 2009: 2; Fundación
Tierra 2010).37 As discussed in previous chapters, these commitments have been adopted
into the legal code in Bolivia, representing an important inter-play between international

37

This data is corroborated by information released by Fundación Tierra (2010)
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and state structures on the issue. The international environment is supportive of the
general idea of greater land distribution for indigenous people. However, in many ways,
the continued pressure on the government to expand land titling to indigenous people
remained a highly domestic issue, and movements directed complaints and demands to
the national government. The issue also consisted mainly of domestic actors involved in
the negotiations over amendments to the INRA. The overall international support for
indigenous land rights between the INRA negotiations in 1995 and those in the 2000s
changed little while land policy outcomes changed significantly. This is because state
structures during the 1990s were less committed to gendered land distribution (or
indigenous distribution at all), and were therefore less likely to incorporate international
advice. This changed with MAS and Morales’ commitment to social justice. In addition,
indigenous people’s movements have used these agreements to attempt to force their
governments to honor the norms and standards established by adopting these statutes into
law. Therefore, international agreements have some indirect effect on mobilization and
policy outcomes. Therefore, the hypothesis that international forces are important for
policy outcomes is qualified to include the importance of political opportunity structures
and other variables in conjunction with international variables. It could be said that
international influences matter when the right domestic structures fall into place.
Land Reform Summary
Of the cases studied in this dissertation, indigenous women’s most significant
accomplishment is the revisions made to the INRA in 2006, after Morales’ election.
Women’s land ownership is a subject that once placed them at odds with their state and
their communities. In the 1990s, this conflict was enough to effectively silence the
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gendered ramifications of land tenure in Bolivia. But the open political opportunity
structure that came with new connections to the state and ongoing international support
aided the renewed mobilization effort of indigenous women. This effort displayed an
emerging leadership of women in addition to impressive state connections. Therefore, the
connections between organizational and state resources are vital components of the
success of land reform in the 2000s.

The TIPNIS Conflict
The struggles of indigenous people in the National Park and Indigenous TCO
Isiboro-Secure (hereafter referred to as TIPNIS) provides an interesting test of the
hypotheses about the role of organizational, state, and international characteristics on a
social movement’s ability to influence policy. The TIPNIS region covers around 1.1
million hectares in the foot of the Andes Mountains and reaches to the Bolivian Amazon.
TIPNIS is located in the center of the country in the departments of Cochabamba and
Beni. Residing in this territory are indigenous Yuracaré, Chimaàn and Mojeño, a group of
communities totaling around 90,000 people (Farell 2012). Plans to build a highway
through the territories initiated in 2003 during Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s second term
in office. Mobilization on the issue among men and women from the three different
ancestral groups occupying the TIPNIS region began in 2006. Objections intensified in
2010 when Evo Morales promulgated Law 005, which approved the protocol of financing
the highway between Brazil and Bolivia. This took place after the granting of the land
titles in the TIPNIS region after the 2009 changes to land reform (Echazú 2011; Saucedo
2012; L. Press 2012). Indigenous protesters argued against the plans on two major
constitutional grounds: Article 30, guaranteeing indigenous rights to be consulted on state
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decisions regarding their territories, and Article 347, which promotes the mitigation of
environmental damage (Farell 2011). Two laws have since been passed regarding the
TIPNIS territory, the first a law that halted construction on and protected the territory
(Law 180) and, two months later, a law which referred the matter of consultation on the
highway to referendum (Law 222). Today, plans for the highway are in progress, as the
consultation referendum returned a vote in favor of consulting the indigenous groups
before construction began. The plans supposedly hinged on whether or not a majority of
indigenous groups approved of the highway plans, in accordance with constitutional
consultation rights. Indigenous activists were opposed to this measure, as they felt the
government would manipulate the consultation process. The results of the consultation
results are seemingly in favor of the TIPNIS highway, as the government claims that 47
out of 48 of the groups consulted have signed on to the highway construction. Yet,
TIPNIS activists state that 52 communities reject both the road and the consultation
process, leaving the outcome hotly disputed (Achtenberg 2012a). On October 6, 2012,
Morales signed a contract for the first segment of the highway, claiming that the process
has properly observed constitutional indigenous rights (Achtenberg 2012, 2012a). This
outcome results in a failure for indigenous women’s goals for the TIPNIS region.
Organizational Characteristics: Resources of the Movement
Indigenous women’s resources during the TIPNIS movement were impressive in
numbers and indigenous women’s leadership in the movement, but possessed weak
networking ties, thus the level of their overall resources was moderate. The failure of the
TIPNIS case represents the final discussion of policies targeted by indigenous women in
the post-liberal, Evo Morales era. Indigenous women from the lowland areas of Bolivia
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have been paramount figures in the conflict over highway construction plans for the
TIPNIS (Achtenberg 2012; Terrazas 2012; Erbol 2012b). While the larger Andean and
Quechua groups in Latin America have been most visible in protests throughout most of
Bolivia’s history, the emergence of smaller indigenous groups seeking a change in their
political fortunes presented a new challenge for ethnic rights in the region.
The largest of numerous protests, marches, and demonstrations were the VIII and
IX Marches of the Indigenous, both taking place between August 2011 and April 2012.
According to news reports, around 400 indigenous women representing 34 villages in the
east, Chaco, and the Amazon, began marching in August 2011 with the elderly, children,
and pregnant family members included in the procession (Saucedo 2012; L. Press 2012;
FFLA 2011). Between April and June 2012, at least 1000 marchers, the majority of them
women, led another march from the lowlands to La Paz, this time with over 300 children
accompanying family members (Achtenberg 2012; Chavez 2012a). Both marches were
highly publicized in national and international media. While this was a positive factor for
the coverage of activists’ issues, it also brought criticisms from NGOs like UNICEF and
government ministries who feared health risks due to the exposure of children to the
harsh Bolivian winter (Achtenberg 2012; Achtenberg 2012b).
While large numbers of marchers were a strong resource for indigenous women,
several events created significant impediments to the efficient mobilization of resources
in the indigenous movement on the TIPNIS conflict. First, in 2011, the Organization of
American States agreed to mediate a discussion over the conflict, and convened a meeting
with cocaleros, commercial interests, and municipal authorities, but excluded the subcentral TIPNIS groups, which were the most vocal in opposing highway construction on
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cultural and ecological grounds (Echazú 2011). This exclusion prompted further protest,
and exposed various divisions within the indigenous movement as a whole. Also, at the
end of December of 2011 the Indigenous Council of the South (CONISUR), representing
some TIPNIS communities, marched in favor of the highway’s construction, as they
argued it would help provide the benefits of development, including easier access to
healthcare and education (L. Press 2012). Divisions between indigenous women’s
organizations are also apparent from news reports that include both statements of support
and opposition about Morales on the TIPNIS issue from such organizations (El Deber
2012; GARA 2012; Achtenberg 2012b; Mujeres Creando 2012; ANF 2012b; Achtenberg
2012). This tension was enough to rattle residents of Caranav, a MAS stronghold, when
the IX March of the Indigenous, led by women, passed through, narrowly avoiding
violent confrontation (El Deber 2012; Achtenberg 2012b). Protesters again avoided
clashes as the TIPNIS activists made their way into La Paz on June 28, 2012, with proMorales Aymara protesters occupying the streets several blocks away (Chavez 2012b).
The fragmentation of the networking potential for indigenous women in the TIPNIS case
aligns with my hypothesis that high amounts of human capital resources in networking
with other social movements would be beneficial to their efforts. The absence of cohesion
on the TIPNIS issue resulted in weak network ties for the movement and harmed their
ability to reach a favorable resolution on this issue,
The mobilization of women has, as identified, been an important force in the
TIPNIS movement, and some nationally recognized women have attained leadership
positions within the conflict. Among these leaders are former drug smuggler Bertha
Bejarano (her followers are called “the Berthas”) and María Galindo of Mujeres Creando
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(Achtenberg 2012). Galindo accused the Morales government of committing the same
crimes against protesters as seen during the 1990s cocalera attacks on women
(Achtenberg 2012), making an explicit connection to the cocalera struggles to end
eradication, which were led by Morales himself. She also pointed out in August 2012 that
out of the forty-five TIPNIS authorities supporting the road’s construction, none were
women (Achtenberg 2012). However, as one social commentator observes, TIPNIS
women appear to be major protagonist in the struggle,
but they have little power within their respective popular movements and are
largely relegated to traditional roles (such as childcare and cooking on the TIPNIS
march), which legitimize the patriarchal social structure. Rather than articulating
their own demands, women are exploited by male leaders to advance their
political agendas. (Achtenberg 2012)
Therefore, while indigenous women used impressive amounts of human capital resources
to press for the TIPNIS cause, it is likely that these narrow spaces for women’s leadership
have stunted the movement’s ability to achieve the policy outcome they desire, bringing
down the value of the numbers of women engaged in protests. In addition, while
indigenous women have gained support from other groups in society, they have not even
managed to solidify networks within other indigenous organizations, which remain
divided. Together, the lacking leadership of women and the narrowness of their networks
indicate a coding of moderate human capital resources, which deviates from the overall
coding of the resources variables during this period. This evidence supports the
hypothesis that indigenous women’s leadership would contribute to favorable policy
outcomes.
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Organizational Characteristics: Frames of the Movement
To press their demands regarding the TIPNIS highway construction, indigenous
women relied upon gendered and ethnic frames. Indigenous women’s participation in the
fight for the TIPNIS territory has been well documented in news sources, with indigenous
women citing environmental and cultural concerns that affect their roles as women. They
also are vocal about what they view as an opaque plan of Morales to construct the
highway for the easier transportation of coca (Friedman-Rudovsky 2012; Lijeròn 2011).
The concern about Morales’ “coca highway” project is reinforced by the fact that the
Federal Treasury will fund a $32 million contract awarded to EBC, a state-owned
contractor, and AMVI, a community enterprise owned by three cocalero union
federations (Achtenberg 2012a).
Responding to criticisms regarding the possible health effects to children in the
marches, María Galindo of Mujeres Creando defends their participation as a cultural and
gendered issue, arguing, “asking women not to bring their babies (to protests) is like
asking them not to participate in social struggles” (Achtenberg 2012). Mariana Guasania,
the Secretary of Gender for the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia
(CIDOB), argues, “the reality of indigenous women in eastern Bolivia is distinct because
we live and feel the defense of our habitat and the natural resources that sustain our
families” (Erbol 2012). These statements in response to social criticism allowed
indigenous activists the opportunity to educate the public about the relationship between
their cultural beliefs and the political goals they possessed (Achtenberg 2012; Erbol
2012). The presence of children in marches drove home the idea that women’s opposition
to the highway was related to the wellbeing of generations, and that their protection of the
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land was a responsibility that had been culturally bestowed upon them. Indigenous
women’s attempts to halt the highway construction represent the use of both indigenous
and women-specific frames. The advance and retreat of the government and social
movements at different times on this issue brings up the question of whether or not the
TIPNIS conflict failed because it pertained to an indigenous minority (unlike the quite
populous Andean Quechua and Aymara). Also, unlike the cases of gas nationalization,
TIPNIS activism did not contain sufficiently broad-reaching claims. Therefore, the issue
of the TIPNIS and its ultimate failure may reveal much about whether or not ethnicspecific claims of smaller, non-dominant indigenous groups are able to influence policy.
Indirect evidence of the impact of indigenous women’s marches and organization
is evident in Morales’ jesting acknowledgment of indigenous women’s activism in a
meeting with a group of young male cocaleros of Cochabamba in early 2012. During this
meeting, he joked that the men should seduce the young women activists so that they
would accept the construction of the highway (Erbol 2012). The comment evoked an
immediate feminist and indigenous backlash (though in this instance one can barely tell
the difference between them) against the display of disdain and trivialization of
indigenous women’s efforts. Indigenous women retaliated in protests and news releases
that claimed that Evo was “machista,” “disrespectful,” and “patriarchal” (Erbol 2012;
Mujeres Creando 2012). The emergence of indigenous female criticism of the Morales
regime from a feminist standpoint reveals how the dynamics of ethnicity and gender can
be extremely paradoxical. A president who passed legislation to ensure equal land access
to women, and later a law to protect women from political violence, became a symbol of
the problem of under-valuing women’s contributions and patronizing their efforts.
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Indigenous women’s increasing resort to feminist arguments is an interesting feature of
social movement organization in Bolivia, where indigenous women remain quite
conservative. The frames of indigenous women have been coded as ethnic and gendered.
In this case, the adoption of gendered frames along with the community claims of
indigenous women has, in this case, had little impact on their ability to influence policy.
State Characteristics: Structural Opportunities/Reforms
While the overall coding of structural opportunities for this period have been
coded as very open, indigenous women from the TIPNIS region faced a structure that
was not open to their demands. Morales first addressed the demands of the TIPNIS
mobilizations by passing a law protecting the territory in October 2011 (Los Tiempos
2011c; L. Press 2012). While the law temporarily halted the construction of the highway,
the government sought ways to circumvent the TIPNIS protests and continue building. In
February 2012, Morales passed Law 222 for Consultation with the Inhabitants of the
TIPNIS, and in July 2012, he announced a constitutional referendum on the plans for
highway construction through the territory (l. Press 2012). Several members of the
TIPNIS region rejected this referendum and the already-initiated consultation with
consenting communities (Melendres 2012; L. Press 2012; Bolivia Weekly 2012).
Government minister of Public Works, Vladmir Sánchez, announced that the
referendum on whether or not to continue plans in the TIPNIS region would proceed
according to the rules of “concertation,” which he distinguished from “consensus,” in that
plans to work toward the involvement of all the affected communities would be executed,
but that,
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Consensus means that of 100%, if there is one person not in agreement, it cannot
be made. This is not the concept of the constitution of the state. From the 29th of
July to the 3rd of September, the government executed the consultation between
communities that wanted to be consulted, between 19 communities in the
colonized zone of Isiboro Sécure, and which are affiliated with the cocalero
federations of Chapare. (Melendres 2012)
Under this method of consultation, the communities that abstained from participation in
the process would be forced to “respect the participation of the communities that have
decided to go forward with the process” (Melendres 2012). In another article, Morales is
quoted as stating, “whether they wanted it or not,” the highway would be built (Osorio
2011).
The president further rejected the complaints of Amazon indigenous communities,
pointing out that “some demonstrations are understandable. It is our obligation to listen to
[demands], we are listening, but some [demands] seem [more like] ambitions, whims, and
worst of all, [the demands] are being used by opposing groups” (L. Press 2012).
Indigenous female activists continue to publish materials and make public
announcements about the allegation that 32 out of 69 of the TIPNIS communities
represented in the dispute had not had their voices heard during the alleged consultation
process undertaken by the government, meaning that prior consultation had, again, failed
(CIDOB 2012b). While the government insists that it had consulted 48 out of the 69
communities and that 47 had approved the highway, the TIPNIS leaders dispute the
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results and cite their own surveys showing that 52 communities reject the road and the
consultation (Actenberg 2012b).
In September 2011, news reports depict a violent clash between police and
protesters, with police firing on and detaining women along with their children (Alejo
2012; CIDOB 2012; Reuters 2011). Responsibility for the brutal reaction by police was
placed on indigenous women for an event the previous day, wherein Foreign Minister
David Choquehuanca was forced to lead indigenous women marchers through a police
barricade set up to impede their progress to La Paz. The minister filed charges of
kidnapping against 6 of the indigenous female activists, which were subsequently
dropped for lack of evidence. In September of 2012, La Razon and CIDOB both report on
an investigation opened by the executive branch to determine where the orders for the
violent activities of police in September 2011 had originated. Morales is quoted as saying
that the National Police acted unilaterally, and that the executive branch did not order the
brutal repression of indigenous rebellion (Alejo 2012; CIDOB 2012). This investigation
is another reaction by the government to appease the lowland groups after the XIX
Indigenous March encountered intense police and citizen opposition. However,
repressive reprisals by police forces have occurred as recently as July of 2012 in La Paz
(Corz 2012). While the overall state political opportunity structure is coded as very open,
the state’s structural opportunities for indigenous people have largely been closed to the
TIPNIS women. The Bolivian government is determined to proceed with the highway, in
spite of a great deal of opposition from people who supported the president’s rise to
power. Thus, the state of affairs of the TIPNIS conflict, at this point in time, supports the
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hypothesis that closed political opportunity structures will impede indigenous women’s
policy success.
International Characteristics
The international environment is highly supportive of indigenous women’s issues
regarding the TIPNIS conflict, based on principles outlined in various international
accords. While news reports of the land issue reference mainly domestic targets for
mobilization, the TIPNIS activists invoke both domestic and international agreements to
support their claims that their guaranteed rights by the 2009 constitution were denied.
They have argued,
The failure to do prior consultation violates international agreements ratified by
Bolivia such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples and International Labor Organization Convention 169. (Kenner 2011)
The TIPNIS movement’s resort to invoking international law reflects the fact that
international accords have a bearing on the issue of the TIPNIS activists’ claims.
International forces are coded as, in general, supportive of indigenous women’s
issues, but aside from the unsuccessful attempt at mediation by the Organization of
American States in 2011, international forces respected Bolivia’s internal conflict on the
TIPNIS issue. Therefore, while the appeals to the ILO and the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples have been made, the issue of highway construction through
the national indigenous park and its outcomes are more directly affected by domestic
influences.
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TIPNIS summary
The outcome of failure on the TIPNIS issue reflects a number of interacting
variables, especially networks and state political opportunity structures. With moderate
amounts of human capital resources due to weak networks, indigenous women were
unable to influence policy in the direction they desired. The use of gendered, ethnic
claims is also associated in this case with indigenous women’s failure. In addition, state
political opportunity structures, while very open during this period, were closed to
TIPNIS women’s goals. Successful cases in this chapter highlight the role of networks
within the government, combined with an open political opportunity structure, as
important contributors of success. Conversely, indigenous women in the TIPNIS conflict
show a lack of government connections through networks and political opportunity
structures. Finally, international forces are found to be supportive, but unable to push
indigenous women’s issues at the domestic level.

Discussion and Conclusions
Organizational Characteristics: Resources and Frames
The policies in this chapter reveal a number of important considerations and
potential generalizations about the way different social movement variables interact in
policymaking for indigenous women. The cases of failure and mixed outcomes (TIPNIS
and gas subsidies) involve different values on several resource variables. The TIPNIS
activists experienced human capital limitations like fragmentation from other indigenous
groups, in spite of mobilization of impressive numbers of participants in protests and the
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leadership of women. 38 The case of gas and food subsidies suffered from impediments in
organizational networking, which hindered their success, while land reform illustrates the
importance of strong networking ties with government and high presence of women in
leadership positions.
The use of gendered and ethnic frames in the TIPNIS case aligns with the
hypothesis that such frames would be less associated with success than broad and nongendered frames. However, this finding does not hold given the successful outcome on
land reform, where indigenous women used similar frames. The mixed outcome
associated with the gas subsidies protests is surprising based on the hypotheses that broad
frames, high amounts of women leading in the movement, and networks with other
organizations would increase chances of success. Gender and ethnic-specific frames for
land reform were successful, contrary to the framing hypotheses. In addition, the TIPNIS
conflict expressed indigenous and gendered frames, while the gas subsidy issue contained
gendered, indigenous and broad-sector frames. Both of these attempts resulted in failures
for the movement. Rather than indicating that the frames of movements are not
important, this fact indicates that different frames gain support, encourage collective
action, and influence policy outcomes in ways not captured by the hypotheses. Movement
frames do not always have to be judged worthy because the movement favors all citizens;
perhaps public support occurs in these cases because the movement goals are deemed
just.

38

Although at least one observer sees indigenous women’s leadership mainly as an
exception while women are kept subservient, as referenced earlier.
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State Characteristics: Neoliberalism and State Structural Opportunities
The effects of declining and minimal neoliberal commitment are called into
question based on the evidence in the cases in this chapter. For instance, the TIPNIS
conflict, under a declining neoliberal model, might be expected to resolve in favor of the
disadvantaged group opposing development plans, but this has not occurred. The land
reform issue supports the idea that weak neoliberalism increases indigenous women’s
chances for policy success. However, the existence of neoliberal vestiges in the
government may have contributed to the neglect of indigenous women’s concerns in the
gasoline and food subsidy issue. Yet, the overall expectation would have been that
minimal neoliberal influence would contribute to a successful outcome; political
opportunity structures explain why the outcome was mixed instead of successful.
Regarding the effects of state structural reforms and opportunity openings that
might aid indigenous women, the analysis produces strong conclusions. On the one hand,
state structural closings or only partial openings determined the failure of TIPNIS and a
mixed outcome for subsidy protesters. Very open political opportunity structures coincide
with strong movement resources to produce success. The overall conclusion from these
data points indicates a very strong correspondence with expectations of the political
opportunity structure hypothesis.
International Influences
The role of international forces varies along with outcomes of policies in this
chapter. Like the Gas War, land reform illustrates how international opposition or support
must accompany favorable state structures to matter to the outcomes for indigenous
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women. Women were unable to get land reform passed under earlier, less favorable
opportunity structures, with the same type of international support. A similar finding is
that when outcomes do not match international intent, as with the TIPNIS case of failed
support, state structures and the government’s stance on the issue primarily determined
the outcome. For the gas and food subsidies issue, vague international opposition does
not seem to have mattered as much as networks, political opportunities and state goals.
These findings confirm the expectation that international influences may matter, but only
in combination with the right state conditions.
Conclusions
The varied outcomes and differences on the independent variables within these
cases indicate that there are reasons to look closely at the constellation of organizational,
state, and international components that fuel success for indigenous women. Networks
matter to policy efforts, and have both positive and negative consequences. In addition,
while gendered, indigenous and ethnic frames are hypothesized to be less likely to
succeed than those that represent the broader sector of society, they meet with success in
the 2000s land reform. Therefore, the gendered or ethnic nature of activist framing seems
to be relatively unimportant for policy outcomes. Finally, the fact that state structures
matter grants possible insight into when we might expect indigenous women to be
successful in other Latin American countries. The existence of a leftist leadership and the
decline of neoliberal influence are important determinants of indigenous women’s
specific outcomes, but matter most when the political opportunity structure is open.
This chapter has summarized the findings that relate to indigenous women’s
protest and outcomes on policy in the 2000s. The next chapter makes more focused
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comparisons between the policies discussed in the previous chapter, and those discussed
in this chapter, attempting to determine what lessons can be learned from the changes in
organizational, state, and international characteristics in Bolivia.
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Chapter VII
Organizational, State, and International Influences, an Overview of the Past
Two Decades
This chapter addresses the outcomes generalized across time periods in order to
assess which variables and their combinations influence indigenous women’s policy
outcomes. These three particular time periods, and especially comparisons between the
neoliberal and post-liberal period, give significant analytical leverage over the research
question because of the changing values in independent variables. The general coding for
the neoliberal period included moderate human capital resources, broad, non-gendered
frames, partially open opportunity structures, and supportive international influences. For
the case of education reform and the INRA, these characteristics produced mixed
outcomes. Deviations from the overall coding in resources result in one success
(Domestic Violence), and deviations from international support and political opportunity
structure result in failure (coca). The intermediate period between these two periods
(approximately between 2000 and 2005) exhibits declining neoliberal commitments, high
human capital resources, broad, ethnic, and gendered frames, closed political opportunity
structures, and international opposition. These variables resulted in two failures for the
Gas War. During the 2000s, the general coding included very high human capital
resources, broad, ethnic, and gendered frames, very open state opportunity structures, and
overall supportive international influences. These circumstances produced two successful
cases, the final gas nationalization victory and gendered land reform success. Gas
subsidies resulted in a mixed outcome, and deviated from the overall coding in political
opportunity structure and organizational resources. The failed case (TIPNIS conflict)
occurs when the political opportunity structure and resources deviate from the overall
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coding of the period. The combined lessons from these cases indicate that political
opportunity structure impacts the final outcome and interacts with other variables to
increase their impacts as well. Overall, the outcomes associated with indigenous women
in the post-liberal period were more favorable than the outcomes of the neoliberal period
and transition period, despite the fact that the post-liberal period seems only marginally
more successful. Indigenous women were able to achieve gender parity goals in many of
their endeavors during the latter period. In addition, the magnitude of the issues in the
2000s can be said to be greater because they were hard cases due to their challenge of the
neoliberal design. The scope of indigenous women’s activism was also greater in the
post-liberal period compared to the neoliberal period, with women mobilizing on behalf
of Bolivia as often as for indigenous women’s specific needs. I hypothesized that
organizational characteristics, state characteristics, and international influences would
impact indigenous women’s success in policy. The following discussion relates to how
these features have varied over time and what their outcomes indicate for the hypotheses
in question.

Organizational Resources
Table 7 illustrates the ordinal rankings/coding of human capital resources along
with the outcome or dependent variable score.
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Table 7: Human Capital Resources
IV Score
Neoliberal Period
Coca
INRA
Education Reform
Domestic Violence
Transition Period
Natural Gas (T1)
Natural Gas (T2)
Post-liberal Period
Natural Gas (T3)
Land Reform
Gas Subsidies
TIPNIS

Moderate (1)
Moderate (1)
Moderate (1)
High (2)
High (2)
High (2)
Very High (3)
Very High (3)
High (2)
High (2)

DV score
1
2
2
3
1
1
3
3
2
1

Moderate amounts of overall resources (1), high amounts in numbers (2), very high amounts in numbers
(3)
*Resources scores are based on average coding of 3 indicators: numbers in participation, women’s
leadership, and networks within organizations
DV Score: Failure (1); Mixed/Indeterminate (2); Success (3)
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The resources scores on each case reveal several major conclusions. First, when
resources are moderate, the outcomes are associated with, at best, mixed outcomes, and at
worst, failure. In addition, when resources are high, the outcomes are associated with
three failures, one success, and one mixed outcome. This indicates that resources by
themselves are not enough to guarantee success. However, according to these cases, the
only way to achieve full success is with the deployment of high or very high human
capital resources. Important is that success happens when these levels of resources
combine with partially or very open political opportunity structures. The only full
successes were the final phase of the Gas War, the domestic violence law, and land
reform, two of these occurring after the election of Evo Morales. While looking at the
values of human capital resources alone helps understand the value of this variable,
looking at them across time periods reveals that success is achieved more often when
human resources are coded as very high. The Gas War, protests over gas subsidies, the
INRA (2006), and the domestic violence law provide good examples of high to very high
human capital resource mobilization. Numbers of participants are important to these
cases, but networks stand out as important variables. While scores of indigenous women
were present to conduct protests, demonstrations, roadblocks, and strikes, they also
attracted a large number of people from networks within society that would assist them in
achieving their goals. For example, during the Gas War, teachers, landless, poor people,
miners, cocaleros, laborers, parts of the middle class, and finally, the president,
comprised the networking resources available to indigenous women in their struggles.
Indigenous women’s networks consisted of mainly indigenous organizations in recent
attempts to influence the INRA, seemingly indicating weak networks. However, their
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human capital resources were magnified by a deepening relationship within the state,
making them more likely to succeed.
Four cases fall into the categories of moderate human capital resources due to
networking troubles or the existence of narrow, ethnic-centered networks. The result of
fewer networking resources is ultimately a lower amount of human capital resources
altogether, and this situation applies to coca eradication policy failure and mixed
outcomes in education and agricultural reform. In the case of coca eradication,
indigenous women lacked strong and broad ties with non-indigenous social movements.
This negative outcome aligns with the hypothesis that networking is a vital human
resource that contributes to policy success. The outcomes of education and agriculture
reform as moderate also reveal that the best-case scenario of weak networking is a
moderate or mixed outcome. Additional illustrations of the role of networks are found in
the outcomes of the gas subsidies and TIPNIS cases, where high resources in numbers
were deployed, but networking troubles lowered the value of these resources. Networks
overwhelmed indigenous women’s efforts in the gas subsidies case, and were
insufficiently tied to the government and other social movements in the TIPNIS case. The
gas and food subsidies case is important because it introduces a nuanced understanding of
networks. The literature on resources indicates that networks are usually important
additive resources for social movements (Lucero 2008; Rousseau 2011; Klandermans
1984; Gordon and Jasper 1996, Snow, et al 1986; Diani and McAdam 2003;
Klandermans 1993; Shentov 2003), but in some cases, networks may dampen indigenous
women’s successes.
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The situation relating to low women’s leadership in education reform, coca
policy, and INRA of the 1990s may have important lessons for indigenous women’s
success. While the failure of coca reform is explained by a number of other factors aside
from the leadership of women, the failure of education reform and the INRA of the 1990s
to intentionally and effectively address indigenous women’s marginalization is related to
their low levels leadership within the indigenous movement. These outcomes contrast
with the INRA demands of the 2000s, where a new leadership of indigenous women
successfully pursued changes in the law that assured female land ownership and access.
This guarantee was one they had been unable to accomplish in the 1995-96 mobilizations
about land reform.
Women’s roles in passing the domestic violence law in 1995 were the exception
to moderate resources in the neoliberal period. This instance revealed the possibilities of
indigenous women’s pursuit of gendered policy when removed from the indigenous
setting that reinforces the notion of community over gendered demands. Indigenous
women were vibrant participants in the domestic violence law protests, but they were by
no means the only social movements engaged in the effort. Middle class women’s
organizations and indigenous women’s organizations in various parts of the country
emerged together to defend the rights of women.
The differences in types of organization in which women find leadership are
important. For example, TIPNIS female leaders operate within mixed-gender
organizations, while indigenous women’s involvement during the Gas War and the gas
subsidies protests was primarily within neighborhood associations. The latter are womendominated groups, where the leadership is based on traditionally female roles of
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conducting the labor of needs provision to families and communities. The TIPNIS
organizations have female leaders, and indigenous women and their families have
constituted a large number of protesters and marchers, but critics still note the
marginalized status of indigenous women who are primarily given traditional female
roles to play in the movement. Looking at the INRA and education reform in the 1990s,
when women lacked leadership and still achieved favorable outcomes for the community,
it is not clear that the TIPNIS conflict fails simply due to this dynamic of women’s roles
within organizations. However, as the issue of the INRA in the post-liberal period
illustrates, the change in leadership roles between the periods may promote women’s
interests more acutely and successfully.
The fact that several failures used high human resources brings attention to the
necessity of looking to other factors in conjunction with organizational resources to
explain social movement success. Political opportunity structure is the most relevant. The
failures in TIPNIS, the Gas War, and mixed outcomes in cases of gas and food
subsidization illustrate that closed political opportunity structures can neutralize the force
of high and very high amounts of social movement resources.
The first hypothesis of this research is that high amounts of social movement
resources would increase indigenous women’s chances of success. The outcomes related
to organizational resources indicate that high amounts of human capital resources,
especially leadership of women and networks, are necessary but insufficient for achieving
success in policy matters. Looking closely at the cases of success, where women used
high amounts of resources to their benefit, they also confronted partially or very open
political opportunity structures.
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The cases in this dissertation reveal that higher amounts of resources are more
commonly found during the post-liberal period than in the neoliberal period and the
interim period. When combined with favorable political opportunity structures, high and
very high amounts of resources help women succeed in their goals. This research
corroborates the resource mobilization viewpoints (McCarthy and Zald 1977;
Klandermans 1984) by finding that resources are an important component of social
movement research, but also justifies arguments by some critics of resource mobilization
(for example, Brysk 2000) that resources present an incomplete picture of the causes and
consequences of activist mobilization.

Organizational Frames
Table 8 presents the nominal rankings of frames divided by time period, along
with the scores of the dependent variable, representing the policy outcome.
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Table 8: Movement Frames
IV Score

DV score

Neoliberal Period
Coca
INRA
Ed Reform
Domestic Violence

BNG
BNG
BNG
BG

1
2
2
3

Transition Period
Natural Gas (T1)
Natural Gas (T2)

EGB
EGB

1
1

Post-Liberal Period
Natural Gas
Land Reform
Gas Subsidies
TIPNIS

EGB
EG
EGB
EG

3
3
2
1

H2: Broad, non-gendered frames (BNG); ethnic, gendered frames (EG); ethnic, broad, gendered frames
(EBG/mixed); Broad, gendered frames (BG)
DV Score: Failure (1); Mixed (2); Success (3)
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Comparison of the frames in the cases during the 1990s illustrates that nongendered, broad frames correlate with failure and mixed outcomes. But ethnic, gendered,
and broad frames are also associated with successful and failed outcomes in the postliberal period. Ethnic, gendered frames in the post-liberal period, along with broad and
gendered frames during the 1990s, are also associated with success and failure. All of the
absolute successes involve gendered frames. Out of the three cases of success, two used
ethnic and gendered frames; one used broad and gendered frames. This research
concludes that organizational frames may lead to different outcomes, depending on the
organizational and structural context of the issue.
The transition and post-liberal period presents a time period where indigenous
women mobilized about issues specific to indigenous women in addition to their concerns
for the community. Indigenous women were visible, and made claims to the government
based on their needs as indigenous women in these instances. In the case of the INRA
and the Gas War, their efforts were successful once the political opportunity structure
changed with Evo Morales’ election. In the case of the Gas War, gas subsidies, the INRA
and the TIPNIS conflicts, gendered claims were combined with rhetoric and framing that
presented the issue to the public as an indigenous women’s issue. In addition to gendered,
and ethnic frames, in the cases of the Gas War, gas subsidies, and domestic violence,
broad sector concerns were also integrated into their frames. Indigenous women defended
the stakes of labor, neighborhoods, miners, and other parts of society in their activism.
The only case of indigenous women’s activism that issued gendered, and non-ethnic or
broad claims was domestic violence, which was a successful case of mobilization in the
1990s. The cases of the INRA (1996), education reform, and coca are examples of non218

gendered, broad “campesino” framing. The outcomes associated with these policies
indicate that, with the INRA and education reform, indigenous claims mixed with broad
public framing was at least a somewhat acceptable formula. However, the same formula
met with failure in the case of coca. This indicates the importance of other parts of the
environment in affecting the success of social movement activities. These outcomes
indicate that, contrary to my hypothesis about the role of frames, indigenous women can
promote their ethnic and gendered issues simultaneously and succeed. This fact is also
evidenced through the second INRA outcome and the Gas War. However, the case of the
TIPNIS conflict and gas subsidies indicate that indigenous female frames are not
guarantees of success. Other important elements come into play in creating success,
especially state-specific features that may not be captured by the assessment of
organizational frames.
To generalize from the evidence presented here on frames, these cases reveal that
there is good reason to deconstruct the language used in a movement and the public
reaction to that language. There is significant evidence that frames have evolved
significantly since the neoliberal period, when the use of ethnic and gendered language
was minimal. This understanding leads to a firmer grasp of the cultural issues
surrounding indigenous women’s activism. However, the extent to which this language
influences policy outcomes is highly contextualized, and the outcome of similar frames
ultimately depends on the issue and other organizational and state variables. Whereas my
reading of the language of social movement frames led me to hypothesize that gendered
and ethnic claims and frames would not be as successful as broad claims, deeper
investigation into each case revealed a much more nuanced story than my original
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hypothesis assumed. For one thing, ethnic and broad claims often occur together, and
more rarely, with gendered claims included. For another thing, it seems that indigenous
issues, when framed broadly, as “peasants,” did not fare any better (in fact, they fared
worse) than indigenous issues that used an “indigenous/native” repertoire. Studying
frames of indigenous women’s movements reveals the importance of the interaction of
the variables under study, especially political opportunity structure. Scholarship on
frames and cognitive/cultural approaches has testified to the importance of language to
the emergence and maintenance of social movements (Snow et al 2004; Davies 1999;
Gamson 1992; Carroll and Ratner 1992; Caniglia and Carmin 2005), and I test these
theories in the area of policy influence of social movements. An important nuance to
studying the cultural/cognitive or framing approach is suggested here, wherein
indigenous women’s frames are seen as having an indirect role in influencing policy,
especially through interacting with other variables. This conclusion is also in line with the
suggestions of other scholars to integrate the cultural and structural approaches for a
more complete vision of social movement outcomes.

Political Opportunity Structure
Table 9 presents the ordinal rankings of the political opportunity structure across
the two time periods, along with scores on the dependent variable, as a summary of the
findings on the political opportunity structure hypothesis.
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Table 9: State Political Opportunity Structure
IV Scores
DV Score
Neoliberal Period
Coca
Closed (1)
1
INRA
Partially Open (2)
2
Education Reform
Partially Open (2)
2
Domestic Violence
Partially Open (2)
3
Transition Period
Natural Gas (T1)
Natural Gas (T2)
Post-Liberal Period
Natural Gas
Land Reform
Gas subsidies
TIPNIS

Closed (1)
Closed (1)
Very Open (3)
Very Open (3)
Partially Open (2)
Closed (1)

H3: Closed POS (1); Partially Open POS (2); Very Open POS (3)
DV Score: Failure (1); Mixed/Indeterminate (2); Success (3)
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1
1
3
3
2
1

Comparison of the political opportunity structures between time periods indicates
that partially open political opportunity structures are associated with mixed outcomes
(INRA, education reform) and success in the cases of domestic violence during the
neoliberal period. Closed political opportunity structures contributed to failed coca
protests during this same period. In the “transition period” roughly between 2000-2005,
closed political opportunity structures resulted in failure for the first two phases of
indigenous women’s involvement in the Gas War. During the post-liberal period,
extremely open political opportunity structures are associated with a somewhat more
positive set of outcomes: natural gas and the 2000s land reform are successes. However,
the TIPNIS and gas subsidies experienced failed and mixed outcomes, due to partially
open or closed political opportunity structures with respect to these issues. The postliberal period witnesses two full successes, whereas the neoliberal period experiences
only one full success. Between and throughout time periods, openness of political
opportunity structure is highly correlated with successful outcomes for indigenous
women. There is also a correlation between very open political opportunity structures
combined with very high amounts of human capital resources—specifically the resources
associated with networking strength—and favorable policy outcomes. Therefore, the
cases of land reform in the 2000s and gas nationalization in the same period show that
strong networks and very open political opportunity structures are conducive to success.
Conversely, very open political opportunity structures combined with weak networking
ties, or network failure, as exhibited in the case of the TIPNIS and gas subsidies, result in
mixed or failed outcomes. Finally, the chances of success under partially open political
opportunity structures increase with strong networks, as indicated by indigenous
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women’s successful outcome on the domestic violence law during the 1990s.The
hypothesis that state political opportunity structures are elemental to social movement
successes obtains strong support from the evidence analyzed in this research. However, it
also indicates that other variables should viewed in conjunction with state opportunity to
understand policy outcomes for indigenous women.
The coding of the TIPNIS conflict and gas subsidies deviate from the overall time
period coding of state political opportunities. Even though these movements faced the
Morales government, with its numerous commitments to indigenous people and social
movements, the gas and food subsidies and TIPNIS case present mixed and failed cases,
respectively. This contrasts with the case of the INRA in 2006, during which changes to
land reform laws in favor of indigenous women were associated with a very open
political opportunity structure. This difference is due to competing goals, both between
different social movements and between social movements and the government. For the
gas subsidies case, clashing objectives between the poor and budget-sensitive
government officials hampered success. In the case of TIPNIS, the Morales government
favors the highway construction for economic and political motives over indigenous
support. As mentioned previously, state opportunities may need to be investigated more
thoroughly in light of the networks of social movements making demands.
The issue of ethnicity should also be unpacked when it relates to the TIPNIS and
the political opportunity structure. While there is an overall positive relationship between
indigenous people and Evo Morales, the less populous groups in Bolivia have, since the
1990s, teetered from time to time in support of the leader, citing, among other things,
allegations of his involvement in possible narcotics trafficking (El Diario 1995w22;
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Friedman-Rudovsky 2012). The involvement between the executive branch and social
movements since the campaign and election of Evo Morales has been unprecedented, but
his reaction against the TIPNIS demands were not reflective of the loyalty expected out
of an indigenous president. Taking a more cynical view of the matter, it could be said
that the less influential indigenous groups may face the old political opportunity structure
formerly facing the newly empowered Aymara and Quechua indigenous.
In general, the comparison between the three time periods reveals the crucial role
played by political opportunity structure in influencing outcomes. This fact is illustrated
through more favorable outcomes under post-liberal structural openings and through the
fact that political opportunities increase the impact of other variables like networks and
international influences (discussed below). The cases in this research therefore provide
strong evidence in favor of the political opportunity perspective (Tilly 1989; Tarrow
1998). The findings are also consistent with other work on indigenous movements in
Latin America that has identified political opportunity structures as having significant
influence over social movement outcomes (Albó 1991, 1994, 2002; Gustafson 2002,
Lucero 2003; Pallares 1999; Van Cott 2000 Yashar 2005; Zamosc 1994; Lucero 2008).

Neoliberal Commitment
Table 10 below presents the ordinal rakings of neoliberal influences over the three
time periods along with the outcomes on the dependent variable as a summary of the
findings of the neoliberal influence hypothesis.
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Table 10: Neoliberal Commitment
IV Scores

DV Scores

Neoliberal Period
Coca
INRA
Ed Reform
Domestic Violence

Strong (3)
Strong (3)
Strong (3)
Strong (3)

1
2
2
3

Transition Period
Natural Gas (T1)
Natural Gas (T2)

Declining (2)
Declining (2)

1
1

Post-Liberal Period
Natural Gas
Land Reform
Gas Subsidies
TIPNIS

Weak (1)
Weak (1)
Weak (1)
Weak (1)

3
3
2
1

H3b: Weak Neoliberal influence (1); Declining Neoliberal influence (2); Strong Neoliberal Influence (3)
DV Score: Failure (1); Mixed/Indeterminate (2); Success (3)
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Two out of the three most successful cases occurred under weak neoliberal
influences. In the 1990s, strong neoliberal commitments were associated with two mixed,
one success and one failed outcome. In the interim period, declining neoliberal
commitments were associated with two failed outcomes on gas nationalization. During
the 2000s, weak neoliberal commitments were associated with one failure, one mixed
outcome, and two successes, which seems to indicate that weak neoliberal influences
affect indigenous women’s success rates positively. This observation is called into
sharper relief when we consider that the unimpressive outcomes of cases in the 1990s
were less in contradiction of neoliberal policies than they became in the 2000s. Thus, the
seemingly surprising rates of success in the 1990s under neoliberal governments is
overstated even by the rare occurrence of success in the domestic violence law, which, it
should be pointed out, does not contradict neoliberal goals. The presence of two
successes in the 2000s is much more impressive than it seems precisely because of the
ability to challenge neoliberal commitments.
I hypothesized that neoliberal influence would be associated with less favorable
outcomes for indigenous women’s policy efforts. The evidence provided from the cases
exhibiting strong neoliberal influence, however, requires a more nuanced understanding
of the role of economic policy on indigenous women’s outcomes. The assumed tendency
of neoliberal governments to ignore indigenous justice is not a given feature, viewed from
the perspective that Sanchez de Lozada integrated indigenous demands into policies.
Succeeding governments (including Sanchez de Lozada’s own second term)
demonstrated the dismissive air most ordinarily associated with neoliberal policies. While
the first Sanchez de Lozada administration’s policies for indigenous peoples in the 1990s
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were arguably political, co-optative attempts to avoid an indigenous rebellion like the
Zapatista uprising or Sendero Luminoso, the few concessions made to indigenous people
during this time were largely considered victories for the indigenous movement as a
whole. These outcomes are especially evident in education reform, the INRA of the
1990s, and the domestic violence law. In the case of the efforts to influence the
government’s decision to eradicate coca plants, the failure of indigenous women to
succeed was likely unrelated to the neoliberal slant of the government. Instead, it was a
reflection of international pressures and the political opportunity structure facing them on
this particular issue.
Having qualified the period of neoliberalism as one that does not necessarily
impede the success of indigenous women’s policy efforts, it is useful to note that the most
impressive gains for indigenous communities and for indigenous women occurred under
a government exhibiting weak neoliberal commitment. These cases include the INRA in
2006, which not only increased the pace of land titling to all indigenous people but also
made the titling provisions for indigenous territories gender egalitarian. This measure
resulted in more favorable outcomes for indigenous women’s property ownership. Still, it
is important to note that these outcomes are still in the preliminary phases and that
indigenous women, particularly those of the lowland regions still express discontent with
the process of securing women’s equal access and rights to land. However, even a
provisional outcome for women in indigenous land titling is a sign of progress. In the
1990s, indigenous women were unable to bring the issue of women’s titling to the
national indigenous federations, much less directly to the state. While this fact indicates
the importance of the nature of the political opportunity structure, it also indicates that the
227

issues with distributing land to indigenous people and to women are more easily resolved
within a more leftist economic framework. The same can be said of the Gas War, as
proven in the final phase emphasized in the past two chapters. Previous scuffles between
social movements and neoliberal governments had managed to produce enough strife to
send President Sanchez de Lozada into exile, but not enough to guarantee that
intermediate governments would submit to indigenous demands. Neoliberal scores were
continually strong until around 2005, when social movements ousted Carlos Mesa and
campaigned for Evo Morales. The success in the Gas War coincides with a sharp break
with neoliberal commitment, as evidenced by the president’s first initiatives involving
indigenous people (land reform) and the nationalization of revenues from natural gas.
However, the cases of the TIPNIS conflict and the gasoline subsidies protests are
at first, surprising exceptions. Although neoliberal influence was weak, the TIPNIS
territorial dispute still engages the issue of indigenous land rights and whether or not the
quest for economic development39 through the construction of a highway overrides the
environmental and cultural concerns of ancestral groups living there. This seems to be an
odd choice for a country whose priority has been increasing autonomy and supporting
indigenous people and leading an environmental revolution. However, if the quest for
economic development through more stable trade routes is a sincere motive behind the
highway’s construction plans, Evo Morales faces an economic concern common to all
It is relevant to note that opponents to the highway’s construction accuse Evo Morales
of attempting to construct a “coca highway,” since the proposed route travels between the
coca-growing Cochabamba region through the eastern part of the country to Brazil
(Friedman-Rudovsky 2012; Lijerón 2011)	
  
39	
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countries. Regardless of the level of neoliberal commitment, countries grapple with how
to promote economic development. These failures, in light of low neoliberal
commitment, also illustrate the importance of political opportunity structures, which were
closed for the case of TIPNIS, and partially open in the case of gas and food subsidies.
The issue of gas subsidies represents another surprise because in this instance, as
opposed to the TIPNIS case, the demands came from indigenous women who had been
the staunchest supporters –namely Quechua and Aymara native women. The uprisings
against gas subsidies were not easily resolved, even considering that government reacted
within days of violent protests to reinstate gas subsidies. The elimination of this particular
subsidy, as noted elsewhere, was more a measure to curb the benefits gained by the
middle class and business than to harm the poor. In this case, however, the mixed
outcome was likely not due to the neoliberal-style solution that eventually was abandoned
(at least temporarily). The evidence seems to indicate that indigenous women’s demands
for food price controls and assistance were not met because of conflicting goals of the
political structure and overwhelming networks.
Generally, the evidence supports the hypothesis that weak neoliberal
commitments are associated with success for indigenous women. However, the evidence
is not overwhelmingly conclusive when we consider that declining neoliberal
commitments result in a range of policy outcomes. However, the ability to overcome
neoliberal commitments during the latter phase, along with the period obtaining one more
success than the earlier period, indicates that weak neoliberal commitments may
contribute to the outcome for indigenous women. Thus, some evidence supports the quite
common claim that neoliberal governments are detrimental to social movement aims in
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Latin America (Nash 2005, Speed 2006, Kellogg 2005, Yashar 1999, Lavrin 1993,
Bouvier 2009; Chong 2007; Eber and Kovic 2003; Gonzales and Kampwirth 2001;
Langer 2003; Yashar 2005; Jacquette 2006; Deere 2001). Leftist government and
neoliberal weakening are positive factors for particular groups’ political goals, but this
research indicates that they are neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve success.

International Influences
Table 11 presents the scores of the variable of international influences across time
periods along with the outcomes of the dependent variable as a summary of the findings
for the fourth hypothesis.
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Table 11: International Influences
IV Score
Neoliberal Period
Coca
INRA
Ed Reform
Domestic violence

Obstructive (1)
Supportive (2)
Supportive (2)
Supportive (2)

DV Score
1
2
2
3

Transition Period
Natural Gas (T1)
Natural Gas (T2)

Obstructive (1)
Obstructive (1)

1
1

Post-Liberal Period
Natural Gas
Land Reform
Gas Subsidies
TIPNIS

Obstructive (1)
Supportive (2)
Obstructive (1)
Supportive (2)

3
3
2
1

H4: Obstructive International Influences (1); Supportive International Influences (2)
DV Score: Failure (1); Mixed (2); Success (3)
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International influences have the most inconsistent coding of all of the variables
investigated in this study. Where an overall environment of support for indigenous issues
prevailed, sometimes opposition on a particular topic warranted a separate coding for a
particular case. This was true for the cases of coca, natural gas and gas subsidies, which
were opposed by international forces. International opposition occurs along with failure
of the Gas War in two phases, mixed outcomes of gas subsidies, and a failed coca policy
effort in the 1990s. Finally, out of the mixed outcomes cases—the first INRA, education
reform, and gas and food subsidies—gas subsidies were the only opposed movement.
While coca and two gas nationalization protests faced international opposition and failed,
the final phase of the Gas War succeeded in spite of international opposition. This
evidence is too inconsistent to support the hypothesis that international opposition harms
the policy outcomes indigenous women want.
The story of international influence provides limited support for the inverse
assumption of the international hypothesis, that international support increases chances of
success. The best evidence for international support comes from the domestic violence
law, which received strong support from abroad during the Beijing Women’s Conference.
However, the outcomes of the INRA and education reform during the neoliberal period
did not align with international support for affirmative action measures. International
support has also had limited influence on the outcome of the TIPNIS conflict.
The most impressive evidence for the importance of international opposition is
found in the effect of international aid on coca policy in the 1990s, but that effect, too,
has ceased to be an important contributor. The United States has ceased its aid to Bolivia
in recent years, and coca eradication laws are being more favorably negotiated for
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indigenous people. In October 2010, the Bolivian government annulled a law that cut the
legal production of coca leaves by one third, after coca growers (many of them women)
blocked the main road to La Paz from the Amazon region. The law was ultimately
annulled because coca growers had not been consulted, and the government promised
that future changes would be conducted under the rules of co-ordination and consensus
with social movement organizations (Cabitza 2010). While this case is not treated in this
dissertation for reasons of space, this outcome contrasts sharply with the 1990s outcomes
on coca eradication when cocaleras faced international and state obstruction to their
goals.
Understanding the exact relationship between indigenous rights and international
influences is an intricate process, since we must acknowledge that in some cases,
international involvement, as in the case of coca and the Gas War, is the target and the
reason for protest to begin with. Thus, international involvement in Bolivia’s affairs
engages more than one level of the process of indigenous women’s attempt to change
policy. Sometimes it incites protest, and it may, in the same case, continue to exist as an
opposition to the goals of the movement, as in coca protests and the Gas War.
Through close investigation of the policies in this dissertation it is possible to
discern under what circumstances international influences are likely to have the greatest
impact. For example, indigenous women’s attempt to influence outcomes on the INRA
and education reform met with mixed results, not because international influences are
unimportant contributors of success. The main reasons are other mitigating factors,
especially organizational weakness, neoliberal tendencies behind reforms, and partial
state structural openings that existed on these cases. Comparisons within the case of the
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Gas War reveal the importance of state political opportunity structures and weak
neoliberal influence. The demands to nationalize gas reserves in the country were
opposed by international forces, and while Mesa and Sanchez de Lozada held the
presidency, indigenous demands were not met. The attempts to change policy would only
be successful with the election of Evo Morales, whose election signaled an enormous
shift in political opportunity structures as well as a dampening of neoliberal
commitments. Comparisons between the case of gas nationalization and coca eradication
reveal a similar conclusion. The closed political opportunity structure combined with
international opposition to cocalera demands resulted in poor outcomes for indigenous
women. However, international opposition was unable to override a very open political
opportunity structure and declining neoliberalism to promote gas privatization. These
findings indicate weaker influence than suggested by scholars of international social
movements, who posit that international influences have a strong impact on outcomes
(Brysk 2000, Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000, Rice and Van Cott 2006; Yashar 2005). While
international factors are an important feature, an integrated approach provides a more
thorough view of the additional variables conditioning indigenous women’s policy
outcomes.

Further Discussion and Conclusions
A broader view of the cases reveals that combinations of certain variables are
conducive to favorable policy outcomes for indigenous women. First, successful
outcomes result from high to very high amounts of organizational resources, partially to
very open political opportunity structures, and international support. This evidence is
provided in the case of the domestic violence law, land reform, and the final phase of gas
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nationalization. Cases of failure result from the combination of international opposition,
moderate to high resources, and closed political opportunity structures, as seen in the case
of coca and the first two cases of gas nationalization. The cases that resulted in mixed
outcomes reveal partially open political opportunity structures, obstructive international
influences, and moderate to high amounts of resources.
Case study and process tracing analysis reveals that moderate and high amounts
of resources interact with partially open political opportunity structures to produce mixed
outcomes. Specifically, when networks and women’s leadership in the movement are
absent, bringing down the overall value of human capital resources, they achieve, at best,
moderate outcomes when confronting closings or partial openings in political opportunity
structure. This is seen in the cases of the first INRA, education reform, and gas and food
subsidy protests, where women’s leadership was lacking or where significant networking
issues arose. One conclusion to draw from this evidence is that only high to very high
resources—and especially leadership and networks—combined with partially to very
open political opportunity structures produce complete success within this sample of
cases. This demonstrates the importance of organizational resources as well as political
opportunity structures, which I address more fully below. High amounts of resources by
themselves are not able to overcome closed or lukewarm administrations, as the TIPNIS
and gas subsidies cases reveal. But no case achieved success without high amounts of
resources (domestic violence, land reform in 2006, and gas nationalization); therefore
high and very high resources seem necessary but not sufficient to achieve policy success.
The cases discussed in this research also reveal that opportunity structures are interactive
because strong networks with the government contribute to achieving the “very high
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resources” mark. This relationship is demonstrated in the cases of natural gas (final
phase) and land reform (2006).
Political opportunity structure is an important guiding variable to the outcomes in
this research. While the other variables exhibit a range of outcomes for any given level,
political opportunity structures do not. Political opportunity structures seem to never
produce success or mixed outcomes when they are closed. Only partially or very open
political opportunity structures have the potential, under all combinations of variables, to
produce favorable policy outcomes. Moreover, partially open structures may produce
success, but very open political opportunity structures seem to further ensure success, as
indicated by the final phase of natural gas and the 2006 land reform. A partially or very
open structure may thus be necessary, but not sufficient to produce success, given that
partially open structures produce mixed outcomes. But very open structures coinciding
with very high resources does seem to be sufficient to result in favorable policy for
indigenous women.
Neoliberalism is shown to be important, but it is not necessary, nor sufficient to
produce favorable outcomes. Strong, declining, and weak neoliberal scores are all
associated with failures, while strong and weak neoliberal scores are also associated with
successes. In cases where neoliberal governments produced successful policy for
indigenous women, they confronted partially or very open political opportunity structures
and used high amounts of resources. However, where weak neoliberal governments
confronted social movements with high amounts of resources, and closed political
opportunity structures (TIPNIS, gas subsidies), social movements experienced failed and
mixed outcomes.
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Finally, international support or opposition is another highly contextualized
variable in this research. International support seems to be more influential in the
neoliberal period, as support combines with partially open political opportunity structures
and moderate resources to produce moderate or mixed outcomes. In addition,
international opposition contributes to failure under closed or partially open political
opportunity structures in the coca, transition-period natural gas, and TIPNIS cases. But
looking outside of the cases of failure, international support coincides with a range of
outcomes. International support correlates with mixed and failed outcomes (INRA and
Education Reform moderate outcomes, TIPNIS failure) as often as does international
obstruction (coca failure, natural gas failure, gas subsidies mixed outcome). Case study
research reveals that international influence requires the presence of other variables like
the political opportunity structure to register any impact on indigenous women’s policy
outcomes. Table 12 illustrates the summarized independent and dependent variable
scores across all cases.
(Table 12 here)
The preceding discussion placed the hypotheses under scrutiny in the context of
changing variables over the different time periods. There is significant support for the
hypothesis that high amounts of human capital resources increase indigenous women’s
chances of success. The evidence also reveals a higher amount of human capital
resources at indigenous women’s disposal during the post-liberal period than in the
previous two periods, which partially explains the greater rate of success after 2006.
Higher amounts of organizational resources are important influences, but state
opportunity structures can either enhance organizational resources or result in lowering
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their effectiveness. Significant changes in frames accompany the changes between the
neoliberal and post-liberal periods, with gendered and ethnic language becoming more
prominent in the latter. There is limited to no support for the hypothesis that nongendered and broad or non-ethnic frames would be more strongly correlated with success
than gendered and ethnic frames. All sorts of combinations of ethnic, broad, and
gendered frames produce varied outcomes. This points to the fact that frames may be
important, but that their impact on policy is conditioned very much by other factors,
especially political opportunity structure.
There is also strong support for the hypothesis that political opportunity structures
influence indigenous women’s chances for success. Indigenous women experienced more
significant success during the open political opportunity structure in the post-liberal
period. State political opportunity structures are found to be very important alone and in
conjunction with other variables like international influences and organizational
resources. These interactions also point to the importance of specific contexts that reveal
various causal pathways to the outcome of success. In all, very open political opportunity
structures are highly correlated with success, while closed political opportunity structures
are correlated with failure. Partially open political opportunity structures are correlated
with mixed, failed, and successful outcomes. Although the post-liberal period contains
the most permissive political opportunity structure in the three time periods investigated
here, this does not serve the gas subsidies protesters, or the TIPNIS activists in the final
outcome. These outcomes point to a closure in political structures to those proposals.
Next, neoliberal commitments are shown to be conditionally important because
indigenous women’s successes are more common when neoliberal commitments are
238

weak, and less common when they are strong. Finally, international influences viewed
over the three time periods reveals little support for the hypothesis that international
support/opposition would contribute to/impede indigenous women’s success. The main
lesson from international forces and neoliberal commitments is that their influences must
coincide with important state political features—like opportunity structure—to contribute
to outcomes. This is made especially clear by the cases experiencing international
opposition, which require closed political opportunity structures to work in obstructing
indigenous women’s goals. The examples of this can be found in the ultimate outcome of
the Gas War, where movement goals were aligned with state goals and thus were able to
overcome international opposition.
This chapter has presented an overview of the variables across the three time
periods to reveal which variables, and combinations of variables, have contributed to
indigenous women’s policy influence. The next concluding chapter summarizes the main
findings of this dissertation and presents a discussion of the implications and further
directions for this research.
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion
Contributions and Implications
The research on indigenous women’s policy efforts in Bolivia concludes with
several implications for the social movement theories addressed here. First, this study
expands the literature on social movement resource mobilization by highlighting the
nuanced relationship between material and logistic resource capabilities. Resources like
high levels of female leadership in the movement and strong networks are proven to be as
important, if not more so, than mere numbers in participation. This is evidenced through
the fact that throughout the nineties, numbers of indigenous women were quite strong in
activist movements. In later periods, networks and leadership emerged to support these
numbers and led to greater success. Thus, this research somewhat justifies scholars’
expectation that expanded personal resources, professionalization of leadership
(McCarthy and Zald 1977) and access to broader social networks (Klandermans 1984)
matter greatly to social movements. In addition, strong ties within the government are
essential tools that aid women’s outcomes, and we see this influence the Gas War’s final
phase and land reform in 2006. However, the cases within this study also show that the
resource of networking may have positive and negative effects, evidenced in the ultimate
outcome of the gas subsidies case. The major findings of this research provide support for
scholarship focusing on the role of networks as mainly positive resources (Powerll and
Friedkin 1986; Gordon and Jasper 1996; Diani and McAdam 2003; Kalndermans 1993).
However, some of the evidence found here also resonates with findings of scholars that
identify negative potential for networks as well (Kitts 2000; Shentov 2003; Olzak and
Uhrig 2001; Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Rojas and Heaney 2008). Different types of
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networks have different consequences for social movements; they may promote success
or they may inhibit it (Kitts 2000; Rojas and Heaney 2008). Networks may inhibit
mobilization because of competition for resources and the draining, or “spill out,” of
resources from one movement to the next when networks form (Rojas and Heaney 2008;
Hadden and Tarrow 2007). To my knowledge, this drain of resources has not been
investigated in terms of government policy output, which adds to the generalized
knowledge about networking and its impact on social movements. Further, while scholars
have identified negative potential impacts, the focus on competition for resources
overlooks the role of government alliances, which this research identifies in the cases of
land reform (2006) and the Gas War. More important, this research identifies the negative
consequences of “anti-networking” in the TIPNIS conflict, which means that social
movements had competing multiple claims that nullified TIPNIS networking potential.
This same dynamic was also present to a lesser degree in the initial resistance of some
indigenous groups to education reform, while other indigenous groups supported it.
Overall, this research provides some evidence on when indigenous networks are
potentially negative: too broad a network can create fragmentation in rewards and
ultimate loss of voice for smaller groups, especially when multiple claims are being made
in partially open political opportunity structures.
The major findings of the research also affirm Brysk’s (2000) argument that
resource mobilization has limited explanatory value. However, my study contradicts her
findings that the limited power of the theory relates to the insufficiency of resources for
this particular group, because indigenous women’s resources have greatly expanded. I
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expected that resources would need to combine with other variables to be effective, and
the analysis confirms this expectation.
This study also applies frames in a new theoretical setting, extending it beyond
explanations of social movement emergence. While I hypothesized that frames that
garner broad support would be most beneficial to women’s policy outcomes, the findings
do not support my assumptions. Focusing on broad, general, non-gendered frames did not
aid indigenous women. Using campesino frames, they were less likely to gain support
and government concession. As they began to express indigenous, native, and female
identities, however, their standing in the movements and within the country changed
dramatically, leading to more significant successes. The post-liberal period also shows
that in other policies, indigenous women succeeded with ethnic and gendered frames
combined with those representing the broader society. While it is hard to generalize from
these broad findings, there seems to be an advantage to gendered and ethnic framing
compared to non-ethnic and non-gendered framing. In addition, broad sector framing is
also helpful. The frames explored in this dissertation reveal an interesting display of
characteristics found by various scholars to be important for providing diagnostic and
prognostic solutions, and motivation for activism (Snow et al 2004; Gamson 1992;
Carroll and Ratner 1992; Caniglia and Carmin 2005). Similarly, present here are
characteristics that other scholars identified for their ability to inspire meaning and
sympathy with potential supporters as well as potential participants (McAdam, Tarrow
and Tilly 2001; Rousseau 2001; Caniglia and Carmin 2005). The exact impact the nature
of this language had on actual policy outcomes, however, is not definitive, but it seems
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that when activist language is more specific, it has better chances to gain public support
and result in positive outcomes for indigenous women.
The roles played by resources and frames were conditioned by accommodating
state structures, and this study finds that state structural features play an inescapably
strong role in the success social movements have in changing policy. Thus, like Jenkins
and Klandermans (1995), I find evidence that success is largely contingent upon the
political environment. As Tarrow (1983), Tilly (1978), Goodwin (1997), McAdam (1996)
and others argue, various types of political opportunities prove to be important for
indigenous women’s outcomes. Among these are the position of alignments within the
system, the formal opening of opportunities within the state, alliances with other groups,
and the state’s potential for repression. While this idea is intuitive in nature, indigenous
women’s participation in unlikely successes sheds light on which state changes will
accommodate social movements. This research supports the findings of indigenous social
movement research that emphasizes the role of state structural opportunities in various
types of outcomes (Albó 1991, 1994, 2002; Gustafson 2002; Lucero 2003; Pallares 1999;
Van Cott 2000 Yashar 2005; Zamosc 1994; Lucero 2008).
Neoliberalism does not always guarantee failure for indigenous women. However,
the cases of land and education reform illustrate that strong neoliberal commitments are
only partially beneficial to indigenous women. Minimal neoliberal commitments by the
governments are associated with a more successful period. These findings align with
those of many scholars that treat neoliberalism as a variable in Latin American social
movements (Langer 2003; Yashar 1999, 2005; Jacquette 2006; Deere 2001; Nash 2005,
Speed 2006, Kellogg 2005; Lavrin 1993, Bouvier 2009; Chong 2007; Eber and Kovic
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2003; Gonzales and Kampwirth 2001). But it is worth noting that in “quantitative” terms,
two successful, one mixed, and one failed case in the post-liberal period barely out
perform the neoliberal period. However, the weight and scope of the issues, as I argued in
Chapter 6, makes the successes in the post-liberal period qualitatively more impressive.
This is due to the unexpected outcomes associated with gas nationalization and
indigenous women’s specific issues in land reform. I find that weak neoliberal
commitments do not ensure success, as evidenced with the outcomes of the TIPNIS
conflict and the gas and food subsidies cases. To generalize across cases, neoliberal
commitment plays a role in explaining final outcomes, but structural changes are
necessary preconditions for success and failure. In addition, it bears noting that some
policies are more likely to succeed under strong neoliberal commitment because of the
nature of the demands in the policy. The varied degree of challenge to neoliberalism
represented by the cases highlights that social movements face different political
opportunity structures about different issues. These nuances leave room for further
exploration on these variables.
Finally, transnational literature on social movements gains mixed support from
this study. While international indigenous movements, globalization forces (the IMF and
World Bank), and geopolitical issues are interwoven into the substance of many issues
that concern indigenous women, other factors must come into play before international
forces prove to be highly influential on policy. This finding indicates a weak
contradiction of the scholarship that indicates a somewhat stronger role of international
support (Razavi 2009; Castillo 2006; Lind 2002; Brysk 2000; Albó 2001; Bengoa 2000;
Rice and Van Cott 2006; Yashar 2005; Rousseau 2011; Hernández Castillo 2003; Sierra
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2001, 2007; Kampwirth 2002, 2004; Speed et al 2006). The findings also somewhat
contradict the expectations that globalization and like international forces can effectively
harm indigenous women’s outcomes (Rakowski 1994; Oliveira and Roberts 1994). This
study contributes to the ongoing literature on transnational movements by highlighting
often overlooked facets of international relations in influencing domestic decisions, such
as the role of illegal trade and geopolitical resentment (not U.S.-related). It also
contributes to the international literature by stipulating that there are times when
international influence is more effective than others.

Comments on the Study and Directions for Future Research
The strength of a case study approach to studying indigenous women is found in
several factors: the abundance of qualitative information versus quantitative information,
the ability to trace potential causes, and the appropriateness of case study materials for
the depth of the research question being asked. The question driving this research –why
indigenous women became more successful in the post-liberal period in Bolivia—
necessitates the sort of detailed analysis provided in this dissertation. This method
enables the dissection of various influences on policy outcomes, and finds that
international influences and organizational characteristics do not explain successful
outcomes well by themselves. In addition, the insights into movement repertoires and
accompanying changes in outcomes requires intensive qualitative understanding of the
cultural and linguistic references found within indigenous women’s activism.
Indigenous women’s experiences in Bolivia provide general lessons for
indigenous and other minority movements in Latin America. Especially in terms of the
minority status associated with indigenous people and the legacy of patriarchy affecting
245

women, Bolivia’s policies and indigenous women’s lives reflect common circumstances
in Latin America. Bolivian outcomes have relevance for Peruvian, Chilean, and
Ecuadorian indigenous movements, due to cultural similarities between Andean countries
and similar policy areas of activism. There, indigenous women are also engaged in broad
and ethnic-centered movements regarding the protection of natural resources and native
autonomy. For example, protests over water privatization have raised the question of
consultation rights in Peru, where the executive has vetoed congressional moves to grant
indigenous groups rights to weigh in on agreements with foreign investors (US Water
News Online 2009; Reuters 2009). Other countries have seen campaigns by indigenous
women to include constitutional provisions or other legislation to improve access to
sanitary drinking water emerge, including Colombia (Martinez 2007) and Ecuador (Ortiz
2010). These movements should consider whether the strategies employed by indigenous
women in Bolivia over the Gas Wars and land reform have application in their own
political environments.
The importance of the role of leadership of women has significant lessons for
marginalized groups of women everywhere, and may even apply to other marginalized
groups within mixed-group movements. Gendered (or minority) leadership is especially
relevant to indigenous women in other states of Latin America, due to the consistent
nature of their marginalization there. Bolivian women’s experiences from cases like the
domestic violence law, the second agricultural reform, and the final phase of gas
nationalization may be generalized to predict that marginalized peoples’ social
movements will become more viable where minorities are able to ascend to leadership
roles.
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The domestic violence law and gas nationalization cases exhibit the importance of
networking with broader society, providing a lesson that can be extrapolated to other
social movements of marginalized people. The sometimes- unpredictable role of
networks should be fully explored in the future to see if cases like the gas subsidy
protests and the TIPNIS conflict, where networks introduced problems, produce similar
outcomes. This case may be especially significant for the Mexican Zapatista movement,
which has strong indigenous and transnational ties, but lacks strong networks and
alliances within the state. When, and to what extent, do networks have detrimental effects
on social movement organizations? What ethnic and gendered connotations remain
unsolved by network dynamics? This dissertation has revealed a potential area of
discovery for the literature on social movements and indigenous women’s movements in
particular.
Another feature of organizations that can inform the study of other regions and
social movements of marginalized ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups is the framing
and cultural findings in this research. First, this is a beginning attempt to extend framing
hypotheses beyond explanations of emergence and determine the impact of frames on
outcomes. This research also has more general applications about all social movements,
who must communicate their goals to supporters and participants. This reality requires
further investigation into the linguistic and cultural aspects of social movement
organizing. Do social movements benefit from specific activist language, or does the
hypothesis about general, broad frames apply to some cultures? What types of repertoires
are truly more likely to garner public support? The overlapping goals and frames of gas
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nationalization and gas subsidies in the post-liberal period are important findings about
the complexities of language that should be applied to other movements.
Identified changes in state structure may also be extrapolated to studies of other
Latin American social movements that face governments with similar capacity for change
toward leftist government. Indigenous movements, and perhaps other marginalized
groups (gays, Afro-Latinos, landless people) may be expected to make stronger impacts
under declining neoliberalism or leftist governments due to tendencies toward more
affirmative action measures. Also, cases like land reform, gas nationalization, and the
TIPNIS conflict reflect attempts to balance social justice with environmental and natural
resource pressures, which are similar social movement concerns in other developing
countries. These lessons may apply to indigenous and non-indigenous social movements
in other social movements around the world. Where changes in organization, state, and to
a lesser degree, international factors, are occurring, social movements may have an added
advantage.
Finally, international forces should be analyzed alongside organizational and state
characteristics to analyze their influence. From the coca case to the nationalization of gas,
various international influences are shown to exert very different levels of influence on
the outcomes. The ten cases present a wide number and range of potential international
influences. In addition to the role of international lending agencies, globalization, and
U.S. domination, future research should consider geopolitical issues like territorial,
cultural, trade, and economic tensions between countries.
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Conclusions
The preceding chapters have analyzed the policy outcomes that accompany
organizational, state, and international changes in Bolivia between 1994-2012. While
indigenous women have not always gotten the policies they want in the post-liberal
period, the changes in organizational and state characteristics witnessed during this era
seem to provide more favorable conditions for policy success. The observations in this
study indicate some support for the resources and state hypotheses, while leaving in
question the exact role of frames of activism and international forces. In essence, high
amounts of resources, weak neoliberal commitments and political opportunities are vital
components to creating success for indigenous women’s policy efforts. Most important
among these are the state variables, particularly opening political opportunity structures.
The investigation of frames created by indigenous women does not present firm
conclusions about their influence on policy. But this research gains relevant insight into
the identity, cultural, and activist messages of indigenous women, which are analytically
and practically useful. Indigenous women now play a more important role in leading
movements, and do so while broadcasting an identity of indigenous femininity. These
intersectional assertions of power by indigenous women have coincided with increased
political influence. Indigenous women’s experience in Bolivia illustrates that there is a
complex but meaningful relationship between language and empowerment. At a
minimum, we must understand this relationship to grasp the purpose behind indigenous
women’s organizing. To the more optimistic, we could understand the evolving language
to mean that indigenous women have achieved a great deal of empowerment just by reclaiming ethnicity and embracing gendered issues. Framing likely affects policy
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outcomes in more indirect ways than captured in this research, and has demonstrated
importance in the way women organize. While indigenous women petition governments
for items that affect them personally, they have also successfully mobilized on issues that
reflect broader societal and international concerns. The scope and range of their successes
in policy outcomes point to the fact that governments, and social scientists, should pay
attention to what indigenous women are saying.
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Questions Asked of Qualitative Data—Chapter 3
1. Were women able to amass significant resources for mobilization?
2.

Was there evidence of strong female leadership?

3. Were frames and discourses consistent with broader public interests?
4. Did the state structure produce political openings for indigenous women?
5. Were indigenous women able to take advantage of political openings?
6. What factors of the international environment entered social movement discourses?
7. Were NGOs engaged in social movement discourses? What were their contributions?

How have they changed over the time period in question?
8. Do social movement organizations show solidarity networks with other organizations

or groups?

9. Are social movements encouraged or discouraged by increasing or decreasing public

support?
10. Does neoliberalism moderate, hinder, or promote success of women in indigenous

movement?
11. Do leftist qualities moderate, hinder, or promote success of women in indigenous

movements?

Questions Asked of Qualitative Data –Chapters 4, 5, and 6
1. Did the action taken by government address any specific claims made by IW?
a. If action addressed IW claims, was it publicly cited as a response to IW?
2. Did the action taken by government address non-indigenous issues supported by IW?
3. Were framing frames representative of a broader population?
4. Were networking/alliance capabilities mentioned as a contributor to success?
5. Were within-organization dynamics conducive to indigenous women’s specific claims?
6. Were movement activities able to garner public support?
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7. Did opponents within society attempt to influence the decision-making process?
8. Was the economic program of the administration conducive to meeting IW claims?
a. Were statements made that indicated tensions between economic policy and
demands of IW?
b. Were issues that produced tension between economic policy and IW resolved
in
favor of IW?
9. Was the international economy a significant factor in IW claims and government
response?
a. Did actors reference globalization as a hindrance or an aid to their claims?
b. Were lending conditions a hindrance to the claims of IW?
c. Was international political influence cited as an important factor?
d. Was international political influence a resource for IW?
e. Was international political influence a topic of contention?
f. Did international political organizations support or oppose government’s
stance?
g. Were international political accords a resource for IW
Did government response address these accords specifically?
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